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The purpose of the dissertation was to analyze the development of 
the Spanish American societies and rural Spanish America in historical 
and comparative perspective. Locating the dissertation in the context 
of the debate over whether the Latin American societies should be 
defined as "pre-capitalist or capitalist?," the author reviews the 
dualist and development of underdevelopment theses as presented by 
Jacques Lan&ert and Andre Gunder Frank, respectively. And noting the 
critiques offered by Eugene Genovese, Ernesto Laclau and F. Stirton 
Weaver, the author proposes that the historical development of the 
Spanish American societies and rural Spanish America be analyzed 
in terms of the social relations of production and the class structures 
to which they give rise. Several chapters are then devoted to 
analyzing the development of rural Spanish America: historically, in 
the context of the respective national societies of Spanish America 
and the developing world economy, and comparatively, as suggested by 
Cristobal Kay, with Eastern Europe.
The thesis of the dissertation is: That the Spanish American
societies have - until recently - been characterized by the domination 
of pre-capitalist ruling classes and that rural Spanish America has 
been characterized by the persistence of pre-capitalist, predominantly 
seigneurial social relations of production and domination. And, that 
the underdevelopment characteristic of the Spanish American societies, 
and, in particular, rural Spanish America, has been the historical
v
product of that persistent seigneurial domination. Furthermore, it 
is argued, the participation of the Spanish American societies in the 
changing and expanding world economy of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had the combined effect of strengthening that 
seigneurialism at the same time that it furthered the development of 
capitalism in those societies. Thus, the Spanish American societies 
experienced the contradiction of combined, or heterogeneous, 
development (i.e. the coexistent expansion of seigneurialism and 
capitalism) which, during the twentieth century - under the impact of 
the world crises - generated the populist (multi-class) alliances 
which have seriously challenged the pre-capitalist domination of the 
Spanish American societies and the persistence of seigneurialism in 
rural Spanish America.
INTRODUCTION
Life must be lived forward, but 
can only be understood backward.
- Kierkegaard
In 1957, the International Labor Organization published a study 
on the agrarian structure of Latin America.*- This study indicated 
that there were three main types of land tenure patterns in contemporary 
rural Latin America. The first type was the coranunal landholding, 
apparently a survival from pre-conquest society. The second type was 
the latifundia, a product of the conquest and colonization of America 
by Spain and Portugal. And the third type was the family-farm land- 
holding, characteristic of Europe: the result of the migrations to
Latin America from Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
3
centuries.
The communal and latifundia land tenure types had, it appeared, 
persisted for centuries. Often, the communal lands and the latifundia 
lands did not exist in isolation from each other, but had, in fact, 
been involved in a continuing struggle over land and labor within a 
latifundia-minifundia tenure pattern. Rural Spanish America from the 
sixteenth century (and earlier) to the twentieth century might be
Vrhis dissertation is restricted to an interpretation of Spanish 
America, focusing primarily on Mexico, Peru, and Chile, with more than 
occasional reference to Bolivia and Venezuela.
international Labor Office, The Landless Farmer in Latin 
America, New Series no. 47 (Geneva, 1957).
ibid., pp. 1-2 .
1
described in terms of persistence and continuity. But, as C. Wright
Mills once wrote:
Rather than 'explain' something as a persis­
tence from the past,1 we ought to ask 'why has 
it persisted?' Usually we will find that the 
answer varies according to the phases through 
which whatever we are studying has gone; for 
each of these phases we may then attempt to 
find out what role it has played, and how and 
why it has passed on to the next phase.^
And yet, since the 1930's, there have been major changes in the 
Spanish American countryside: Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile and 
Peru have all experienced (or are experiencing) major reforms of 
their agrarian structures.-* A common element in these reforms has 
been the diminution of the latifundia as a land tenure type in favor 
of greater peasant landholding.
However, that major changes have finally occurred in rural 
Spanish America does not negate the question 'why did the agrarian 
structure persist?' Rather, the whole issue is provided with new 
significance. By rephrasing the question of persistence as 'why was 
there no change?' and posing it opposite the question 'why have there 
recently been major changes in rural Spanish America?,' it becomes 
very apparent that persistence and change must be studied in relation 
to each other, rather than in isolation.
^C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), p. 154.
5"...generally understood to mean a set of institutions, norms 
(both written and unwritten) and social, political, and economic 
relationships governing the access to and use of land as a productive 
resource." Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Introduction" in Stavenhagen, ed., 
Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1970), p. 3.
3The study of continuity and change Is essential In the study of
development. And if "historians should stress continuity over change"®
while "sociology is an attempt to understand the direction of change,
then the integration of history and sociology - whose relationship
Peter Berger has called "symbiotic,"® must be achieved for an
appreciation of development. At the same time, it must be remembered
that we are not referring "to the dull little padding known as
'sketching in the historical background,"'^ but rather that:
...the use of such a perspective goes beyond
the notion of 'historical background' to the
theoretical comprehension of development and 
underdevelopment as historical processes.*-®
Nevertheless, history has been excluded from the field of 
development studies; probably because of sociology's eagerness to both 
break with the "evolutionism" of its theoretical origins (which has 
been seen as an historical approach) and also to "establish its own 
academic credentials. "*•*■ The contradiction has been that the rebel­
lion from history has not only been at the expense of understanding
^Stanley Stein and Barbra Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 189.
^Philip Abrams, "The Sense of the Past and the Origins of 
Sociology," Past and Present, no. 55 (May 1972), p. 18.
Q
Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Garden City: Anchor 
Books, 1963), p. 169.
9Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 154.
lOHenry Bernstein, ed., "Introduction." Underdevelopment and 
Development: The Third World Today (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 
p . 15.
^Abrams, "The Sense of the Past," p. 25.
412persistence, but also - by necessity - it has been at the expense of
understanding change. Thus, an understanding of development has been
jeopardized, if not sacrificed:
As a reaction to the concept of an inevitable 
succession of stages, social scientists have 
turned anti-historical - erecting a barrier 
between social change and social development.
The historical development of rural Spanish America has been 
characterized by persistence, continuity and, since the 1930's, major 
change. The challenge of this dissertation is to explain that per­
sistence and change, and, thus, to seek to further understanding of
the development process in Spanish America. As the historian,
E.H. Carr, once wrote:
A historically-minded generation is one which 
looks back, not indeed for solutions vrtiich
cannot be found in the past, but for those
critical insights which are necessary both to 
the understanding of its existing situation 
and to the realization of the values which it 
holds.14
An Outline of the Study 
This dissertation is an attempt to interpret persistence and 
change in rural Spanish America in historical and comparative perspec­
tive, and to relate the issue of persistence and change to the subject 
of development and underdevelopment.
^Which, in fact, many critics in the discipline claim has been
just the opposite, i.e. sociology has been stuck on equilibrium studies.
l^Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory 
and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), p. 37.
^Edward Hallett Carr, The New Society (Boston: Beacon Press,
1957), p. 18.
Basically, the thesis presented herein is, that the Spanish 
American societies have - until recently - been characterized by the 
persistence of precapitalist ruling classes15 and that rural Spanish 
America has been characterized by the predominance of precapitalist, 
seigneurial relations of production and domination.1^ Furthermore, it 
is argued, the underdevelopment characteristic of the Spanish American 
societies,1  ^ and in particular rural Spanish America, has been the 
product of that persistent precapitalist, seigneurial domination.
Chapter One, "A Debate and A Thesis," locates the issue of per­
sistence and change in rural Spanish America within the debate 
"feudalism and/or capitalism in Latin America?," as represented by the 
"dualist" and the "development of underdevelopment" theses. Following 
a critique of these two theses, seigneurialism and capitalism are 
defined for the purpose of historical analysis and the thesis of this 
study is presented in more complete form.
Chapter Two, "Spanish Seigneurialism," examines the changes in, 
and yet persistence of, seigneurialism in Iberian Spain in order to 
locate the origins of Spanish American seigneurialism as an 
historico-social formation.
Chapter Three, "Colonial Development in Comparative Perspective," 
examines the persistence of, and changes in, Spanish seigneurialism 
produced by the conquest and colonization of America, and places the
15The term, precapitalist ruling classes, does not include all 
non-capitalist ruling "classes," e.g. the ruling bureaucracies of the 
communist states.
16See pages 26-27.
^Generally understood to be the lack of economic growth via 
industrialization.
6development of Spanish American seigneurialism in historico-coraparative 
perspective with Eastern Europe, which also experienced the persistence 
of seigneurialism in this period of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.
Chapter Four, "Spanish American Seigneurialism," follows the 
persistence and expansion of seigneurialism as a mode of production 
and domination during the first half of the nineteenth century and the 
establishment of Spanish American independence; and examines Spanish 
American seigneurialism as a mode of production characterized by the 
social relations between a dominant landowning class and a dependent 
peasantry.
In Chapter Five, "National Development in Comparative 
Perspective," Spanish America is again placed in comparative perspec­
tive with Eastern Europe in order to examine the decline of seigneur­
ialism as a result of the development of capitalism, and to understand 
the divergent paths that their respective agrarian structures followed 
as a result of the specific class alliances which emerged during the 
period of transition.
Finally, in the "Conclusion," the dissertation is summarized 
with reference to the theses presented, and an attempt is made to 
indicate the limitations of this study and to propose further areas 
of research to be pursued.
Note on Methodology
It would be easy to fall upon the quote of Paul Sweezy and say
18"aLl sociology worthy of the name is historical sociology."
18Mills quoting Sweezy, The Sociological Imagination, p. 146.
7However, in order to present the methodology of this dissertation, a 
few more words on "historical sociology" seem essential.
It has already been stated that the objective of this disserta­
tion is to confront the questions (or dual question) "why did the 
agrarian structure persist and why has there recently been change?"
In order to accomplish this task, the Spanish American societies and 
their rural sectors must be placed in historical, comparative perspec­
tive, i.e. they must be examined through the phases of their 
historical development.
Analyzing the historical development of a society (or institu­
tion, community, etc.) is the task of historical sociology.^ The 
method of historical sociology is the application of social science 
theory to the research and evidence of the historian. To quote Mills, 
"The production of historians may be thought of as a great file indis­
pensable to all social science,"^® Directly relevant to the use of 
historical works in sociology is Seymour Martin Lipset's citing of 
T.H. Marshall's statement:
Another criticism which has been levelled at the 
sociologist's attempt to generalize by comparing 
the histories of several nations is that he must 
inevitably rely extensively on secondary authori­
ties without going back to the original resources.
T.H. Marshall, one of the deans of British socio- 
logy, has justified this practice: Nothing is more 
unreliable than the first-hand account of an
^Seymour Martin Lipset, "History and Sociology: Some Methodolo­
gical Considerations," in Lipset, Revolution and Counter-revolution: 
Change and Persistence in Social Structure (Garden City: Anchor Books, 
1970), pp. 3-36. In this article, Lipset states: "A significant source 
of the renewed interest in historical and comparative sociology has 
been the emergence of the body of inquiry which has been called the 
sociology of development." (p. 5)
^^Mills, The Sociological Imagination, p. 145.
8eye-witness, nor more liable to deceive than 
diaries and correspondence whose authors 
thoroughly enjoyed writing them. And even the 
accounts of treasurers cannot always be accepted 
as representing the final and absolute truth.
It is the business of historians to sift this 
miscellaneous collection of dubious authorities 
and to give to others the results of their 
careful professional assessment. And surely 
they will not rebuke the sociologist for putting 
faith in what historians write.21
If there is a tradition which the methodology and interest of
this dissertation would pretend to fit, it is the traditional concern
22of the classical sociologists for historical social change, and the
renewed interest among historians and social scientists in unifying
23the study of the past and the present.
In particular, this dissertation subscribes to the proposal of 
the French historian, Fernand Braudel. Braudel, directing himself to 
the issue of unifying the social sciences and history, proposed that 
the unification begin through the study of the "long term" and 
" d u r a t i o n . I n  this way, he hopes that historians will be able to 
move away from merely focusing on the short-term, the individual and
^^-Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Ration: The United States 
in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Garden City: Anchor Books, 
1967), p. 10. T.H. Marshall quoted from Sociology at the Crossroads 
and Other Essays (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 36-37.
^T h e  classical sociologists, Karl Marx and Max Weber, studied 
history to understand the meaning of change in their respective 
presents.
^ I n  more recent times, there has been a renewed interest in 
historical social change, exemplified by the work found in the 
journals, Annales (French), Past and Present (British), and Comparative 
Studies in Society and History (North American).
2%ernand Braudel, "History and Social Sciences," in Peter Burke, 
ed,, Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe: Essays from Annales
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 11-42.
9the event, and social scientists, who often make pretensions to
trans-historical analysis, will return to the study of historical 
25society:
The past can only be told as it truly ijj not 
was. For recounting the past is a social act 
of the present done by men of the present and 
affecting the social system of the present.
25Ibid., p. 13,
2 fiImmanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: 
Academic Press, 1974), p. 9. Wallerstein explains that this should 
not be at the cost of objectivity.
CHAPTER I
A DEBATE AND A THESIS
A major debate among students of Latin America has been the 
issue of whether Latin American society, and in particular rural Latin 
America, should be termed pre-capitalist or capitalist. The 
persistence of the debate has been due to several reasons.
The first reason is that the many participants in the debate 
have not all defined the term capitalism in the same manner. Thus, 
although they may be analyzing the same society (or societies) they 
are not using the same criteria. This problem of definition has been 
compounded by the fact that the participants in the debate have rarely 
made explicit the definitions they are using in their analyses.
A second reason, closely related to the first, is that the many 
analyses carried out and the propositions which have been stated are
often focusing on different levels, i.e. some arguments in the debate
1 2 focus on the region, others on the nation, and others on the inter-
national system. It is possible that contradictory conclusions which
were reached about Latin America would not have been reached had the
^■Josue de Castro, Death in the Northeast (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1966).
o
Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970).
3
Immanuel Wallerstein, "Rise and Future Demise of the World Capi­
talist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, vol. 16, no. 4 (September 1974), pp. 387-415.
10
11
same level of analysis been used in each case. At the same time, the 
case of similar definitions, at different levels of analysis, resulting 
in opposing conclusions, can guide analysis in search of the cause of 
this contradiction.
Still a third reason for the persistence of the debate over pre­
capitalism vs. capitalism in Latin America is that this issue is not 
merely an academic one. Political and social change strategies, for­
mulated by both revolutionaries and reformers, have been constructed 
according to the particular framework of social organization believed 
to exist in the respective Latin American societies. It has been 
written that:
Modes of definition embody particular assumptions 
and concerns and give rise to particular methods 
and uses. It is one of the peculiarities of social 
science that its concepts and the activities of its 
practitioners themselves enter the field of study.
Thus, political and governmental coalitions, peasant mobiliza­
tions and agrarian reforms, development programs and projects have 
often depended on the definitions used and the conclusions reached in 
the debate over capitalism in Latin America.
Definitions of Capitalism
Before examining the major arguments in the debate, it is impor­
tant to review the particular definitions of capitalism which exist in 
historical and sociological research. Maurice Dobb, the late British 
economist and economic historian, wrote that there have been "three
^Henry Bernstein, ed., Underdevelopment and Development, p. 14.
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separate meanings assigned to the notion of capitalism."'*
The first definition of capitalism, according to Dobb, is the
one proposed in the writings of Werner Sombart and Max Weber. Sombart
sought the meaning of capitalism in a particular unity of the "spirit
of enterprise" or adventure, and the "bourgeois spirit" of calculation
and rationality:^
...we must trace the origin and growth of the 
capitalist spirit...we dissect the whole into 
its component parts, and we shall turn our 
attention chiefly to two, the spirit of enter­
prise and the bourgeois spirit which when united 
generated the capitalist spirit... The spirit of 
enterprise is a synthesis of the greed of gold, 
the desire for adventure, the love of exploration 
... The bourgeois spirit is composed of calcula­
tion, careful policy, reasonableness, and economy.
Max Weber also referred to a particular world view which he
called the "spirit of capitalism," and in his work he sought to
differentiate modern capitalism from capitalisms of the past and other
geographic regions, i.e. the spirit of capitalism was not merely the
quest for wealth, but rather the quest for wealth according to
rational conduct and a rationalistic economic ethic:
The impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, 
of money, of the greatest possible amount of 
money has in itself nothing to do with capi­
talism. This impulse exists and has existed 
among waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, 
prostitutes...gamblers and beggars. One may 
say it has been common to all sorts and 
conditions of men at all times and all countries
%aurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New 
York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 4.
^Ibid., pp. 4-5.
^Werner Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the 
History and Psychology of the Modern Business Man, trans. M. Epstein 
(London: T. Fisher and Unwin, 1915), p. 22.
of the earth... Cthisd Unlimited greed for gain 
is not in the least identical with capitalism, 
and is still less its spirit. Capitalism may 
even be identical with the restraint, or at 
least a rational tempering, of this irrational 
impulse. But capitalism is identical with the 
pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit, 
by means of continuous rational, capitalistic 
enterprise.®
The second definition is the one which identifies capitalism
with production for the market, particularly distant markets. Thus,
Henri Pirenne located the origins of capitalism in the twelfth
century, amongst a developing class of merchants:
In actual fact, the capitalistic spirit made 
its appearance simultaneously with conmerce 
...it began in conformity with the stimulus 
which it received from the outer world - with 
long range trading and the spirit of big 
business... it was dominated by the capitalist 
spirit... Those who initiated and directed 
and expanded the commerce of Europe were a 
class of merchant-adventurers.
Thus, for Pirenne, capitalism is commerce. In fact, he wrote:
Of one thing we may be absolutely sure, that 
these men were inspired by a greedy spirit of 
profit-seeking. We must not think of them 
simply as respectable folk doing their best 
to make both ends meet. Their one object was 
the accumulation of wealth. In this sense, 
they were animated by the capitalist spirit, 
which the rudimentary psychology of our modern 
economists would have us regard as something 
highly mysterious, born in penury or Calvinism.
With these words, Pirenne attempts to sweep aside the work of
®Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 
17. It will be argued later that equating Weber's work with Sombart's 
may be to misread it.
%enri Pirenne, A History of Europe, 2 vols. (Garden City: 
Anchor Books, 1958), vol. I, p. 196.
10Ibid., p. 195.
Sombart and Weber and their notion of a particular synthesis of profit
seeking and rationalism, and argues that capitalism originated in a
"greedy merchant-class - not among god-fearing calvinists."
Related to the definition of capitalism offered by Pirenne is
that of Karl Polanyi, which equated capitalism with the market economy
reaching its height in the nineteenth century. Polanyi wrote:
Neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile 
conditions was there, as we have shown, a 
separate economic system in society. Nineteenth 
century society, in which economic activity was 
isolated and imputed to a distinctive economic 
incentive, was indeed a singular departure. ^
This definition of capitalism is today found in similar form
amongst a particular school of economic anthropologists who focus on
market and exchange relationships. Thus, capitalism is defined as
increasing complexity in the market, whereby the range of transactions
is enlarged through the monetization of the economy.^
The third definition of capitalism, according to Dobb, is the
one traditionally identified with the work of Karl Marx. In this case
capitalism, and other historical forms of society, are identified by
the "social relations between men which result from their connections
13with the process of production." Thus, to quote Dobb:
Capitalism was not simply a system of production 
for the market, but a system under which labour- 
power had itself become a commodity and was bought 
and sold on the market like any other object of 
exchange. Its historical prerequisite was the
^Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1957), p. 71.
12cyril j. Belshaw, Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965).
l^Dobb, Studies, p. 7.
15
concentration of ownership of the means of 
production in the hands of a class, consisting 
of only a minor section of society and the 
consequential emergence of a propertyless class 
for whom the sale of their labour-power was their 
only source of livelihood. Productive activity 
was furnished, accordingly, by the latter, not 
by virtue of legal compulsion, but on the basis 
of a wage contract.
Or, as Marx himself wrote:
...two very different kinds of commodity 
possessors must come face to face and into 
contact: on the one hand, the owners of money, 
means of production, means of subsistence, who 
are eager to increase the sum of values they 
possess, by buying other people's labor; on the 
other hand, free laborers, the sellers of their 
own labor power, and therefore the sellers of 
labor. Free laborers, in the double sense that 
neither they themselves form part and parcel of 
the means of production, as in the case of slaves, 
bondsmen, etc., nor do the means of production 
belong to them, as in the case of peasant 
proprietors... ■*
This definition of capitalism, based on the analysis of the 
social relations of production, has been termed the "materialist con­
ception of history," while the "spirit of capitalism" approach has 
often been posed in opposition to it as the "idealist" argument. Thus, 
Marxian theory has often been countered with what has been called 
"Weberianism." However, not all social scientists have viewed the 
Marxian-Weberian dialogue as necessarily a conflict. In their work in 
social psychology, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills recognized this and 
wrote that:
I^bid,
^Karl Marx, "Excerpts from Capital: A Critique of Political 
Economy." Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, 
ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 161.
16
For both Karl Marx and Max Weber, in contrast 
to both Simmel and Sombart, "modern capitalism" 
is anchored in the sphere of production.
Accordingly, the historical emergence of modern 
capitalism is not seen as a quantitative expan­
sion of markets, but as the emergence of the 
factory as a productive unit or, in Weber's 
terms, of a rational organization of formally 
free labor for the continuous acquisition of 
profits... Marx focused on the labor supply...
Weber was more interested in the origins and 
psychology of...Cthe3 middle class 
entrepreneur.
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, his 
classic work on the origins of capitalism, Weber wrote that: "The
Occident has developed...a very different form of capitalism which has 
appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization of for­
mally free labor."17 Therefore, the significance of Weber's work in 
relation to that of Marx was, perhaps, not to argue against it, but 
rather to understand the psychological and socio-cultural dimensions 
of the development of capitalist society.
There are, then, three definitions of capitalism which have 
predominated in historical and sociological theory:
1) capitalism as a specific "spirit of livelihood;"
2) capitalism as production for a market, i.e. commercial enterprise 
for profit; and
3) capitalism as a particular historical formation in which the owners 
of the means of production hire labor from a propertyless class
^Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Character and Social Structure: 
The Psychology of Social Institutions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World - Harbinger Books, 1964), p. 214.
^Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 21, As indicated above, Weber 
sought to differentiate "modern capitalism" from other capitalisms.
See Gerth and Mills, Character, pp. 215-223.
which has nothing to offer for sale but that labor.
The methodological and theoretical significance in the choice of a 
particular definition of capitalism will become apparent in the 
following discussion of the debate over the characterization of the 
Spanish American societies as pre-capitalist or capitalist.
The Debate
In the debate over whether Latin American society and its rural 
sector should be characterized as pre-capitalist or capitalist, there 
have arisen two dominant theses, which can be termed the "dualist 
thesis" and the "development of underdevelopment thesis."
The dualist thesis originated in the work of the Dutch
economist, J.H. Boeke.^ Cyril Belshaw, in Traditional Exchange and
Modern Markets, explains that:
The notion of dual economy implies that within 
one political framework, there is one sector 
which operates according to the principles of 
modern capitalism. This sector is commercially 
sophisticated, linked with international trade, 
dominated by motives of maximization... Opposed 
to this sector and separated from it is the 
traditional peasant economy, which, according 
to the purist form of the theory, is conserva­
tively oriented, interested in security and 
continuity rather than change, not concerned 
with maximization of profit or resource use, 
oriented towards the satisfaction of social 
needs rather than reacting to international 
forces, and incapable of engaging dynamically 
in trade and commerce.^0
l^The definition of capitalism used in this dissertation is that 
favored by Marx, see p. 26.
19J.H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies 
(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953).
^^Belshaw, Traditional Exchange, p. 96.
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According to this thesis, the dual society is, in fact, two 
separate societies with their own laws of dynamics and change. 
Supposedly, the interaction between the two societies (of the dual 
society) is minimal.
The dualist thesis applied to Latin America is best represented
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by the work of Jacques Lambert. According to Lambert, the majority 
of the Latin American countries is characterized by social dualism, 
which exists when "the population is divided between archaic and 
developed forms of social organization." He indicates three forms of 
social dualism: regional dualism, rural-urban dualism, and rural 
dualism.22 Regional dualism is characterized by Brazil, where the 
southern region is modern and developed and the northeast is archaic 
and underdeveloped; and by Peru in the contrast between the coast and 
the sierra.23 Rural-urban dualism exists throughout Latin America and 
is supposedly increasing "to the point where there may be a 'break' 
between the rural and urban s o c i e t y . T h e  third form of dualism is 
rural dualism which, in Latin America, refers to the difference 
between the plantation and the hacienda.^ The plantation, according 
to Lambert, is typified by the coffee fazendas of Sao Paulo, sugar 
plantations of the Caribbean and the coast of Peru, and fruit farms of 
Central America - as well as many cattle estancias of Argentina and
Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structures and Political 
Institutions. trans. Helen Katel (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967).
^Jacques Lambert, Os Dois Brasis (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editors 
Nacional, 1967).
24i,ambert, Latin America, p. 85. 25IjJi(j., p< 7]^
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Uruguay. He contrasts these "capitalist" agricultural investments to
the "feudal" haciendas of pre-revolutionary Mexico and Bolivia,
highland Peru, northeast Brazil and other regions of Latin America.^
Lambert differentiates between the two types of latifundia, plantation
and hacienda, by whether they are market-oriented or not. He finds
that the plantations often concentrate on a single-crop for export,
while the haciendas are not so commercially-oriented, but rather tend
27
towards self-sufficiency. He further states that the plantation's 
commercial orientation leads it to establish modern, capitalist labor 
relations, i.e. hired labor on wage contracts, while the hacienda's 
relations of production are feudal in nature because of its basically 
non-commercial orientation.
Thus, Lambert argues that rural dualism (and dualism in general 
in Latin America) results from the fact that some landholdings, the 
plantations, are commercially-oriented and involved in the market 
economy, while other landholdings, the haciendas, are not commercially 
oriented, nor involved in the market economy, and that these respec­
tive orientations are the product of their owners' motivations.
In contrast to the dualist thesis, there is the development of 
underdevelopment thesis which was formulated by Andre Gunder Frank.
Actually, Frank proposed the development of underdevelopment thesis to 
counter the dualist thesis, which he felt was ahistorical. According 
to Frank, one cannot talk of "feudalism" in Latin America because Latin
^Ibid., pp. 72-73. ^Ibid., pp. 68, 72.
2ftAndre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America (London: Penguin Books, 1971) and Latin America: Underdevelop­
ment or Revolution? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
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America has been capitalist since the Conquest. It is Frank's argument 
that, in fact, Spain and Portugal were capitalist in 1500 and, thus, 
any analysis of rural Latin America must be seen in the framework of 
capitalism.^9 in his research and writings, Frank has sought to show 
that, historically, those regions which are today most "backward" and 
characterized by isolation from the market were, at one time, most 
involved in commercial relations, e.g. northeast Brazil, highland 
Peru, and Bolivia, and other regions.**0 Thus, according to Frank, the 
backward regions of contemporary Latin America are the product of the 
development of underdevelopment, which is the result of the contradic­
tions of capitalist development, i.e. the development of Western 
Europe and the United States has been at the expense of Latin America 
and the rest of the Third World. Frank's thesis is based, in part, on 
the work of Paul Baran, the economist, who argued that the Third 
World's underdevelopment must be viewed in relation to the development 
of the advanced capitalist countries.^ Frank writes:
Economic development and underdevelopment are 
the opposite faces of the same coin. Both are 
the necessary result and contemporary manifes­
tation of internal contradictions in the world 
capitalist system... One and the same historical
29Luis Vitale, the Argentine historian, in his research has 
also argued that Spain and Portugal were capitalist societies and, 
thus, the idea that Spain or Portugal transplanted feudal societies to 
the Americas is out of the question. His thesis is based on a defini­
tion which equates "natural economy with feudalism" and "money economy 
with capitalism." Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist?" in 
James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., Latin America: Reform or 
Revolution? (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1968), pp. 32-43.
30Ibid.
■^Paui Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (London: Penguin 
Books, 1972). In particular, chapters 5, 6 and 7 on the "Roots of 
Backwardness."
process of the expansion and development of 
capitalism throughout the world has simultan­
eously generated - and continues to generate 
- both development and underdevelopment.^^
Frank, like Lambert, defines capitalism on the basis of Whether 
or not the society, region or community, is involved in - or has been 
involved in, market and commercial activity. According to this 
definition, Frank finds that all of Latin America has been actively 
participating in capitalist economy and, therefore, the Latin American 
societies can only be termed capitalist.
The debate over feudalism vs. capitalism in Latin America deals, 
in effect, with the issue of persistence and change. According to 
Lambert's dualist thesis, the persistence of "feudalism" in rural 
Latin America is due to the non-coranercial orientation and lack of 
integration of those regions and/or enterprises in the national/inter­
national economy. Frank's development of underdevelopment thesis 
takes the opposite view. According to Frank, the persistent "back­
wardness" of those regions which Lambert termed "feudal" is actually 
due to their historical commercial activity and integration in the 
world economy.
Of course, one must ask how it is possible that the two theore­
tical frameworks arrive at different, even contradictory, conclusions, 
especially when Lambert and Frank have defined capitalism in the same 
way. That is, both the dualist thesis and the development of under­
development thesis define capitalism in the manner proposed by 
Pirenne, i.e. "is production being carried out for the market?"
To a certain extent, the issue can be termed the "problem of
■ ^ F r a n k ,  Capitalism and Underdevelopment, p. 33.
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sociology without history and history without sociology." Lambert's
analysis was based on contemporary Latin America and projected into
the past, leading to ahistorical conclusions. Thus, Lambert's weak
historical analysis placed his thesis in jeopardy, or as Rodolfo
Stavenhagen has written:
There is no doubt that in all the Latin American 
societies great social and economic differences 
exist - between rural and urban areas, between 
Indian and non-Indian populations, between the 
mass of peasants and the urban and rural elites, 
and between the very backward and the relatively 
developed regions.
Nevertheless, these differences do not 
justify the use of the concept of dual society 
for two principal reasons. First, the relations 
between the "archaic" or "feudal" regions and 
groups and the "modern" or "capitalistic" ones 
represent the functioning of a single unified 
society of which the two poles are integral 
parts; and second these two poles originate in 
the course of a single historical process. ^
At the same time, Frank's historico-economic analysis, and its 
emphasis on Latin America's integration in the world economy fails to 
provide us with an explanation for Latin America's structural hetero- 
geneity on the level of national social organization. Frank's argu­
ment that the Latin American societies cannot be termed dual societies 
because of Latin America's Integration in the world economy, although 
admittedly with historical and regional variation, does appear more 
tenable than Lambert's, considering the evidence. However, by focus­
ing his analysis on the level of the world economy, he does not
33Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies about Latin America," in 
Petras and Zeitlin, eds., Latin America, pp. 16-17.
Alberto Martinelli, "Dualism in the Analysis of Underdevelop­
ment," International Journal of Sociology, vol. 4, no. 2-3 (Fall 1974), 
pp. 23-26,
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provide us with a framework within which we can understand the histo­
rical development of particular Latin American societal structures and 
regional variations in social organization.
As well as the problem of "sociology without history and history
without sociology," there is the problem of "definitional weakness" in
the debate over capitalism in Latin America. Maurice Dobb has
commented that:
The justification of any definition must 
ultimately rest on its successful employment 
in illuminating the actual process of histo­
rical development; on the extent to which it 
gives a shape to our picture of the process 
corresponding to the contours which the 
historical landscape proves to have.
With this in mind, the problem of definitional weakness in the 
debate over capitalism in Latin America can be recognized in Dobb's 
critique of the definition of capitalism proposed by Sombart and 
Plrenne:
Both Sombart's conception of the capitalist 
spirit and a conception of Capitalism as pri­
marily a comnercial system share the defect, 
in common with conceptions which focus atten­
tion on the fact of acquisitive investment of 
money, that they are insufficiently restrictive 
to confine the term to any one epoch of history, 
and that they seem to lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that nearly all periods of history 
have been capitalist, at least in some degree.^
Thus, in a similar fashion, we can see that by using the defini­
tion of capitalism which Lambert and Frank seem to utilize, we could 
be led to conclude that both contemporary Europe and pre-Columbian 
Mesoamerica have been capitalist societies."^
■*"*Dobb, Studies. p, 8. "^Ibid.
^Something which neither scholar would wish to suggest.
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A related criticism of Frank's thesis, that the Latin American
societies are necessarily capitalist by virtue of their integration in
the world economy, has been made by a number of historians and social
scientists. Ernesto Laclau has written that in "the debate over
1 feudalism vs. capitalism'... its protagonists have constantly confused
the two concepts of the capitalist mode of production and participation
38in a world capitalist economic system." ° Similarly, although not
necessarily directed at Frank, the following statement by Eric J.
Hobsbawm is relevant:
...while in many ways Detroit and Cuzco are today 
part of a single system of functional inter­
relationships (for example, part of one economic 
system) few would regard them as part of the same 
society, sociologically speaking. ^
In the same vein, but in this case directed specifically at
Frank's work, Eugene Genovese has written:
What Frank cannot understand - and this failure 
steins from his singular concern with economics... 
is that it is one thing to argue that European 
capitalism has intruded itself into every part of 
the world and has exploited and subjugated the 
most diverse peoples, societies, and social systems; 
but it is quite another thing to argue that there­
fore every such people, society, or social system 
has become one more variant of bourgeois culture.
And, with greater reference to the issue of development, F. 
Stirton Weaver has directed the following criticism at both traditional
^®Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," 
New Left Review, no. 67 (May-June 1971), pp. 36-37.
•^Eric j, Hobsbawm, "From Social History to the History of 
Society," Daedalus, vol. 100, no. 1 (Winter 1971), p. 30.
^Eugene Genovese, "The Comparative Focus in Latin American 
History" in Genovese, In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in 
Southern and Afro-American History (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 
pp. 385-386.
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international economic development theory and the development of under­
development thesis which located itself in supposed opposition to the 
former:
The real problem is the narrowness of the 
economic terms in which the argument is con­
ducted; it simply does not include a sufficient 
view of social process to make historically 
valid generalizations about the impact of 
foreign trade and investment on economic 
development. 1
Later, he added (which, to a certain extent, introduces the
method of historical analysis to be used in this dissertation):
Although inter-nation transfers of economic 
surplus is useful for understanding the 
benefits accruing to the developed capitalist 
trading and investing nations, it is too fra­
gile to bear so much of the burden of explana­
tion for the more complex "development of 
underdevelopment." The extreme wealth of 
Latin American appropriating classes through 
history is potent prima facie evidence against 
"capital scarcity" and "too poor to save" 
explanations of economic stagnation. The use 
of economic surplus, not merely its quantity, 
must be the center of attention, and this 
necessitates class analysis.
Actually, what these criticisms appear to be moving towards is, 
as Genovese proposes, "a redefining of capitalism. From being under­
stood as merely a system of economic relations, it must be understood 
as a social process."4^ And, following Marx, (Weber), and Dobb, 
Genovese argues that such a "redefinition of capitalism" should begin 
by focusing analysis on the mode of production of the society and the
4 *T. Stirton Weaver, "Positive Economics, Comparative Advantage, 
and Underdevelopment," Science and Society, vol. 35, no. 2 (Summer
1971), p. 171.
42Ibid., p. 176.
4^Genovese, "The Comparative Focus," p. 387.
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social relations which compose it. To operationalize his proposition,
Genovese suggests that the following definitions of "seigneurialism"
and "capitalism" be used:44
Seigneurialism is here defined, following Marx 
and Dobb, as the mode of production characterized 
by a dependent labor force that holds some claim 
to the means of production. This definition makes 
seigneurialism roughly equivalent to serfdom, but 
not exactly so, for it includes regimes in which 
the lords' claims on the economic surplus are met 
by payments in money or kind, as well as in labor 
services. Capitalism is here defined as the mode 
of production characterized by wage labor and the 
separation of the labor force from the means of 
production, that is, as the mode of production in 
which labor power itself has become a commodity.
He explains that:
The great value of this viewpoint lies in its 
focus on the human relationships inherent in 
labor systems. As such, it should be understood 
to transcend mere economic categories and to 
define each mode of production as a social rather 
than as a narrowly economic system.4^
These are the definitions upon which the historical and
44Genovese's work has been devoted to analyzing (U.S.) Southern 
plantation society and the master-slave relationship, placing it in
comparative perspective with the slave regimes of the Caribbean and
South America, particularly Brazil.
4^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders Made (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1971), p. 16. Genovese's use of the term seigneurialism 
instead of feudalism is explained:
"The substitution represents a grudging, long-resisted 
capitulation to those medieval historians who bitterly 
complain about the expropriation of one of their favorite 
terms. Since feudalism continues to define a particular, 
fairly well delineated political system...the dual meaning 
causes unnecessary trouble. As Marx and Dobb themselves 
show, the mode of production they call feudal does not 
require the political system of the same name, although 
some kind of rough historical correlation may be made.
The term "selgneurial" expresses the essentials of that 
mode of production and avoids the difficulty." (p. 16)
46Ibid., p. 17.
sociological analysis of this dissertation will be based. From a 
study of the social relations of production, analysis can proceed to 
the class relations and structure of the society, which are based on 
those social relations of production.
Frank appears to have recognized that his emphasis on economic 
relations required further grounding in social class analysis. Thus, 
his argument that Spain and Portugal were capitalist societies in 1500 
was refined and he proceeded to describe Iberian society as "merchant 
capitalism," in which the merchant class becomes the dominant class in
/ *7
the society. Therefore, his argument that Spain and Portugal were 
capitalist societies remained intact.
However, if we are going to define capitalism as a specific
historical form of social relations, is there a "merchant capitalism?"
Maurice Dobb responded to this issue with the following:
If we are speaking of Capitalism as a specific 
mode of production, then it follows that we 
cannot date the dawn of this system from the 
first signs of the appearance of large-scale 
trading and a merchant class, and we cannot 
speak of a special period of "Merchant 
Capitalism" as many have done. We must look 
for the opening of the capitalist period only 
when changes in the mode of production occur, 
in the sense of direct subordination of the 
producer to the capitalist. This is not just 
a point of terminology, but of substance; 
since it means that if we are right, the appear­
ance of a purely trading class will have of 
itself no revolutionary significance; that its 
rise will exert a much less fundamental influence 
on the pattern of society than will the appear­
ance of a class of capitalists whose fortunes are 
intimately linked with industry; and that while a 
ruling class, whether of slave owners or feudal
^ S e e  James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson, 
Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy 
(Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972).
lords, may take to trading or enter Into a class 
alliance with traders, a merchant class, whose 
activities are essentially those of an inter­
mediary between producer and consumer, it is 
unlikely to strive to become a dominant class 
in quite that radical and exclusive sense of 
which we were speaking a moment ago. Since its 
fortunes wilL tend to be bound up with the 
existing mode of production, it is more likely 
to be under an inducement to preserve that mode 
of production than to transform it. It is likely 
to struggle to "muscle in" upon an existing form 
of appropriating surplus labour; but it is unlikely 
to try to change this form.^-®
Max Weber, in his research, stated:
...we shall see that at the beginning of modern 
times it was by no means the capitalistic entre­
preneurs of the comnercial aristocracy, who were 
either the sole or the predominant bearers of the 
attitude we have here called the spirit of capi­
talism. It was much more the rising strata of 
the lower industrial middle classes.
And Gunnar Myrdal has noted that: "Trade by itself...rather 
tends to have backwash effects and to strengthen the forces 
maintaining stagnation or regression.
Thus, the appearance of an active and aggressive merchant class 
is - according to our definition and analytical method - insufficient 
to characterize a society as capitalist, because it will not 
necessarily entail the development of capitalist social relations.
In fact, neither does the appearance of a bourgeoisie itself, 
whose further progress would seem dependent on the expansion of
^®Dobb, Studies, pp. 17-18. Also, see the work by Dobb, ed., 
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (New York: Science and 
Society, 1954).
^^Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 65.
50Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions 
(New York: Harper and Row - Torchbooks, 1971), p. 53.
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capitalist social relations - both as an enlarged market and an 
enlarged labor supply, necessarily guarantee the transformation of a 
society from seigneurialism to capitalism. Eric Hobsbawm, in discus­
sing the European crisis of the seventeenth century, has shown that 
large-scale production of a capitalist nature developed early in some 
regions, but at the same time the rising bourgeoisie of those regions 
was immobilized by a still-strong seigneurial structure of society.
And Genovese has similarly Illustrated, in his work on the slave 
South, that the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie was immobilized
52to the point of becoming strong supports of the slaveholders' regime. 
Thus, it can, perhaps, be argued that it is not merely the appearance 
of a "capitalist class" which forwards the development of capitalism 
to the extent that it becomes the dominant mode of production, but 
rather, as one historian has written: "Capitalism, as a mode of pro­
duction, does not attain great strength until the disintegration of 
feudalism reaches an advanced s t a g e . T h e r e f o r e ,  rather than resort 
to the "promiscuous application of class l a b e l s , t h e  uniqueness of 
social classes in their specific historical and national context must 
be recognized.
■^Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in 
Trevor Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe. 1560-1660 (Garden City: Anchor 
Books, 1967), pp. 15-19.
-^Eugene Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1967).
“^ Joseph T. Fuhrmann, The Origins of Capitalism in Russia: 
Industry and Progress in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972), p. 257.
^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders Made, p. 19.
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A Proposition and A Thesis
This work, in approaching the issue of persistence and change in 
rural Spanish America, will follow the method of analysis which focuses 
on the social relations of production and the class relations and 
social structure which develop from them; recognizing that such an 
analysis must be carried out in the context of the national societies 
of which the rural sectors are a part. At the same time, those 
national societies were originally the product of a common source, the 
expansion of Spain, and they have developed, and are developing, 
within the developing world economy, which together provide a frame­
work for a comparative analysis and perspective.
Stated formally, the thesis of this dissertation is: That the
Spanish American societies have - until recently - been characterized 
by the domination of pre-capitalist ruling classes and rural Spanish 
America has been characterized by the persistence of pre-capitalist, 
predominantly seigneurial social relations of production and 
domination. And that the underdevelopment characteristic of the 
Spanish American societies, and in particular rural Spanish America, 
has been the historical product of that persistent seigneurial 
domination. Furthermore, it is argued, the participation of the 
Spanish American societies in the changing and expanding world economy 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had the combined 
effect of strengthening that seigneurialism at the same time that it 
furthered the development of capitalism in those societies. Thus, the 
Spanish American societies experienced the contradiction of combined, 
or heterogeneous, development (i.e. the coexistent expansion of 
seigneurial and capitalist social relations of production), which
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during the twentieth century - under the Impact of the world crises 
- generated the populist (multi-class) alliances which have seriously 
challenged the pre-capitalist domination of the Spanish American 
societies and the persistence of seigneurialism in rural Spanish 
America.
Although we have been highly critical of both Lambert's dualist 
thesis and Frank's development of underdevelopment thesis, they have 
made valuable contributions to Spanish and Latin American development 
studies. Lambert's dualist thesis recognized the coexistence of 
seigneurial and capitalist social relations in Spanish America. On 
the other hand, Frank's development of underdevelopment thesis has 
recognized that Spanish (and Latin) America have participated in the 
world economy with historical and regional variation. Nevertheless, 
we will argue - on the basis of class analysis - that the underdevelop­
ment characteristic of Spanish America, and in particular rural 
Spanish America, has been due neither to a supposedly non-commercial 
orientation of the Spanish American landowning classes, nor caused by 
the Spanish American societies' participation in the world economy.
In view of our criticism of the dominant theses of Spanish 
America's historical development, i.e. the dualist thesis and the 
development of underdevelopment thesis, there are a number of ques­
tions which remain unanswered or require re-evaluation in terms of the 
method of analysis to be used herein. The following questions can, 
therefore, serve as a guide to this dissertation and the argument of 
the thesis presented:
1) What was the nature of Iberian-Spanish society at the time of 
the Conquest, and what role did it play in the creation of
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conquest societies in. America?
2) What was the nature of the societies which developed during
the colonial period and established their independence in the
nineteenth century, and what were the dominant social relations 
in the rural sector?
3) What was the impact of the changing and expanding world
economy of the nineteenth century, followed by the world 
crises of the twentieth century, on the Spanish American 
societies and their rural sectors?
4) And, considering the changes of this century in Spanish America,
and particularly in rural Spanish America, what role did the
social relations of production play in generating those changes?
CHAPTER IX
SPANISH SEIGNEURIALISM
The discovery of America, the rounding of the 
cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising 
bourgeoisie. The East Indian and Chinese 
markets, the colonization of America, trade 
with the colonies, the increase in the means 
of exchange and in commodities generally, gave 
to commerce, to navigation, to industry an 
impulse never before known, and thereby, to 
the revolutionary element in the tottering 
feudal society, a rapid development.*
Although it was Spain which discovered and conquered America, 
thus enlarging the European world economy and providing further 
stimulus to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, it was not 
Spain which was to undergo this revolutionary change. The new markets 
available and the wealth which was generated did not instigate the 
social changes necessary to develop capitalism in Spain, rather they 
merely served to support the persistence of the seigneurial regime 
which had developed.
In turn, it was not capitalism which conquered and colonized 
America,^ for if it had been capitalism, the development of America 
would have proceeded differently. Spanish America inherited from 
Iberia the social relations of seigneurialism, although admittedly
^Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International 
Publishers, 1948), pp. 9-10.
^i.e. Spanish America. For Portuguese America, see Genovese, 
The World The Slaveholders Made.
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cast with a mercantilist orientation.^ Thus, to understand seigneuria­
lism in rural Spanish America, analysis must begin in Spain, set in 
the Mediterranean world^1- and the product of the Reconquista.’*
The Reconquista's impact on the historical development of Spain 
is a debate unto itself. But within that debate there seems to be 
agreement that the nature and the longevity of the struggle impeded 
the development of classical medieval feudalism.®
At the same time, the error should not be made of assuming that 
the weakness of feudalism made the victory of capitalism easier. In 
fact, one might argue the contrary, i.e. that the strength of the 
monarchy would not depend as much on an alliance with the nascent 
bourgeoisie to subjugate the nobility to its authority. Thus, although 
feudalism (political) would not have developed, seigneurialism (socio­
economic) and its inhibition of capitalism would not be seriously 
challenged by such an alliance. Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz wrote:
It has been stated that Spain never knew 
feudalism, and some have affirmed that it 
didn't know the Renaissance either. For 
two decades I have insisted many times 
about an absence no less transcendent:
Ji.e. commercial orientation.
^On the significance of Spain's geographical, economic and socio- 
historical position in the Mediterranean, see Fernand Braudel, The 
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. 2 
vols. trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). One 
reviewer has written: "His vision of Latin America as part of the 
sphere of Mediterranean interest is pregnant with new insights and 
directions for research." (Thomas Glick, Hispanic American Historical 
Review, vol. 54, no. 1 (February 1974), p. 160.)
^The period of the Reconquista can be seen as having stretched 
from 711-1492.
®See Marc Bloch, Feudal Society. 2 vols. (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1961).
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Spain lacked a bourgeoisie.^
The Reconquista produced an Iberia of disunited kingdoms: 
Portugal, along the Atlantic coast, which had finished its reconquest 
earlier than the other Iberian kingdoms, and the Spanish kingdoms, 
which by -the late fifteenth century were to come under the domination 
of Aragon and Castile.
Aragon commanded Mediterranean Spain, and in the latter period
of the reconquest had developed a commercial empire, along with
Catalonia. This Catalan-Aragonese conmercial empire supported a ruling
class of merchants and a small nobility. J.H. Elliott has written:
The success of the Catalan-Aragonese commercial 
system brought prosperity to the towns of the 
Crown of Aragon and helped to consolidate power­
ful urban patriciates. These, in practice, were 
the real masters of the land, for, apart from a 
handful of great magnates, the nobility of the 
Crown of Aragon was a small-scale nobility, unable 
to compare in territorial wealth with its 
counterpart in Castile.®
Merchant classes, as Maurice Dobb has argued, are not the revo­
lutionary bourgeoisie which has been attributed with the transformation 
of societies from feudalism to capitalism. The Catalan-Aragonese 
merchants are further proof of the statement:
One feature of this new merchant bourgeoisie 
that is at first as surprising as it is 
universal, is the readiness with which this 
class compromised with feudal society once its 
privileges had been won.®
^Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, Espana: un enigma historico. 2 vols. 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1962).
®J.H. Elliott, Imperial Spain: 1469-1716 (New York: Mentor Books, 
1963). Also, for a description of the Catalan-Aragonese economy, see 
Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain, trans. F.M. Lopez- 
Morillos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
^Dobb, Studies. p. 120,
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Thus, the "new nobility" of merchants in the Crown of Aragon 
invested their profits in land, in order to collect the seigneurial 
rents of the peasantry, as did the "old nobility."
In Aragon (and Catalonia) the major institution of the seigneu­
rial structure was remenca. The remenca-peasantry constituted up to 
a third of the population,^ and:
...they were for the most part bound to the soil, 
unable to leave or dispose of the farms they held 
without the lord's consent; their rights over their 
personal property, and their privileges of marriage 
and inheritance were seriously limited by seig­
niorial interference; and they staggered under a 
heavy burden of dues of various sorts, which were 
payable in money, labor, and kind, and were imposed 
in most vexatious ways.
The lot of the Catalan peasantry was exceptionally hard under
the seigneurial regime, due to the particular regional variation of
1 2remenca which included the seis malos usos - six evil customs.
Thus, Aragon and Catalonia, although highly mercantile and inte­
grated into the Mediterranean world economy, remained seigneurial on 
the essential level of the social relations between the ruling nobility 
(old and new) and the working peasantry. While the Crown of Aragon was 
commercially oriented and involved in the Mediterranean, the Crown of 
Castile continued with the reconquest of Iberia and pushed its domain
^Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 37.
H-Roger Bigelow Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the 
Old World and the New. 3 vols., vol. 1, The Middle Age (New York: 
Macmillan, 1918), p. 477. Also, for the legal history of seigneuria­
lism, see Alfonso Marfa Guilarte, El Regimen senorial en el siglo XVI 
(Madrid: Institute de Estudios Politicos, 1962).
^Ibid., p. 478. The six evil customs gave the lord greater 
control over the peasant's property and, in some local areas, included 
the traditional (and infamous) seigneurial privilege of first night 
with the peasant's bride 1
southward. The Reconquista for Castile "was at once a crusade against
the infidel, a succession of military expeditions in search of plunder
and a popular m i g r a t i o n . T h e  'tradition of conquest1 which Castile
maintained through the continuing battles in southern Spain was to
lend itself to the later conquest and colonization of America.
J.H. Parry, in his classic, The Spanish Seaborne Empire, wrote:
In Andalusia the Castilians developed their 
own domestic imperialism and formed the habits 
of conquest and settlement which they would 
inevitably, sooner or later, seek to exercise 
beyond the boundaries of Spain. ^
Southern Spain, conquered by Castile, was carved into vast 
landed estates and distributed to the nobility as their reward for 
participating in the s t r u g g l e . A l o n g  with their estates and juris­
dictions, the Castilian nobility secured a "numerous and extremely 
docile peasant population.
In Aragon, the merchants and nobles secured an agrarian labor
^Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 31.
Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (London: Penguin Books,
1973), p. 8. Parry also notes the significance of the Castilian con­
quest of southern Spain and the capture of Seville, "The richest, most 
productive and most civilized territory in all Spain, the greatest and 
most industrious city, a thriving port which was to become the gateway 
to Atlantic trade and discovery, became incorporated in Castile, the 
most warlike, the most powerful, economically, and socially the most 
backward kingdom in Spain. A whole armoury of new weapons had been 
placed in the hands of the successors of the Cid."
l^Edward Malefakis, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in 
Spain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Malefakis discusses 
land tenure and labor relationships and emphasizes the impact of the 
Reconquista on the modern agrarian pattern,
■^Parry, The Spanish, p. 4. Also, "A docile peasantry is a 
source of strength and weakness to a strong ruler who can organize its 
capacity for labor and taxes, but under a weak and disintegrating 
government such a peasantry will, without much spontaneous resistance, 
render passive obedience to an invader from outside."
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force and taxes from the remenca-peasantry. In Castile, there was 
also a seigneurial system of lordship over the peasantry known as 
senorio de solarlego (which persisted into the seventeenth century), 
Varying, according to the amount of land owned by the lord, "its 
principal feature was that the vassals EpeasantsU obtained inheritance 
rights from their lords in exchange for dues or services."17
Seigneurialism in Aragon and Castile took different juridical 
forms; however, the essential features were similar in both kingdoms. 
The peasants were subject to feudal-seigneurial labor services and 
dues, owed to the nobility (or merchant aristocracy) which dominated 
landholding as well.
In the century prior to the Spanish conquest of America, Spain 
itself was taking shape. During the fourteenth century, the 
Mediterranean world economy had suffered a severe crisis, which has 
been termed a "crisis of feudalism" by many economic and social 
historians.18 ^ result of the crisis was a decline in the economic
strength of the seigneurial nobility involved in the Mediterranean 
world economy.^
However, the economic crisis and the weakening of the seigneurial 
nobility did not lead to the collapse of the feudal-seigneurial 
regimes. Rather, as a result of the economic crisis, many merchant
^There was a second type of senorio called senorio libre or 
behetrfa, however, it eventually became indistinguishable from senorio 
de solariego. See Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 67.
*-®Ruggiero Romano and Alberto Tenenti, Los Fundamentos del mundo 
moderno: edad media tardea, renacimiento. reforma (Mexico: Siglo XXI,




families purchased landed estates with their wealth and bought their
Of)
way into the nobility, u and:
tended inevitably to transform themselves into 
aristocracy, a new part of the aristocracy that 
sought to inherit and almost always succeeded 
in doing so, the privileges - all the privileges 
- of the old aristocracy.^^-
The Spanish seigneurial structure maintained itself by being
9 9open and available to the mercantile class which sought entry into it. 
Social mobility, i.e. movement from the merchant class to the aristo­
cracy (and the seigneurial power and privilege it provided) was 
possible and appears to be a characteristic of Spanish society at this 
time. Luis Suarez Fernandez, in his research, has commented:
From time to time a new man appeared and 
immediately poured all his energies into 
founding a mayorazgo, into creating a noble 
house; it cannot be said, therefore, that 
the oligarchy was a closed one. The great 
lords served as a model for a large number 
of nobles of an intermediate type... They 
were highly conservative, and their conser­
vatism was directed above all toward the 
economic structure which allowed them to 
develop their power. They can be called 
capitalists only in the sense they they had 
been able to accumulate enormous sums of
money.23
20There have even been hypotheses that the crisis in the 
Mediterranean economy was due, in part, to the merchants' preference 
to 'seigneurialize' themselves rather than expand their commercial 
activities or involve themselves in manufacturing.
^Romano and Tenenti, Los Fundamentos. p. 69. The authors ask 
if it should be termed neo-feudalism.
22See Stanley Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal. 2 vols. 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), vol. 1, p. 270, on the 
possibilities for "ennoblement."
^Luis Suarez Fernandez, "The Kingdom of Castile in the Fifteenth 
Century" (1964) in Roger Highfield, ed., Spain in the Fifteenth 
Century: 1369-1519 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 97.
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Following the crisis of the fourteenth century, the fifteenth 
century was a period of decline in the Catalan-Aragonese economy and 
commercial empire in the Mediterranean. The economic and comnercial 
decline of the Crown of Aragon generated conflict between the classes, 
and a civil war broke out. Meanwhile, Castile was laying the founda­
tion for its eventual dominance in Iberia and the future Spanish 
empire overseas.
The economic crisis of the fourteenth century had led many of 
the Catalan merchants to place their wealth in agrarian estates and to 
seigneurialize themselves. When the crisis of the fourteenth century 
was followed by the comnercial decline of the Catalan-Aragonese economy 
in the fifteenth century, the merchant-nobility (as well as the older 
nobility) made increased demands on the remenca-peasants, generating
n /
peasant uprisings. Urban socio-political conflict was also breaking 
out between the merchant elite and the class of ’’artisans, craftsmen, 
producers, and exporters who were seeking greater political equality 
and more protective tariffs against foreign competition."^
In the third quarter of the century, full-scale civil war
erupted in the towns and in the countryside:
The landlords in the countryside who wished to 
preserve their social privileges over their 
backward serfs,... tended to link hands with the 
merchant oligarchs and form a combination.^
These struggles were, in great part, limited to the principality
24payne, A History, vol. 1, p. 165. Also, see the work of Pierre 
Vilar on Spanish economic development, particularly La Catalogue dans 
l'Espagne moderne (Paris: 1962).
25pierre Vilar, Spain (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1967), p. 9.
^^Roger Highfield, "introduction," in Highfield, Spain, p. 18.
of Catalonia, the roost commercially-oriented region of the Aragonese 
Crown. (It was the Catalanese peasantry and townspeople who most 
immediately felt the commercial decline and the increased exactions 
made by the merchant nobility.)
The Crown's Involvement in the struggle tended to support the 
popular-urban classes and the peasantry. The Aragonese monarchy was 
hoping to further tame the nobility by reducing its seigneurial power 
and privileges. Thus, attempts were made to set the remenca-peasantry 
free. The nobility (old and new) attempted coups against the monarchy 
at the same time that it sought to crush the rural and urban 
rebellions. In the 1470's, the monarchy gained the victory and the 
nobility swore allegiance to the Aragonese Crown.
The civil war had further weakened Aragon's economy at the time 
when Spain was finally moving towards unification under a Castilian- 
Aragonese partnership. Thus, Castile was to dominate the partnership. 
Also significant was the fact that the weakened Catalan merchant class 
was unable to effectively compete with their Genoese comnercial 
rivals, which meant that the Spanish economy, on the eve of its empire- 
building, was to be heavily infiltrated by foreign commercial interests. 
Later, in 1492, with the expulsion of the Jews, the Italian merchants 
were further able to extend their activities. As Elliott has written:
This Genoese predominance decisively influenced 
the course of sixteenth century Spanish development.
If the Catalans rather than the Genoese had won the 
struggle for entry into the Castilian commercial 
system, the history of a unified Spain would have 
taken a profoundly different turn. '
^Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 38. With regard to Italian 
influence and involvement in Spain's economy and overseas expansion, 
see Charles Verlinden, The Beginnings of Modern Colonization (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1970), especially chapters 6 and 7,
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Ferdinand of Aragon, who had married Isabella of Castile (thus, 
at least uniting the Crowns in one family) issued the Sentencia de 
Guadalupe in 1486, which finally set the Catalanese peasantry free 
from remenca and the six evil customs. The nobility maintained owner­
ship of the land, but the peasants were guaranteed usufructuary rights 
on the payment of a fixed rent,'*® i.e. "...it very cleverly gave the
O Q
peasant effective possession of his land."
Some historians, eager to locate capitalism in the Spanish past,
have emphasized these political events in Catalonia, and the Crown's
o n
support of the popular classes; however, a more accurate reading of 
the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella reveals the uniqueness of the 
Catalonian case (even within the Crown of Aragon). In fact, "...if 
anything, the reign of the Catholic Kings was characterized by an
O 1
increase in the social and economic power of the great nobles.
It is true that Ferdinand and Isabella sought to tame the
political power of the nobility:
...feudal castles were destroyed, private wars 
were declared illegal... The audiencia, or high
court of justice, frequently presided over by
the monarchs themselves, became the supreme 
judicial body, and with the establishment of 
minor audiencias in local districts royal justice
2®Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 79; Payne, A History, vol. 1, 
p. 177; and Vilar, Spain, p. 19.
^Vicens Vives, An Economic History, p. 294. He adds, "Ferdinand 
the Catholic's accomplishment was truly democratic, for it gave some 
50,000 individuals access to a fair-sized property. This is why there 
have not been, up to the contemporary period, any attempts at agrarian 
revolt in Catalonia."
®®Luis Vitale, "Latin America," pp. 32-43.
®*-Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 109.
made deeper inroads on the private law of the 
feudal lords.^2
However, the united monarchy followed a 'dual policy' toward the 
nobility:
While reducing it to political obedience on the 
one hand, the crown fully ratified its social 
and economic predominance on the other. J
During the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, 95% of the population 
"lived in the country and were peasants" and yet, "the nobles owned 
97% of the territory of the Peninsula, either directly or by jurisdic­
tion. xhe monarchy 'ratified' the socio-economic strength of the 
seigneurial nobility through a variety of politico-legal decisions and 
actions. Following the conquest of the kingdom of Granada, the 
Catholic Kings carved up the new territories into vast landed estates 
for the nobility. Later, under the Laws of Toro (1504), the monarchs 
"confirmed and extended the right of establishing mavorazgos;" the
right of hereditary transmission which entailed property to the
36first-born of a family.
A major political economy decision of the united monarchy was
37its support of the Mesta, ' the guild of sheepowners. Through several
32john Lynch, Spain Under The Hapsburgs. vol. 1, Empire and 
Absolutism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 5.
^Payne, A History, vol. 1, p. 270.
3^Lynch, Spain Under, vol. 1, p. 12.
35yicens Vives, An Economic History, p. 295.
■^Ibid., p. 296. The monarchs also approved a policy of 
matrimonial ties which produced further land concentration. Lynch, 
Spain Under, vol. 1, pp. 13-14.
37julius Klein, The Mesta: A Study in Spanish Economic History. 
1273-1836 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920).
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cedulas (edicts) the monarchy gave the Mesta 'right of way' to Spain's
countryside, in preference to agriculture, e.g. edicts expelling
fanners from certain lands, communal and private, and banning 
enclosures in certain regions, like the kingdom of Granada.-*®
The policy of supporting the Mesta at the expense of agriculture 
is further proof that it is not merely the 'search for profit' which 
provides the impetus for capitalist development, because, in fact, it 
was the monarchy's eagerness to collect the revenues from the pastoral 
interests and wooltrade rather than promote agriculture and await its 
return which led it to make those decisions. Furthermore, it was the 
nobility which had the biggest stake of all, because many nobles had 
been converting their lands to pasture to take advantage of the market 
in a way which needed little investment of money and manpower.
For these reasons, Richard Herr has written:
After Ferdinand and Isabel brought order to
Castile, the clergy and aristocracy no longer
posed a direct threat to the crown, but the 
kings did little to reduce the wealth of these 
groups or the income they obtained from the 
commoners over whom the crown had given them 
seigneurial jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the nobility was no longer classically feudal, in a 
political sense; however, its socio-economic strength unchallenged - if
' J O
~>°The importance of enclosures appears even more significant if 
we recall the role of enclosures in the development of capitalist 
agriculture in Britain. On capitalist agricultural development in 
Britain, see R.H. Tawney, The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth Century 
(London: Longmans, 1912).
39see Vicens Vives, An Economic History, pp. 303-304, and Lynch, 
Spain Under, vol. 1, p. 17.
^Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974), p. 41.
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not increased - the harnessing of the nobility might better be called 
an association than a subjection. Perhaps the transition can be 
termed one of feudal-seigneurialism to aristocratic-seigneurialism, 
i.e. reducing the nobility's political prerogatives, but assuring the 
perpetuation of its socio-economic power and privilege.
The peasantry of Spain could no longer be referred to as serfs
in a legal sense because they were no longer bound to the land by
feudal laws, i.e. they were permitted to change their residences.
However, remembering that the nobility possessed 97% of the land
through ownership and seigneurial jurisdiction, the words of one
historian that "this freedom meant only the freedom to die of
h u n g e r , c a n  be properly understood. The peasantry could move about,
but it was merely able to move from one seigneurial estate (or
jurisdiction) to another, and as Elliott points out:
The land was worked by peasants who had probably 
been compelled to borrow in the first instance 
to secure a plot, and then found their meagre 
earnings drastically reduced by tithes, dues 
Cseigneurial3 and taxes. After this, it only 
needed one or two bad harvests to make them 
fall hopelessly into debt.
Thus, by the sixteenth century, the seigneurial regime had come 
to be based on two foundations: seigneurial jurisdictions and land- 
ownership. At times, the two were so closely intertwined that they
t
became indistinguishable. The peasantry owed dues to the nobility
41vicens Vives, An Economic History, p. 299.
^ E l l i o t t ,  imperial Spain, p. 115. Those two bad harvests came 
early in the sixteenth century - 1502 and 1509!
^Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, The Golden Age of Spain: 1516-1659. 
trans. James Casey (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 155-161.
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for the right to cultivate lands of the estates and as subjects of the 
seigneurial jurisdictions.
Sixteenth century seigneurialism in Spain had acquired new 
features, and like Spanish seigneurialism historically, it persisted 
because it was flexible. It remained available to successful merchants 
and, like a chameleon, responded to the rise of the united monarchy in 
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Of course, one historian 
has admitted: "To break this power Cthe seigneurial lords * 3 would have 
been a formidable task and it could hardly be done in a single 
generation."^
Where was the Spanish bourgeoisie during these crucial years of
the rise of the united monarchy and the development of a united Spain?
Richard Herr has written: "Most lacking of all was a middle class
engaged in commerce and manufacture."^ And another historian wrote:
It was undoubtedly because of this pervasive 
seigneurial economy that Castile did not succeed 
in creating industry... This inability to create 
an industry was reflected in the social order.
There was no bourgeoisie conscious of itself as 
a class which might oppose the nobility.
There have been recent attempts to counter this view of the 
absence of a bourgeoisie lacking in class consciousness,^ however, 
debate continues over whether the Comunero movements of 1520-21 were 
urban attempts to maintain their medieval privileges, or social
^Lynch, Spain Under, vol. 1, p. 13.
^Herr, An Historical Essay, p. 47.
^Suarez Fernandez, "The Kingdom," p. 85.
^7juan Ignacio Gutierrez Nieto, Las Comunidades como movimiento 
antisenorial (Barcelona: Editorial Flaneta, 1973).
movements of a revolutionary nature against the persistent seigneuria­
lism which inhibited the development of capitalism. In any case, the 
movements failed, and as Marx recognized:
While the aristocracy drowned in decadence 
without losing its most noxious privileges, 
the cities lost their medieval privileges 
without gaining modern power.
The Crown's policy towards the nascent bourgeoisie and the
merchant class had already manifested itself prior to the Comunero
uprisings. During the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the monarchy's
policy was to favor, if not instigate, the establishment of guilds
amongst the producing groups, and consulates for the merchants. More
for the purpose of regulation than protection, its effect on the
development of capitalism and the rise and spread of industry in Spain
was negative. In the words of the economic historian, Vicens Vives:
At the end of the 15th and beginning of the 
16th centuries, just at the moment when all 
Europe was starting to break loose from the 
guild, Ferdinand the Catholic put the 
corporative strait-jacket on the Castilians. "
The definitional level of the social formation has been posited 
as the social relations of production. However, of major significance 
are the ideology, culture and social psychology of the respective 
classes comprising the Spanish social structure and economy for the 
way in which they help to shape the relations between the social
classes and to support or reject the rule of the dominant class. As
Irving Zeitlin has written:
^®Karl Marx, "La Espana revolucionaria," in Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels, La Revolucion en Espafla (Moscow: Editorial Progreso,
1974), p. 12.
^Vicens Vives, An Economic History, pp. 308-309.
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Weber's work must not be read as a repudiation 
of Marx's methodological principles, but rather 
as a 'rounding out' and supplementing of his
method.50
Spanish nobles based their wealth, privilege, power and prestige 
on mayorazgos and senorios. Did the bourgeoisie, which in sixteenth 
century Spain was the merchant class and a number of petty industria­
lists, reject these symbols? On the contrary, wha' Fernand Braudel 
calls the "treason of the bourgeoisie"-^ and Ruth Pike "this passion 
for hidalgu£a"52 wag the bourgeoisie's eagerness to enter the aris­
tocracy by purchasing estates, creating mayorazgos, and securing 
seigneurial jurisdictions, both for economic reasons and for the 
social prestige they provided.
John Lynch explains that the absence of a middle class in Spain
could be attributed to the social prejudice against trade and the odium
attached to business and manual work - "el^  deshonor de trabalo. " ^
These prejudices were probably associated with the prejudices against
Moors and Jews who were associated with crafts, manual labor and
trade. Lynch adds that:
The mania for aristocratic status need not have 
been damaging to Spanish society and economy if 
the newly ennobled, like those of the English
50irving Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological 
Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 112.
^Braudel, The Mediterranean, vol. 2, pp. 725-733.
52RUth Pike, Aristocrats and Traders: Sevillian Society in the 
Sixteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 99.
->3'The dishonor of work.' Lynch, Spain Under, vol. 1, p. 107. 
Also, see William J. Callahan, Honor. Commerce and Industry in 
Eighteenth Century Spain (Boston: Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration, 1972), and Payne, A History, on "Social Psychology," 
pp. 285-286.
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gentry who came from merchant backgrounds had 
remained faithful to business. But it produced 
a contempt for trade and restless anxiety to 
join the aristocracy which were ruinous for 
Spain and her people.^
The supremacy of the nobility, based on the seigneurial regime
it had succeeded in maintaining, was not rejected by the merchant
class and nascent bourgeoisie. The flexibility of seigneurialism
meant, in part, the failure of the bourgeoisie to overcome it. Eric
Hobsbawm, comparing Spanish historical development to that of the
rest of Europe, stated:
Spain is different. Capitalism has persis­
tently failed in that country and so has social 
revolution, in spite of its constant imminence 
and occasional eruption. The problems of Spain 
rise out of its failures, not the successes, of
the past.
The failure of the Spanish bourgeoisie meant failure for the 
Spanish peasantry, which remained subject to seigneurial jurisdictions 
and dependent on the nobles' mayorazgos for land and laboring. The 
seigneurial regime, with the subjection of the peasantry to the 
burdensome 'tithes, due and taxes' and the entailment of landed 
estates in mayorazgos, prevented the development of capitalism and the 
rise of industry in Spain. One historian, in his study of rural 
sixteenth century Spain, has recognized the problem:
It isn't strange. The 16th century has on its 
stage two contradictory ages: that of feudal
54-lbid. In Lazarillo de Tormes. the famous sixteenth century 
picaresque novel, there appears an extremely descriptive quote: "any 
no-good wretch would die of hunger before he would take up a trade." 
Anon., Lazarillo de Tormes. trans. Michael Alpert (London: Penguin 
Classics, 1969).
55Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Spanish Background," chapter 8 in Revo­
lutionaries (New York: New American Library, Meridian Books, 1973), p. 71.
economy, and that of capitalist economy. But the 
passage to the second age...was not to be effected 
completely until the radical destruction of the 
feudal landholding and the liberation of the 
peasantry from seigneurial laws and dues and 
ecclesiastical tithes, transforming them into 
independent producers and c o n s u m e r s . 56
The discovery, conquest and exploitation of American wealth did 
not instigate and generate the further development of capitalism in 
Spain, even though it appears to have stimulated its further growth in 
other parts of Europe. The gold, silver, dyes and other resources 
provided by America could not change the Spanish social structure and 
economy; it could merely act upon the structure which was in the 
process of taking shape. And that structure was seigneurial.
Spanish society persisted in its seigneurial mold into the 
eighteenth century. The movement from basing one's power, wealth and 
prestige on seigneurial jurisdictions to basing it on mayorazgos and a 
dependent peasant labor force had c o n t i n u e d , 57 however, the seigneurial 
jurisdictions were still significant.-*®
There was an attempt at modernization in the eighteenth century 
when the Bourbons replaced the Hapsburgs on the throne of Spain;
5%oel Salomon, La Vida rural castellana en tiempos de Felipe II 
(Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1964), pp. 181-182.
57a .R.M. Carr, "Spain" in A. Goodwin, ed., The European Nobility 
in the Eighteenth Century: Studies of the Nobilities of the Major 
European States in the Pre-Reform Era (London: Adam and Charles Black, 
1953), pp. 43-60, particularly pp. 48-52.
58Richard Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 89-102. In fact, 
Herr points out that in many cases senorio and mayorazgo, because they 
became intertwined on a local basis, almost became indistinguishable 
(p. 95). He also points out that the Church was a major landholder 
and holder of senorios. The ecclesiastical version of mayorazgo was 
mortmain, which meant the land could never be alienated.
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however:
Hie changes In the classical agricultural structure 
of Spain between 1750 and 1850 were achieved by a 
rearrangement of the traditional economy, by its 
expansion in space, but not by any fundamental change.^
The transition to capitalism and the elimination of seigneurialism 
in Spain finally came in the mid-nineteenth century, following the inde­
pendence of Spanish America,®^ And yet, social structures seem to leave
legacies, depending on how they are transformed. The legacy of Spanish
seigneurialism was the latifundia.^l
The Spanish seigneurial legacy also made its impact on America, 
and has persisted there longer - molded to the conquest, colonization 
and particular development of the Spanish American societies.
Pierre Vilar, the French historian, playing on the words of
Lenin,^2 has termed the expansion of Spain into America and imperialism
in Europe as the supreme stage of feudalism, and he has written:
In so far as it instituted the world market and
in so far as it permitted the primitive accumu­
lation of capital, by pouring cheap silver into
Europe, the Spanish Conquest founded a new 
society. Such a society, however, could only 
develop with increased productive forces and 
with new social relationships. This is what 
was to come about in northern Europe. In
^Raymond Carr, Spain. 1808-1939 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), p. 29. Quoted in Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries. p. 73.
GOsome historians link the rising of the bourgeoisie in Spain 
with the crisis of the loss of the colonies. On this, and on the 
transition from seigneurialism to capitalism in Spain, see Josep 
Fontana, Cambio econ6mico y actitudes politicos en la Espana del sjglo 
XIX (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1973). Also interesting is Marx and 
Engels, La Revoluclon en Espana.
6^-Carr, Spain, and Malefakis, Agrarian Reform.
62y.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New 
York: International Publishers, 1939).
Spain, on the other hand or rather in Castile, 
the ruling classes managed the Conquest as they 
had the Reconquista. namely in the feudal manner. 
To occupy land, subjugate the inhabitants, and 
carry off their riches was in no way to prepare 
for investment in the capitalist sense. ^
^Pierre Vilar, "The Age of Don Quijote" in Peter Earle, ed., 
Essays in European Economic History, 1500-1800 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), p. 105.
CHAPTER III
COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Andre Gunder Frank, eager to prove that the conquest of America 
by the Spanish was a capitalist enterprise, has quoted Christopher 
Columbus: "The best thing in the world is gold...it can even send souls 
to heaven," and Hernan Cortes: "The Spaniards are troubled with a 
disease of the heart for which gold is the specific remedy," as 
evidence for his thesis.^-
There is no denying the role of economic motivations in the con­
quest of the New World; however, even Weber recognized that greed 
alone is not the source of the 'capitalist spirit' when he wrote:
Traditional obstructions are not overcome by the 
economic impulse alone. The notion that our 
rationalistic and capitalistic age is charac­
terized by a stronger economic interest than 
other periods is childish; the moving spirits of 
modern capitalism are not possessed of a stronger 
economic motive than, for example, an oriental 
trader. The unchaining of the economic interest 
merely as such has produced only irrational results; 
such men as Cortez and Pizarro, who were perhaps its 
strongest embodiment, were far from having an idea 
of a rationalistic economic life. If the economic 
impulse itself is universal, it is an interesting 
question as to the relations under which it becomes 
rationalized and rationally tempered in such 
fashion as to produce rational Institutions of the 
character of a capitalist enterprise.^
If Iberian-Spanish society at the time of the conquest of America
^■Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, p. 310.
2
Max Weber, General Economic History (New York: Collier Books,
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was seigneurial, although shaped by a developed commerce and an 
increasingly absolute monarchy, then the regime which the Spanish 
colonizers would seek to establish might also be expected to be
3
seigneurial. One historian, in his study of the early colonial
period in Spanish America, commented:
Anthropologists have made us familiar with the 
stubbornness with which people cling to their 
cultural patterns. The Spaniards who carried 
out the conquest brought with them the accumu­
lated social habits of centuries and never 
relaxed in their long effort to impose them 
upon the indigenous population of America.
At the same time, the Spanish conquest and colonization of
America, even if possessed with the seigneurial idea and the intention
of recreating seigneurial relations of production in the new lands and
amongst the colonized peoples, would be subject to the limitations
generated in the encounter with the conquered societies. Eugene
Genovese pointed out that:
A ruling class does not grow up simply according 
to the tendencies inherent in its relationship 
to the means of production; it grows up in 
relationship to the specific class or classes it 
rules.5
Because the Spanish conquistadors and colonizers recognized 
themselves as subject to the Crown and Church of Spain they would also
1961), p. 261. Elsewhere, he wrote that capitalism rested on the 
expectation of profit from peaceful exchange, which Spain's entry into 
America was never accused of being.
^Unless, of course, the Spaniards who conquered and colonized 
Spanish America were refugees or utopianists eager to create a new 
society but, except for rare instances, this was not the case.
^Lesley Byrd Simpson, The Encomienda in New Spain: The Beginning 
of Spanish Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. vii.
^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders Made, p. 5.
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encounter obstacles to their seigneurial ambition from those paramount 
institutions.
Eastern Europe’s Second Serfdom 
It has been noted by historians and sociologists that the "long 
sixteenth century,"** from 1450 to 1650, was characterized by the 
decline of feudalism in Western Europe, the intensification of serfdom 
in Eastern Europe, and the creation of Iberian overseas empires.^ Of 
historico-comparative significance is the simultaneous weakening of 
seigneurialism in Western Europe and its intensification in Eastern 
Europe;® and, as it will be argued, its rise in colonial Spanish 
America.®
^Fernand Braudel, "European Expansion and Capitalism: 1450-1650," 
in Contemporary Civilization Staff of Columbia College, ed., Chapters 
in Western Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 
chapter 8 , pp. 245-288.
^See Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," 
in Trevor Aston, ed., Crisis in Europe: 1560-1660. pp. 5-62. Also 
significant is Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System.
®It is only recently that attention has focused on this possi­
bility for historico-comparative analysis, i.e. comparative analysis 
made within an historically unified framework. A Polish historian has 
commented, with reference to the potential for comparison of Eastern 
and Western Europe: "It seems astonishing that both of these processes, 
which took place at the same time are usually analyzed separately." 
Jerzy Topolski, "Manorial Serf Economy in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Agricultural History, vol. 
47, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 341-352.
^Magnus Morner noted in a recent article that attention has also 
finally begun to focus on the possibilities for comparing Latin America 
and Eastern Europe as frontiers of the Atlantic World. Momer,
"Spanish American Hacienda: A Survey of Recent Research and Debate," 
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 53, no. 2 (May 1973), pp. 
183-216. He cites the work of Mario Gongora, Encomenderos v estan- 
cieros: estudios acerca de la constitucion social aristocrats de Chile 
despues de la Conquista. 1580-1640 (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 
1970), and Cristobal Kay, Comparative Development of the European 
Manorial System and the Latin American Hacienda System: An Approach to
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Freidrich Engels initiated an historical debate when, in a letter
to Karl Marx, he wrote:
I consider the view expounded here Creferring to 
an article by someone else which he was enclosing] 
regarding the conditions of the peasantry in the 
Middle Ages and the rise of a second serfdom after 
the middle of the fifteenth century as on the whole 
incontrovertible.10
The criticism of Engels, and the debate which was generated,
arose over his denotation of the developments in Eastern Europe during
the period under discussion as "serfdom." It was argued that serfdom
could only refer to the Middle Ages in Europe. However, Engels'
response - which seems highly descriptive of Latin America - was:
It is certain that serfdom and bondage are not 
a peculiarly medieval-feudal form, we find them 
everywhere, or nearly everywhere, where con­
querors have the landcultivated for them by 
the old inhabitants. 1
Engels termed the resurgence of Eastern European serfdom the 
"second serfdom" because the resurgence followed upon a period of 
declining seigneurialism, in which capitalist farming had begun to 
develop:
...in the midst of the feudal system, e.g. paid 
employment of the poorer villagers and of day- 
laborers, especially on lands rented by wealthy
a Theory of Agrarian Change for Chile (Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Sussex, 1971).
*-®Engels to Marx, December 15, 1822, Karl Marx, with an Intro­
duction by Eric J. Hobsbawm, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, trans. 
Jack Cohen (New York: International Publishers, 1965), p. 145.
1*-Engels to Marx, December 22, 1822, Ibid., p. 148. Perhaps the 
disagreement over terminology is due to Marx and Engels' being histo­




The original theory proposed to explain the return of serfdom 
and the manorial structure has been termed the "military theory." It 
stated that the nobility began to take a more active interest in the 
rural economy in the late Middle Ages because the changing nature of 
warfare displaced them from the army; thus, they increased their 
demands on the peasantry.^
Comparatively, it might be argued that the same process took 
place in the New World, i.e. the conquest completed, and rapid plunder­
ing no longer possible, the Spanish 'nobles' settled into seigneurial 
relations with the Indians to take advantage of less immediate wealth. 
However, the military theory has been proven inadequate for Eastern 
Europe, and although extremely descriptive for the immediate aftermath 
of the conquest in America, it is incomplete for later colonial 
development.
There were other theories proposed, but recently two theories 
have been favored for their explanatory powers, the "market theory" 
and the "political theory.
The market theory emphasizes the expanding export opportunities 
in Western Europe resulting from the economic development and popula­
tion growth taking place in those countries. Thus, it is argued, the 
nobility began to take advantage of the market opportunities by
12g.p. Pach, "Sixteenth Century Hungary: Commercial Activity and 
Market Production by the Nobles" in Burke, ed., Economy and Society in 
Early Modern Europe, pp. 113-133.
+ 13see Jerzy Topolski, "Manorial Serf Economy," for references to 
works in East European languages.
l^Ibid., pp. 342-343.
demanding increased labor services and eventually proceeding to expand 
the size of the demesne.
The political theory, on the other hand, emphasizes the signifi­
cance of the strong political position of the East European nobility 
and argues that, by virtue of this power, it was able to further sub­
ject the peasantry to seigneurialism, having the state legitimate its 
actions. Jerome Blum wrote:
Among the factors which were present in all of 
the Eastern European lands was the acquisition 
by the nobles of political power in the state, 
which enabled them to reduce the peasants on 
their manors to a position of dependence on 
them.
Blum's emphasis on the factor of political power may be due to 
the inclusion of Russia in his analysis. Russia also experienced a 
renewal of serfdom during this period, some have even claimed it was a 
"first" serfdom; however, Russian agriculture was not involved in the 
export market supplying Western Europe.
In any case, the two theories, the market and the political, are 
not contradictory. The market theory provides the stimulus, or insti­
gating factor, for the nobility to demand increased dues and labor 
service from the peasantry and its heightened interest in demesne pro­
duction. At the same time, the nobility's ability to intensify its 
demands on the peasantry was based on its political domination of the 
state and the relative weakness of a bourgeoisie to effectively 
oppose it.
The intensification of serfdom characteristic of Eastern
15j0rome Blum, "The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe," American 
Historical Review, vol. 62 no. 4 (July 1957), p. 836.
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European lands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not a 
sudden and total reversal of the trend towards capitalist agriculture. 
During the fifteenth century, a period of gradual revival following 
the crisis of the fourteenth, the nobles of Eastern Europe closest to 
the trade routes - particularly the Baltic - recognized the commercial 
opportunity of exporting grains to the west.*-** Thus, in great part due 
to its geographic location, Poland began to expand its export of wheat 
to Holland, England and northern France early in the fifteenth century, 
and as the population continued to expand in the west, Poland's nobles 
found an ever larger market.^
Following Poland's lead in the export market, and responding to 
the rising demand for grain in the west, the nobilities of other East 
European countries took a more active interest in the rural economy 
and their seigneurial holdings and domains. In Hungary, the nobility's 
commercialization occurred in three phases. First, the lords increas­
ingly demanded payment from their peasantry in kind, rather than in 
money. In this way, the lords secured a stronger hold on the market 
early in the sixteenth century. In the second phase, the nobility 
moved into the livestock trade, still leaving the production aspects 
intact. This commercial activity also began early in the century, but 
did not become significant until the middle of the century. Finally, 
the lords began to increase production on their demesnes. The further 
growth of the export market and the coranercial opportunity of supplying
*-6j.H. Elliott, Europe Divided: 1559-1598 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1968), pp. 44-45.
^ I m m a n u e l  Wallerstein, "Three Paths of National Development in 
Sixteenth Century Europe," Studies in Comparative International 
Development. vol. 7, no. 2 (1972), pp. 96-97.
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the King's military forces on the frontiers Instigated production 
expansion onto fallow land and into pasture and forests. Much of this 
expansion took place at the expense of the peasantry's common land.^-® 
"But the exploitation of land demanded the exploitation of labor 
thus, it was necessary to intensify labor inputs - which meant 
increasing the amount of time that the peasants would have to work on 
the demesne:
Whereas in the years 1510-20, one day of compul­
sory labor was the rule, according to the laws of 
1514, and this in fact was not enforced, by the 
middle of the century the situation was very 
different.
Similar patterns took place throughout Eastern Europe; on Bohemia
one historian has written:
During the sixteenth century the lords began to 
acquire and add land to the demesne and to cul­
tivate grain crops for income. By the second 
half of the sixteenth century they began to 
demand more robota from the peasants in order 
to get the increased demesne acreage tilled. ^
Even on the frontier of Europe with the Ottoman-Turk Empire, the 
economic growth of Western Europe made its impact via Eastern Europe
r y * \
and supported the rise of a second serfdom.
The export market stimulated the interest of the nobility in
l^Pach, "Sixteenth Century Hungary," pp. 113-121.
l^Elliott, Europe Divided, p. 45.
20pach, "Sixteenth Century Hungary," p. 122.
21^ William E. Wright, Serf, Seigneur and Sovereign: Agrarian Reform 
in Eighteenth Century Bohemia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1966), p. 9. Robota is similar to corvee. i.e. compulsory labor 
by the peasantry.
^Troian Stoianovich, A Study in Balkan Civilization (New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1967), pp. 78-79, 159-162.
rural economy, but it was the weakness of the opposition which enabled 
the lords to proceed with the second serfdom.
There is little disagreement with the following comment of
J.H. Elliott:
The nobles of the West, while still immensely 
powerful, had seen their seigneurial jurisdic­
tion eroded by the advance of royal justice; 
and although they had managed to infuse urban 
society with many of their own values, they 
nonetheless found themselves competing with 
their social inferiors, whether gentry or 
townsmen, for the effective control of power 
in a monarchical state. The magnates of the 
East, on the other hand, had little competi­
tion to fear. With kings and towns alike too 
weak to contest their authority, they dominated 
an overwhelming agrarian society, in which 
their economic predominance as great landowners 
was backed up by the exclusive rights over the 
serfs on their estates.^
Thus, Eastern Europe was similar to Spain in that the strength
of the seigneurs persisted; however, in Eastern Europe there was even
less question that it had increased. The sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries experienced the rise of absolutism, ^  however, this did not
always signify the decline of the nobility:
In Eastern Europe, where there was no powerful 
middle class to set against the nobles, the 
rulers secured the nobles' loyalty by granting 
to them greater powers over their serfs, a 
concession which in no way weakened the crown.
With an association between the monarchy and the nobility, which 
has been referred to as a "feudal state," the weak bourgeoisie lost
^ E l l i o t t ,  Europe Divided, p. 46.
^Except for England and Poland.
25oavid Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century (New York: 
Macmillan-St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 20.
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further ground in Eastern Europe. The more active the nobility became
in the export market, the more it discovered that it was possible to
deal directly with long-distance merchants from Western Europe, rather
than through local, domestic m e r c h a n t s . And through this trade the
nobility found it could acquire the luxury and manufactured goods which
27it desired at advantageous prices.
Finally, the Intensification of serfdom limited the peasantry's
participation in the market as consumers and/or potential laborers for
capitalist industry, while in Western Europe the peasantry was becoming
free for capitalist-industrial development. The significance of the
peasantry's bondage was recognized by Engels when he wrote:
The general reintroduction of serfdom was one 
of the reasons why no industry could develop 
in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.28
and more recently by Alexander Gerschenkron: "Emancipation of the 
peasants, despite its manifold deficiencies, was an absolute 
prerequisite for industrialization."2^
By the end of the sixteenth century, the second serfdom charac­
terized Eastern European rural life (or society, as they were agrarian 
societies). Attracted by the profitable opportunities of the export 
market, the lords injected themselves into commercial activities,
2^Wallerstein, "Three Paths," p. 97, and Pach, "Sixteenth 
Century Hungary," p. 125.
22Elliott, Europe Divided, p. 48.
^®Engels to Marx, December 15, 1822, Marx, Pre-Capitalist 
Economic Formation, p. 146.
2^Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1962), p. 19.
63
demanded increased dues and labor services, and began expanding the
size of the demesne at the expense of the pastures, forests, and,
eventually, peasant holdings.^0
During the seventeenth century, the European world economy
experienced a severe crisis, and in the midst of the crisis religious
31warfare and peasant uprisings occurred. As a result of the crisis
in the European economy, the market for East European grains declined
in the west, although it did not experience a total collapse. The
response to the crisis in the market by the East European nobility was
to demand still further increases in the dues and services owed by the
peasant-serfs; in order to maintain the income level they had achieved
previously.^ One study of the crisis argues that the East European
nobility was in a position of international debt bondage to West
European merchants; therefore, to meet their obligations they had to
33increase pressure on the peasantry. J
The trend towards the renewal of serfdom thus continued in the 
midst of the crisis. The nobility was also able to increase its labor 
supply through manorial expansion at the expense of increasingly 
impoverished free peasantry. When crises forced the peasant to borrow, 
by necessity the lending agent was the local lord - further crises and
■^i.e. the lords altered the rural economy from Grundherrschaft 
to Gutsherrschaft.
"^Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," pp. 9-13.
32
Henry Kamen, The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe. 1550- 
1660 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971), pp. 223-228. Kamen 
terms the East European nobility "feudal-capitalists" because they were 
profit-oriented, but their profit seeking was based on the "feudal mode 
of production," i.e. serfdom.
^'Hjallerstein, "Three Paths," p. 97.
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indebtedness forced the free peasant to sell his land to the lord and 
become a peasant of the estate, which meant that the peasant had become 
enserfed: "Indebtedness of an impoverished peasantry became one of the 
essential factors in the evolution of serfdom.
At the same time, it must be recognized that seigneurial social
relations and the serf's relation to the lord did provide the peasant
with some security:
For all this subjection to his lord the serf did 
enjoy, according to the customs of the land, at 
least assurance of aid in times of emergency and 
great need. In time of famine the lord was 
required to distribute food from the community 
stores and procure seed for the next sowing. If 
the serf should have his house, tools or animals 
destroyed by fire or natural disaster, the lord 
was to stand ready to lend materials, tools or 
animals to replace losses.
Eastern European serfdom persisted in the eighteenth century,
if it was not actually intensified, and was not finally eliminated
until well into the nineteenth century. In contrasting the status of
the peasantry in Eastern Europe with that of the peasantry in the
west, which was experiencing further declines of serfdom in the
eighteenth century, George Rude wrote:
East of the Elbe, however, the issue was not so 
much one of occasional services and obligations 
as one of a continuous and almost total lack of 
freedom, varying from personal bondage in the form 
of serfdom to the status of a domain or household 
chattel. One or other of these conditions was 
general in Brandenburg, Prussia, in Poland, Russia 
and in large parts of the Austrian Empire... there 
were of course exceptions...Cand yetJ in most of
-^Kamen, The Iron Century, p. 216.
^^Wrights, Serf. Seigneur, p. 18, He adds: "However, this was 
small compensation...for the many indignities and aggravations that 
the serf suffered at the hands of his seigneur."
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these countries serfdom was extending and not 
contracting and the remaining pockets of 
freedom were being gradually mopped up.36
Hie Development of Spanish American Seigneurialism
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all 
instruments of production, by the immensely faci­
litated means of communication, draws all, even 
the most barbarian, nations into civilization.
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy 
artillery with which it batters down all Chinese 
walls, with which it forces the barbarians' 
intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to 
capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of pro­
duction; it compels them to introduce what it 
calls civilization into their midst, i.e. to 
become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it 
creates a world after its own image.
The analogy stated by Pierre Vilar (using Lenin's "imperialism 
- the highest stage of capitalism") that "Spanish imperialism was the 
highest stage of feudalism," can be extended to enhance the analysis 
of the Spanish conquest and colonization of America. Marx's proposi­
tion that the bourgeoisie "creates a world after its own image," might 
be restated for the conquest of America as: "the seigneurs created a 
world after their own image." In similar fashion, it has been written:
Spaniards going to the New World left a society of 
landholding aristocrats, a small bureaucracy, a few 
townsmen and a mass of peasants and estate laborers.
It was logical that they refuse to create family 
farms in the colonial world where there existed huge 
expanses of land and a large population of skilled, 
subservient Amerindian agriculturists.38
36George Rude, Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Aristocracy and 
the Bourgeois Challenge (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972), p. 33.
37Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, pp. 12-13. Also, see Marx, 
Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, ed. Shlomo Avineri (Garden 
City: Doubleday and Co., 1968). Marx's use of the word "barbarian" is 
merely evidence of his own historically situated life.
38stein and Stein, The Colonial Heritage, pp. 36-37.
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What was the nature of the societies which the Spanish, and 
Iberian seigneurialism, encountered and subjected to their domination, 
eventually leading to the formation and development of Spanish 
American societies?
The most significant peoples whom the Spanish encountered in the 
New World were the Aztec, the Maya, and the Inca. The Aztec and the 
Maya shared the culture area referred to as Mesoamerica and the Inca 
dominated the Andean culture area.^^
Although not exactly alike, there were strong similarities in 
the social organization of these peoples. At the time of the Spanish 
arrival in America, each of these peoples had developed into class 
societies. By the sixteenth century, the Maya were reduced to a state 
of civil wars between feuding city-states, while the Aztecs and the
Inca had succeeded in creating extensive empires.
These three societies were agrarian, with the overwhelming per­
centage of their populations being peasant. The ruling nobilities of 
each consisted of warriors and priests; there also existed state and 
religious bureaucracies, and merchant and artisan classes.
The ruling classes, and the state and religious apparati, were 
supported by the peasantry, who secured access to the land through 
their membership in the clans: the Aztec calpulli. the Mayan patri­
lineal protection societies, and the Incan ayllu.^Q There were land
^^The basic sources for this brief comparative description of 
the Aztec, Mayan and Incan societies are taken from: George C. Vaillant, 
revised by Suzannah B. Vaillant, Aztecs of Mexico: Origin. Rise and Fall 
of the Aztec Nation (London: Penguin Books, 1966); Michael D. Coe, The 
Maya (London: Penguin Books, 1971); J. Alden Mason, The Ancient
Civilizations of Peru (London: Penguin Books, 1968).
^Vaillant, pp. 122-134; Coe, pp. 168-172; Mason, pp. 174-179.
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tenure customs unique to each clan-system; however, the general form 
was that of communal landownership with individual family usufruct.^
The peasants' support of their respective ruling classes had, 
historically, been in the form of tribute, either a share of the 
communal harvest, as in Mesoamerica; or communal labor on special lands 
of the community, the harvest of which supported the rulers, as in the 
Andes
All three societies appear to have developed several forms of
slavery: selling oneself or one's child, criminals bound to their
victim or the victim's family, war captives, etc. However, slavery
remained of secondary importance to their economies and in their social
/ 1
structure (in comparison with the predominating tribute systems).
Besides the tribute in kind, which the peasantry supplied to 
support the ruling classes, there were also compulsory labor systems 
to construct and maintain imperial and communal projects. Referred to 
as coatequil amongst the Aztecs and mita amongst the Inca, the compul­
sory labor systems were also based on the community. Thus, histori­
cally, the most advanced civilizations of pre-Columbian America were 
founded on tributary relations, based on a peasant community.
And yet, a significant change was occurring in the imperial 
societies of pre-conquest America. In the period prior to the arrival
^ F o r  a comparison of Aztec and Mayan land tenure systems, see 
Jose Miranda, "La Propiedad pre-hispsinica en Mexico," in J. Miranda 
Vida colonial v albores de la independencia. Sep Setentas no. 56 
(Mexico: Secretarxa de Education Publica, 1972), pp. 23-31.
2^()n the Inca tax system, see Sally Falk Moore, Power and 
Property in Inca Peru (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
^Vaillant, Aztecs, pp. 130-131; Coe, The Maya, p. 170; Mason, 
Ancient Civilizations, pp. 192-193.
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of the Spanish, there emerged relations of serfdom alongside the 
tributary systems which prevailed.
In the fifteenth century, the Aztecs had increased in strength 
and through military conquest extended their domain from the valley of 
Mexico throughout the central highlands and beyond.^ The rise and 
expansion of the Aztecs meant greater power and prestige for the 
warrior-nobility, which demanded greater rewards in the form of land 
and labor. Thus, they acquired private landholdings amongst the 
conquered peoples and the Aztecs themselves. Through two methods the 
nobility acquired a labor force to cultivate its estates. One method 
was to use the labor tribute of the vanquished. The other method was 
to enserf landless peasants. Increasingly, the lands of the calpulli 
had become inadequate for the members of the clan. In order to secure 
land to cultivate, a peasant would leave the community and request 
land from a noble. Having left the community, the peasant lost 
membership in the calpulli, and the protection it provided. And by 
moving onto the land of the noble, the peasant became enserfed. The 
growing numbers of enserfed peasantry were called mayeque
The Inca experienced a similar development early in the sixteenth 
century, also related to imperial expansion. The Inca nobility, as a 
reward for their service in the conquests and Imperialist expansion,
^ S e e  the historico-anthropological work of Eric Wolf, Sons of 
the Shaking Earth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix 
Books, 1959), pp. 102-152.
^-*0n the emergence of pre-Columbian seigneurialism in Mexico, 
see Friedrich Katz, "The Evolution of Aztec Society," Past and Present, 
no. 13 (April 1958), pp. 14-25. Also, R.C. Padden, The Hummingbird and 
the Hawk: Conquest and Sovereignty in the Valley of Mexico. 1503-1541 
(New York: Harper and Row - Colophon Books, 1970), pp. 15-18, 43-45.
were granted landholdings in the core of the empire. These land­
holdings came to be worked by a group of peasants called yanacona.
The origin of these peasant-serfs were the tribes which had rebelled 
against the empire. Their punishment was the alienation of their 
lands, which were distributed amongst the Inca nobility; with the 
formerly rebellious peasants attached as serfs, or yanacona.^
Another source of yanacona was the Inca ayllu. Member families 
would send individual family members to the nobles as "bondsmen."
They would either work the land, or they might serve the noble in a 
more responsible capacity. The yanacona could be exchanged later for 
another family member . ^
Thus, the Spanish conquerors and colonizers were not only to 
encounter primitive societies, as in some regions of the New World, 
but also class structured societies, based on tributary systems and 
developing seigneurial relations.
The competition, and developing conflict, between the tribute 
relations based on the community-clan systems and the emerging seig- 
neurialism based on landholding and the noble-serf relationship were 
not dissimilar to the social conflict which was taking place in Iberia 
In Spain, the crown was seeking to reduce the nobility's seigneurial 
control over the peasantry and to limit the seigneurial relations to 
tribute. At the same time, the nobility was transforming the base of 
its seigneurial power from merely feudal jurisdictions to power based 
on both mayorazgos (entailed land systems) and feudal-seigneurial
^Friedrich Katz, The Ancient American Civilizations (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972), pp. 294-295.
^Ibid., p. 295. Also, see Mason, Ancient Civilizations, p. 184
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domains.
In America, the Spanish crown was to attempt to prevent the 
formation and development of seigneurial regimes by favoring the 
creation of tribute systems, or the adaptation of pre-existing tribute 
relations, based on the Indian community; while the nascent aristocracy 
of conquerors and colonizers sought to develop seigneurial societies 
which stood in opposition to the Indian Comnunity. Thus, the pre­
conquest competition between communal tributary and seigneurial 
systems, which had been developing in unique, but not dissimilar forms, 
in both America and Iberia, was recast in colonial Spanish America as 
a struggle between the tribute paying Indian peasant community, 
supported by the crown and the Church, and the new nobility of con­
querors and colonizers. The major struggle in colonial Spanish America 
was not between a developing capitalism and a persistent seigneurialism 
but between a developing seigneurialism and a persistent Indian 
community. In fact, the historical development of rural Spanish 
America up to the twentieth century can be viewed, in great part, in 
terms of this struggle.
The political conflict between the crown and the colonizers 
emerged rapidly in the immediate expansion and colonization of the 
Caribbean. The Spanish, having developed imperialist practices in the 
later Reconquista and the original overseas expansion in the Atlantic/*® 
had already established the institutional precedents to be applied in 
the conquest of the New World.^ Thus, the Spanish conquerors expected
48parry, The Spanish. Also, see J.H. Parry, The Age of 
Reconnaissance (New York: Mentor Books, 1964), pp. 162-177.
49Robert S. Chamberlain, "Castilian Backgrounds of the Reparti- 
miento-Encomienda," Contributions to American Anthropology and History.
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and received from their leaders grants of Indian labor and tribute with 
which to mine for precious metals and support themselves."*®
These grants of Indian labor and tribute, or encomiendas. were 
accepted by the crown as a temporary arrangement, and in any case 
preferable to the enslavement of the Indians. However, the struggle 
between the colonizers and the crown was inherent in the encomienda as 
it was structured. And yet, the issue of whether the encomienda was 
to be a permanent, hereditary grant or merely temporary, was not to be 
resolved in the Caribbean, because the major impact of the Spanish 
conquest was the rapid decline of the Indian population. ^  The 
decreasing Indian numbers and the colonizers' critical labor shortage 
led to the enslavement of the Indians on islands still being conquered 
(the crown accepted the enslavement of Indians who refused to accept 
domination and Christianization) and eventually, due to the continued 
decline, the colonizers resorted to the African slave trade which the 
Portuguese had established to supply southern Iberian and Mediterranean 
e s t a t e s . T h u s ,  the struggle between the colonizers and the crown
vol. 5, no. 25 (1939), pp. 23-71.
SOpor a description of the discovery, conquest and exploitation 
of the Caribbean, see Carl 0. Sauer, The Early Spanish Main (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966).
5l0n the encomienda in the Antilles, see Silvio Zavala, La 
Encomienda indiana (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Historicos, 1935), 
pp. 1-40.
-^For example, on the island of Hispaniola, the indigenous popu­
lation suffered the following decline: 1490 - 1,000,000; 1508 - 60,000; 
1554 - 30,000; 1570 - 500. From Roland Mellafe, Breve historia de la 
esclavitud en America Latina. Sep Setentas no. 115 (Mexico: Secretarfa 
de Educaci6n Publics, 1973), p. 22.
53Mellafe, Breve historia. p. 23. Also, see C.R. Boxer, The 
Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London: Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 21-22, 
24-25, and 85-107.
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was unresolved, while the Caribbean became a region of African slaves 
and European masters. The crown did not intend to permit the exten­
sion of the encomienda to the mainland of the New World, It insisted 
that the Indians were free vassals and could neither be enslaved nor 
enserfed (which was not to state that they did not owe tribute to the 
c r o w n ) . L e s l e y  Byrd Simpson has rightly argued that the crown did 
not intend to permit the rise of a New World nobility when it was just 
beginning to tame the Old World nobility.^ However, the ambitions of 
the conquerors and colonizers demanded the labor of Indians for the 
mines, and their tribute to supply produce to maintain and support 
them. In the process of the conquest and colonization of Mexico, 
Central and South America, the Spanish conquistadors continued to 
establish and grant encomiendas to themselves and their followers.
The crown's response to events in America was to insist that the 
encomienda was a temporary arrangement, emphasizing that it merely 
represented the crown's temporarily granting its own privilege to 
receive tribute from the Indian community to the conqueror, as a 
reward for his services in the conquest. The encomienda, as originally 
structured, granted the holder the right to receive tribute from 
designated Indian communities, in kind or in labor service.-*** The 
encomendero. on his part, was expected to protect the Indians in his
5^See Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the 
Conquest of the Americas (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965).
^^Simpson, The Encomienda.
56charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper and Row 
- Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 48-66, especially pp. 49-50. Also, see 
Zavala, La Encomienda. and Simpson, The Encomienda.
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charge and to provide for their Christianization.-^
Originally, it was believed that the encomienda also entitled 
its holder to the lands of the Indians; however, legal historians have 
adequately proven that no juridical link existed between the encomienda 
and the later development of the landed estate. Nevertheless, their 
evidence that no juridical link existed does not mean that no 
functional relationship existed.
The struggle between the crown and the Spanish colonizers was 
inherent in the encomienda system. Was the encomienda to serve as a 
temporary arrangement giving way to a tributary relationship between 
the Indian community and the crown, or was it to serve as the basis for 
the development of a new seigneurial society dominated by the Spanish 
colonizers? In part, the crown was right, the encomienda was to be 
temporary, not only because of the crown's opposition to it, but more 
so as a result of the changes involved in the formation of the Spanish 
American societies.
In the early stages of conquest and colonization, the encomienda
CQ
was able to serve the needs of the colonizers, but, due to the repe­
tition of the Caribbean tragedy on the mainland, i.e. the Indian popu­
lation's decline, while the Spanish population and demands were 
increasing, the encomienda was to be an inadequate method of supporting
-^Ibid.
-*®Silvio Zavala, De encomiendas v propiedad territorial en 
algunas regiones de la America espanola (Mexico: Antigua Librerla 
Robredo-Porrua, 1940).
S^On the early period of colonization, see Charles Gibson, The 
Aztecs Under Spanish Rule (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 
pp. 58-81, pp. 220-256; and James Lockhart, Spanish Peru. 1532-1560 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).
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the nascent colonial nobility.
The process whereby the conflict inherent in the encomienda 
emerged as the struggle between the developing seigneurial hacienda 
and the tribute paying Indian community held in corregimiento (enco- 
miendas which were held directly by the crown) is comparable to the 
rise of the second serfdom in Eastern Europe. As in Eastern Europe, 
the intensification of the latent seigneurial structure was to be 
instigated by the expanding market opportunities available to the 
dominant class, or nascent nobility in the case of Spanish America. 
Although it appears that the first wave of conquerors was not 
necessarily from the noble class (which is not to say that they did 
not carry the seigneurial idea with them in the conquest), nevertheless, 
the Spanish nobility's second sons, excluded from seigneurial inheri­
tance in Spain as a result of the mayorazgo system, did play a signi­
ficant role in the later conquests and colonizations.
It appeared in the mid-sixteenth century as if the crown had 
been able to exert its authority over the seigneurial ambitions of the 
Spanish colonizers. In Mexico, the crown had succeeded in removing 
the labor service as part of the Indians' obligations to the encomen- 
dero, and the encomienda was limited to two generations, after which 
it reverted to the crown.^ In South America, the encomienda continued
^ S e e  James Lockhart, The Men of Caiamarca: A Social and Bio­
graphical Study of the First Conquerors of Peru (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1972), pp. 63-64. Also, Romano and Tennenti, Los 
Fundamentos. p. 185; Enrique Semo, Historia del capitalismo en Mexico: 
los origenes, 1521-1763 (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1973), p. 114, and 
James Lockhart, Spanish Peru, pp. 39-41.
^ I n  the New Laws of 1542, labor service was abolished, but it 
was not possible to fully enforce this until 1549. See Simpson, The 
Encomienda. chapter 11, "The New Laws," pp. 123-145.
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to include labor services until later in the century, and in a few 
regions into the seventeenth century; however, the crown was able to 
set certain limitations on the use of Indian labor by the colonizers.^ 
At the same time, although the encomienda was to be continually 
reduced in importance, it did persist as a tribute system into the 
eighteenth century in several parts of the empire.^
However, the declining significance of the encomienda as a labor 
system was not due merely to a royal victory over the colonizers. The 
encomienda1s decline should be seen in relation to the use of other, 
parallel, tributary and seigneurial systems. For, as the Indian popu­
lation declined, absolutely and relatively to the colonizers' and 
mestizos' numbers,^ alternative methods of exploiting the Indian 
peasant population developed to meet the needs of the colonizers and
£ C
their seigneurial ambitions.
6^John j. Rowe, "The Incas Under Spanish Colonial Institutions," 
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 37, no. 2 (May 1957), p. 160, 
and Eduardo Arcila Farias, El Regimen de la encomienda en Venezuela 
(Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1966), pp. 193-221.
^ S e e  Maria Isabel Gonzalez Porres, "La Encomienda de indigena 
en Chile durante el siglo XVIII," Historia. vol. 5 (1966), pp. 7-103.
^^Nicolas Sanchez Albornoz, La Poblacion de America Latina: 
desde los tiempos pre-colombinos al ano 2000 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 
1973), pp. 58-107. It has been estimated that the pre-conquest popu­
lations of Mexico and Peru were approximately 25 million and 10 million 
respectively, and that by 1560 they had declined to approximately 2.5 
million and 1 million, respectively.
^^The internal conflict in the encomienda was recognized by 
Robert Keith in "Encomienda, Hacienda and C o r r e g i m i e n t o Hispanic 
American Historical Review, vol. 51, no. 3 (August 1971), pp. 431-446. 
Keith argues that the conflict was between an antifeudal crown and a 
capitalist colonizing class; however, it will be argued herein that 
the conflict was not feudalism vs. capitalism, rather that it was 
between the crown's intention to create a tributary system based on 
the Indian peasant community vs. the seigneurial ambitions of the 
colonizers who were not above making a profit.
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Developing parallel to the encomienda and increasing in 
importance with the decline of the encomienda, were the corregimlento 
and the hacienda. The corregimlento, or royal encomienda, was 
intended to protect the Indian community's cohesiveness against the 
ambitions of the colonizers and the development of the seigneurial 
hacienda.00 Thus, the struggle inherent in the encomienda system 
emerged in these two ways.
The corregimiento was in the charge of a royal official, rather 
than held privately by an encomendero. The communities of the corre­
gimiento were still obligated to provide tribute for the crown and 
they were also subject to temporary corvee labor, or repartimiento.^7 
when requests for it by the colonizers were approved by the royal 
official. The requests for repartimiento came from mine operators, 
owners of obrajes (textile sweat-shops), and landowners. The Indians 
involved in repartimiento were to be paid salaries for their labor.
The hacienda, on the other hand, was in the early phases of its 
development. The crown had provided means for the establishment of 
towns and the distribution of lands, based on the Iberian experience, 
to be followed in America. Hoping to protect the Indian communities, 
the crown intended that the lands distributed should be worked by the 
Spanish themselveshowever, regardless of their social origins, the
^ G i b s o n ,  S p a i n , pp. 143-144.
^Repartimiento was called coatequil in Mexico and mita in Peru, 
showing its structural-functional continuity with pre-conquest times.
^Gibson, Spain, p. 144.
^Frangois Chevalier, Land and Society in Colonial Mexico, trans. 
Alvin Eustis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 52- 
82.
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conquerors and colonizers were imbued with the seigneurial idea, 
enhanced by their domination as conquerors.^® Thus, the holding of 
land also required the acquisition of a labor force.
At first, when the Spanish population was small and the
encomenderos were still politically dominant, it was not uncommon for
the encoraendero and the landholder to be the same individual. Although
the encomienda grant itself did not include landholding, neither did it
forbid the encomendero to own land. Thus, the encomenderos often
sought landownership near the site of the encomienda. In fact, based
on evidence from various regions of the empire, one historian has
concluded that:
One can say with some assurance that during the 
conquest period encomenderos in all the major 
regions of the Spanish Indies regularly owned 
land as private individuals and that many of 
their holdings were inside the limits of their 
own encomiendas.^
And so long as the encomienda permitted labor service, the 
landholder, as encomendero, used his Indians to work his land.
However, as the non-encomendero Spanish population grew, it 
became evident that the encomienda would not be able to meet the 
colonizers' needs, nor their seigneurial ambitions. The decline of 
the encomienda, although greeted with hostility by the encomenderos, 
was welcomed by the non-encomendero population because it was replaced
7®See George M. Foster, Culture and Conquest: America's Spanish 
Heritage (New York: Werner Green Foundation, 1960), p. 11.
71jaraes Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of 
the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies," Hispanic American Historical 
Review, vol. 49, no. 3 (August 1969), p. 416. Arcila Farias has 
referred to the "coexistence of encomenderos' and Indians* land" in 
Venezuela. Arcila Farias, El Regimen de la encomienda. p. 288.
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by the corregimlento, and the repartimiento labor that it provided.
72Increasingly, Spanish landowners utilized repartimiento labor.
With the continued growth in the non-Indian population and the 
expansion of markets in the Spanish mining and administrative centers, 
the demand for labor in agriculture continued to increase. The Indian- 
peasant population was declining rapidly. Thus, while the Indian labor 
force was declining, the demands upon it were increasing: for the 
mines, for public works projects, and for the agricultural lands which 
supplied them.
The several sectors calling upon the repartimiento as a labor
supply (mining, obrajes, the colonial administration, and agriculture)
were, in effect, competing with each other for the Indians. In a
system based on compulsory labor, this situation does not necessarily
benefit the laborer. Instead, the colonizers were able to have the
amount of repartimiento which was required of each community 
7 ^increased, J The competition for labor became so intense, according
to one historian, that:
Spaniards sequestered laborers, beat them, refused 
to pay them, seized their food and clothing to 
prevent escape, and undertook to acquire private 
native workers outside the draft... The reparti­
miento system of the late sixteenth century was 
everywhere one of compulsion and abuse. ^
The landowners, eager to take advantage of the commercial oppor­
tunities available by supplying the population centers with
^ G i b s o n ,  The Aztecs, pp. 224-226, and David L. Weidner, "Forced 
Labor in Peru," Americas, vol. 16, no. 4 (April 1966), pp. 361-362.
^^Ibid., (Gibson), p. 230, and Rowe, "The Incas Under Spanish," 
pp. 170-175.
^Ibid., (Gibson), p. 233.
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agricultural produce, sought a more readily available labor force than 
that of the repartimiento. The precedent for debt peonage already 
existed to a certain extent in Spain and had appeared in the New World 
as a means to secure a labor force for the obrajes. The obrajes had 
been in competition for repartimiento labor with the mines and agri­
culture, but they had also acquired labor by "buying" criminals from 
the courts, who would then work for a stipulated period in the obraje.^ 
Eventually, the obraje operators turned to debt peonage, in which they 
would forward a cash payment to an Indian which was to be worked off 
in the shop. The Indian would never be able to pay back the debt and 
would, thus, remain tied to the obraje. To prevent escape, the obraje 
operator would be sure to keep the workers chained and the doors to 
the obraje locked.^
The spread of debt peonage in agriculture is part of a process 
of circular causation which leads to the rise of the hacienda, com­
parable to the rise of the second serfdom in Eastern Europe. The 
increasing competition for the decreasing Indian labor force instigated 
the Spanish landowners to seek to acquire a private labor force, apart 
from the repartimiento. The Indians, suffering the increasing burden 
of repartimiento, were easily attracted by salary advances made by the 
landowners. The landowners demanded that their peons be excluded from 
the labor requirements of the community and the repartimiento draft, 
and were often successful in having their requests granted.^ The
75pernando Silva Santisteban, Los Obrajes en el vlrreinato del 
Peru (Lima: Museo Nacional de Historia, 1964), p. 37. Also, see Gibson, 
The Aztecs, pp. 243-244.
76ibid., (Gibson), p. 245.
^Ibid., p. 247, and Weidner, "Forced Labor," p. 363.
landowners were willing to pay the Indians' tribute in order to main­
tain their presence on their lands.7®
The attraction of Indians to the Spanish lands became a cumula­
tive process. The decrease in the communities' population was 
advanced by the continuing departure of additional Indians to the 
Spanish lands (peonage was preferable to working in the mines or the 
obrajes), which meant that even less Indians were available in the 
communities to meet the required, increasing demands of repartimiento. 
Thus, even more Indians abandoned the communities to enter into 
peonage arrangements with the Spanish landowners. Furthermore, the 
latter were eager to expand their landholdings; so the less populated 
Indian lands were sought and acquired through purchase, rental,
70
encroachment, and usurpation. It has been noted that:
Peonage moreover was not limited to individual 
Indians. Entire families and successive genera­
tions of families were drawn within the system.
And through advance payments on rentals of com­
munal lands, hacendados were able to subject 
whole towns to a condition of subservience and 
economic thralldom.®®
The elements in the growth of the hacienda, debt peonage and
78Ibid.
78For examples of estate expansion in one region, see William B. 
Taylor, Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1972), pp. 132-133. Also, Chevalier, Land and 
Society, pp. 212-220.
^Charles Gibson, "The Transformation of the Indian Community in 
New Spain, 1500-1810," Journal of World History, vol. 2, no. 3 (1955), 
p. 597. The process of seigneurialization sounds similar to that des­
cribed by Marc Bloch in Feudal Society, vol. 1, p. 242: "The majority 
of peasants belonged, therefore, at one and the same time to two groups 
constantly out of step with each other; one of them composed of 
subjects with the same master, the other of members of the same village 
community."
land acquisition, did not go unheeded by the crown; however, royal 
policies were inconsistent. The crown's response to debt bondage was 
one of acceptance, because formally it appeared as a voluntary wage 
relationship which the crown favored. And yet, because it was recog­
nized as a potentially compulsory labor relationship, the crown sought 
to regulate it.81 The same inconsistency prevailed in the crown's 
response to the hacienda's land acquisition. At the same time that 
decrees were issued seeking to protect the communities' lands, the
crown carried out policies jeopardizing the Indians' landholdings,
82e.g. congregaciones and composiciones.
There were two major impediments to a consistent crown policy.
The first was the political power of the landholders: "The wealthiest
and most powerful persons in the colony - viceroys, high ranking
83officials, prosperous merchants, ecclesiastics...” and:
For the accumulation of such large estates, 
political power as well as money was required.
Diego de Ibarra was Governor of New Biscay.
Holders of that office generally managed to do 
well for themselves in land. Perhaps the pro­
cess was cumulative - they first became eligible 
for office because they were landowners, and then 
authority enabled them to build up their domains
81(3.H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World - Harbinger Books, 1963), pp. 62-63, and Gibson, The 
Aztecs. p. 253.
B^Congregacion was the reduction or transplantation of Indian 
communities in order to facilitate administration, tribute collection, 
and Christianization. Composici6n was the paying of a fee to consoli­
date and legitimate the lands one held - which meant that "encroached 
upon and/or usurped lands" would be titled as belonging to the Spanish 
occupant. On the social-legal impact of the crown's policies, see 
Jose Miranda, "La Propiedad comunal de la tierra y la cohesion social 
de los pueblos indfgcnas mexicanos," Vida Colonial, pp. 56-66.
83cib son, Spain, p. 155.
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still further.84
And the second was the crown's need for additional revenues. At 
various times, starting in 1591, the holding of composiciones took 
place.8^
Thus, as in Eastern Europe, the 'estate1 was encroaching upon 
the peasants' lands to supply an expanding market. The absorption of 
Indian-peasant labor and Indian-peasant land in the sixteenth century 
in colonial Spanish America was not a competition between seigneuria­
lism and capitalism, giving rise to a bourgeoisie and a rural prolet­
ariat, but a struggle between the tribute paying Indian-peasant 
community and the seigneurial hacienda, giving rise to a regime of 
aristocratic landowners, often resident in the urban centers, and 
serfs, resident on the hacienda and managed by overseers. The struggle 
was a transformation of the conquest-colonial relationship between 
Spaniards and Indians to a class relationship between dominant 
landowners and dominated peasant-serfs.
The nobility of Eastern Europe had encroached upon the labor and 
land of the peasantry, and had expanded demesne production, in order 
to exploit the commercial opportunities of the Western European grain 
markets. Although not so directly involved in Western European 
commerce as the East European nobility, the nascent "nobility" of 
Spanish America supplied agricultural produce to the mining centers
84P.J. Bakewell, Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: 
Zacatecas. 1546-1700 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971),
p. 116.
o r  j
Jose M. Ots Capdequi, El Regimen de la tierra en la America 
espanola durante el periodo colonial (Ciudad Trujillo: Editora 
Montalito, 1946), see pp. 67-91 on the composicion of 1591. Also,
Chevalier, Land and Society, pp. 265-277.
83
which exported precious metals to Spain - which then moved them to 
Western Europe in return for manufactured goods. This commercial net­
work has been termed the European-world economy;®® and the crisis of 
the seventeenth century in the European-world economy also appears to 
have involved parts of the Spanish empire in America, particularly New 
Spain (Mexico and Central America).
The impact of the seventeenth century crisis had not reversed 
the trend towards a second serfdom in Eastern Europe and it even seems 
to have accelerated the process in many areas. In New Spain's 
"century of depression"®^ and connected to the crisis, a similar 
acceleration in seigneurialism occurred.
There are two arguments which seek to explain the acceleration
in the rise of the landed estate during the crisis. The first states
that those Spaniards who possessed land (or could acquire it) moved
onto their landholdings in order to take refuge there against the
economic crisis; and that they managed their estates as self-sufficient
manors. Thus, cumulatively the landowners sought to secure a resident
labor force, through debt peonage, and a monopoly on landholding, to
force additional Indians to move onto the estate. One historian has
written on Central America:
Many Spaniards... abandoned the more overt com­
mercial activities which had engaged them...
Some became hacienda owners in an impressive way 
and converted themselves into fair imitations of
®®Pierre Chaunu and Huguette Chaunu, "The Atlantic Economy and 
the World Economy." Earle, ed. Essays in European Economic History, pp. 
113-127.
®7"From 1576 until well over a century later New Spain had a con­
tracting economy." Wodrow Borah. New Spain s Century of Depression. 




And others, referring to the mining dominated regions of Mexico
and Peru, have written:
Miners and merchants shifted investment to land 
and accelerated the formation of the latifundia.
Without the incentive or stimulus coming from 
the mines, their output of silver, labor force 
and dependents, the large estates tended to 
become relatively self-sufficient.®9
The second argument states that the accumulation of land and 
labor continued at a rapid pace because the decline in the Indian popu­
lation meant declining Indian agricultural production; therefore, the 
seventeenth century presented even greater commercial opportunities by
QQ
way of supplying the population centers. Woodrow Borah has written:
The solution to the problem of Spanish food 
supply lay in decreasing or eliminating direct 
dependence upon the enfeebled Indian communities.
The most obvious solution was to extend to other 
essential crops the system of Spanish-owned large 
estates which were already raising wheat and 
livestock for the cities.91
Amongst those social scientists defining capitalism (or its 
absence) on the existence (or non-existence) of a market and commercial 
activity, this debate is basic to the characterization of the hacienda 
as pre-capitalist or c a p i t alist.However,  differences in the several
®®Murdo J. MacLeod, Spanish Central America: A Socio-economic 
History. 1520-1720 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 
p. 153. The classic work forwarding this argument is Chevalier's 
Land and Society in Colonial Mexico.
®9stein and Stein, The Colonial Heritage, p. 38.
9®Borah, New Spain’s Century of Depression, pp. 30-44.
91Ibid., p. 32.
92S ee Andre Gunder Frank, "Capitalist Latifundia Growth in Latin 
America," Latin America, pp. 231-248.
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arguments might be explainable in geographical terms, because they are 
based on research in separate regions; e.g. Chevalier's study focused 
on northern Mexico, while Borah focused on central Mexico.
What is significant in these developments is not that the impact 
of the seventeenth century generated different responses in different 
regions, which can be explained as the result of differing circum­
stances, but rather that it generated similar responses in different 
regions of differing circumstances, i.e. the responses to the crisis 
accelerated the development of seigneurial relations in societies 
already in the process of seigneurialization! And, regarding the 
issue of commercial orientation, the following quote of Eric Wolf
seems to have captured it best:
The dual nature of the hacienda - its ability to
retrench in times of adverse markets, its ability 
to increase production if demand rose - allowed 
it to adapt even to conditions which differed 
from those that gave it birth. ^
Through a monopolization on landholding, the hacendado eliminated 
competition and attracted impoverished Indians to settle on the estate 
as peons. The best land of the estate served as the demesne and the 
less desirable lands were provided for the peons, often their own 
former lands, in return for a specified number of days of labor 
service. Thus, during normal times the peons provided for themselves 
and their labor service provided for the demesne production, "to 
furnish not only returns of capital invested, but also to furnish the 
funds needed to feed the owner and to support his aspirations for power
93Wolf, Sons, p. 210.
94Ibid., p. 215.
86
and prestige."9^ When markets improved (or were depressed) it was 
only necessary to increase (or decrease) the peons' required labor 
services, and perhaps to alter the size of the demesne as well.
The Indians' movement from their communities to the landed
estates was not only the development of seigneurialism at the expense
of the colonial-tribute relations, but it also furthered the rise of
the uniquely American mestizo racial classification:
There is no reason to doubt that the surge of the 
haciendas profoundly changed the structure of the 
rural population and that, at the same time, it 
accelerated rapidly the processes of miscegenation 
and transculturation.
The rising numbers of mestizos were due not only to the further
mixing of the Indian and European races, but also because, at a
certain stage in the growth of the mestizos' numbers, the "racial"
characteristics differentiating amongst Indian, mestizo, and bianco
became less significant (less distinguishable?) and differentiation
was increasingly class based, i.e. more a social issue than a
bio-racial issue. Thus:
...at least in the rural sector, the Indian was 
generally the member of a community that func­
tioned according to the hispano-Indian norms 
established in the Laws of the Indies.97
while the peons of the hacienda were becoming mestizado.
In review, the "long sixteenth century" in the Spanish Empire in
^5Eric R. Wolf and Sidney W. Mintz, "Haciendas and Plantations 
in Middle America and the Antilles," Social and Economic Studies, vol. 
6 , no. 3 (September 1957), p. 387.
^^Magnus Morner, Estado. razas v cambio social en la hispano- 
america colonial, Sep Setentas no. 128 (Mexico: Secretarfa de Educacion 
Phblica, 1974), p. 115.
97Ibid., p. 125.
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America was a formative period. The conquest and immediate coloniza­
tion of the New World was a period of plunder and the creation of 
colonial relations combining the institutions of expansion developed 
in Iberia and the tribute relations found in America. However, the 
decline of the Indian populations, coupled with the growth of the 
Spanish demands for labor service for the mines, obrajes, public works 
and agricultural production, instigated a competition between the 
colonial-tribute system and the seigneurial ambitions of the colonizers. 
Increasingly, the colonizers sought to acquire private, dependent labor 
forces for their holdings, at the expense of the colonial-tribute 
system and the Indian community upon which it was based. The demands 
on the tribute system came to depend more and more upon reduced com­
munity populations, making the Spanish estates appear as an increas­
ingly preferable alternative to them. Attracted by a salary advance, 
and land to cultivate, the Indian peasants moved onto the Spanish 
lands, where they became peons, tied by debt and increasing material 
and psychological dependence.
The haciendas' development began in the sixteenth century and
the crisis of the seventeenth century accelerated its formation. And:
When the depression of the seventeenth century 
came to an end in the economic upswing of the 
eighteenth century, the hacienda, too, 
participated in the renewed expansion.^®
Not all of the Indian communities were absorbed, or even 
threatened by the growth of the landed estate; however, it is during 
this period that the struggle between the hacienda and the community 
(which was always weighted in favor of the estate) took on its
9®Wolf, Sons, p. 211.
traditional character.
The formation of seigneurialism in colonial Spanish America has 
thus far been examined with reference to Mexico (New Spain) and Peru, 
particularly the former. A further example of the development of 
seigneurialism, which is unique - but similar,®^ is the conquest and 
colonization of Chile.
The conquest of Chile followed upon that of Peru. Beginning in 
the mid-sixteenth century, it persisted into the seventeenth (and 
beyond) as the frontier was pushed further south at the expense of the 
Indians. In a fashion similar to the subjection of the Indians of 
prior conquests, the native population of Chile was parcelled out to 
the colonizers in encomiendas. The encomienda system was, thus, 
introduced into Chile when it had already begun its decline in the 
older colonial regions
Originally, as was thought to be the case in the other developing
colonial societies, the encomienda system was assumed to be the origin
of the landed estate and its dependent labor force:
The land which was assigned to a conqueror was 
called repartimiento and the Indians who lived 
on it and who were also assigned to him, 
encomienda, because he had them in his care... 
and he made them work. 101.
However, research by Mario Gongora has clarified the
99"Diversity in similarity, similarity in diversity," a guiding 
phrase in Latin American studies.
lOOgalvat Monguillot, "El Regimen de encomiendas en los tiempos 
de la conquista," Revista Chilena de Historia y Geograffa. no. 132 
(1964), pp. 5-59.
lOlLuis Galdames, A History of Chile, trans. and ed. Isaac Joslin 
Cox (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 55.
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encomienda-hacienda relationship in Chile by showing that it was not
only that they were equivalent but that very often the encomendero
also acquired land which he succeeded in locating near his labor force
102- and many times within the limits of the encomienda. Thus, land 
and labor do appear to have been united quite often under the same 
colonizer.
The Indian labor force was not acquired merely through encomienda. 
Additional labor was brought onto the land in the form of slaves, 
acquired in the constant Indian wars along the southern frontier. And 
"the Indian slaves worked and lived together with the Indians of the 
encomienda, there being no more than a juridical difference."103
The encomienda system persisted longer in Chile than in the other 
colonial societies. Although there were attempts to eliminate it in 
the late sixteenth century, it was not finally shorn of the labor 
service until 1635 - and it remained as a tribute system until 1791.^^
The persistence of the encomienda led to the assumption that the 
dependent peasants, the inquilinos, of the nineteenth and twentieth 
century Chilean estates were the descendants of the encomienda and 
slave Indians,1^5 However, recent research by Gongora argues that the
102jferio Gongora, Encomenderos v estancieros. pp. 4-16.
103^^varo jarflji "Salario en una economfa caracterizada por las 
relaciones de dependencia personal," Revista Chilena de Historia y 
Geografla. no. 133 (1965), p. 54.
104porres, "La Encomienda ind^gena," pp. 13, 90-91. On the 
history of the Chilean encomienda system, see Domingo Amunategui Solar, 
Las Encomiendas de indfgenas en Chile. 2 vols. (Santiago: Imprenta 
Cervantes, 1909).
lO^Helen Douglas-Irvine, "The Landholding System of Colonial 
Chile," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 8, no. 4 (November 
1928), pp. 449-495.
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inqullinos have predominantly other origins.
Following the conquest and colonization of Chile in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the further expansion of 
the frontier became limited. The military forces, composed of "poor 
Spanish" and mestizos were, therefore, unable to fulfill their seig­
neurial ambitions and were forced to resort to smallholdings. The 
small landholdings which they secured were obtained from the large 
landowners in return for a stipulated annual labor service. The land­
owners, resident in the urban centers, used their land for cattle- 
ranching, and the labor service they required of their tenants involved 
working at round-ups and rodeos. It is amongst these poor Spanish and 
mestizos, as well as the Indians in encomienda and slavery, that 
Gongora locates the origins of the inquilinos. In the eighteenth 
century, the Chilean economy responded to the opportunity of exporting 
wheat to Peru. The landowners converted grazing land to grain culti­
vation and exported the wheat to Peru. In their seigneurial fashion, 
the landowning aristocracy did not "modernize" the social relations of 
production, they merely increased the labor requirements of their 
tenants. Market production was thus accomplished by the landed aris­
tocracy within the seigneurial regime they had established. Gongora 
has written:
In sum, then, the rural tenancies from the 
grants to inquilinaje had nothing to do with 
the encomienda or the Conquest. It proceeds 
from the second period of colonial history.107
lO^Mario Gongora, Orfgen de los inquilinos en Chile central 
(Santiago: Universldad de Chile, 1960).
107Ibid., p. 116.
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Thus, could it not be argued that the social relations of seig­
neurialism, characteristic of colonial Spanish America, were not depen­
dent merely on the privileges of conquest and racialism, but even more 
so on the "sociology" of Spanish society and the transplantation to 
America of the seigneurial idea?
The development of colonial Spanish American society and agrarian
Spanish America necessarily involves mention of the church, not only as
the spiritual arm of the conquest and colonization, but also because of
its role as a financial, landholding and welfare institution. It has
been recognized by historians that the church, through its various
units and chapters, was a major source of capital in colonial society
and that, as a result of the mortgages it held, tithes it collected,
and exemptions it possessed, the church was able to accumulate exten- 
108sive holdings. The significance of the church as an economic 
institution, however, was not that it furthered economic development.
Rather, the church's operation might be seen as having been "in 
certain respects...an economic burden upon the colonies."109
Ecclesiastical holdings were acquired through four means: 
mercedes, purchases, estate owners' obligations to the church, and 
mortgages, Mercedes and purchases were, of course, not unique to 
the church; however, estate owners' obligations and the great number
10®Haring, The Spanish Empire, pp. 176-178, and Gibson, Spain, 
pp. 84-85.
109Ibid., (Haring), p. 177.
l l O e y estate owners' obligations is meant the practice of placing 
encumbrances on landholdings to provide the church with an income to 
carry out pious works. See J. Vicens Vives, Historia econ6mico y social 
de Espana v America (Barcelona: Editorial Teide, 1957), vol. Ill, pp.
511-514.
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of mortgages held by the church were the result of the church's dual 
role as the dominant spiritual institution and the dominant credit 
institution of colonial society.
The non-capitalist - if not anti-capitalist - character of the 
church should be evident in that the "investments" it made included 
not only loans and purchases, but also such economically non-productive 
activities as church construction, missionary work, charitable founda­
tions, etc.: "Even when its enterprises function according to 
capitalist canons they are subject to extra-economic goals."HI 
Therefore, when the leading financial institution and single property 
owner does not operate according to the "spirit of capitalism" how can 
the society be termed capitalist?
At the same time that the agrarian sector of the Spanish Empire 
in America was developing seigneurial relations of production, other 
non-agrarian sectors were also developing. These other sectors 
included mining, merchant operations, the obrajes, and artisanry.
These sectors have been termed "embryos of capitalism."U-2
An elite of the potential bourgeoisie was the class of mine- 
owners who produced - or rather, extracted - precious metals for export 
to Spain. Originally, the mineowners had depended on the labor service 
of the colonial tribute system to recruit workers; however, although 
large masses of laborers were never required (relative to agriculture), 
the mineowners increasingly turned to other more secure methods of 
labor recruitment, e.g. debt bondage.H3 Seeking to clarify the
Hlsemo, Historia del capitalismo. p. 115. ^-^Ibid., p #
H 3 g ee Bake we 11, Silver Mining, pp. 121-129.
mining sector's relation to land and labor, one historian has written:
It must not be forgotten that the majority of 
the mines are small enterprises enclosed within 
the haciendas... Generally the systems of 
extraction and processing are primitive and the 
workers are the same peons or Indians that are 
occupied in agriculture. ^
However, with the resurgence in mining in the eighteenth century 
(and the longer separation of the workers from their conmunity origins) 
the system of debt bondage appears to have given way to a more volun­
tary system of labor recruitment in some regions. Referring to New 
Spain, David Brading noted:
Mexican mineworkers, far from being the oppressed 
peons of legend constituted a free, well-paid geo­
graphically mobile labor force... The vast majority 
of Mexican mineworkers, they did not number more 
than 45,000 individuals, worked voluntarily.
Although a significant source of colonial wealth, the capitalist 
social relationship developing between the mineowners and the mine­
workers remained a quantitatively limited one in the colonial social 
structure (relative to agrarian pursuits). The mineowners attracted 
laborers from the communities - both by force and by salary advances, 
thus they weakened village cohesiveness. However, the mineowners did 
not challenge the seigneurial regime which was developing. There was 
no need to. Their wealth and future profits did not require a large 
consumer market because they were based on the export of precious 
metals. And the mineowners' enterprises provided them with the wealth 
they required to purchase estates and enter the colonial aristocracy:
^^Semo, Historia del capitalismo. p. 148.
115Davi(j A. Brading, Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico. 
1763-1810 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 146.
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"Wealthy merchants and miners employed excess capital for the purchase 
of rural estates, and needy hacendados contracted marriage alliances 
with willing merchant and mining families."^®
Another motivational factor in the mineowners' land purchases 
was that the mineowners were rarely permitted to entail their mine- 
holdings, thus they purchased estates in order to establish 
mayorazgos.
The merchant-bourgeoisie of colonial society was very similar to 
the mineowning elite in its ambitions and behavior; and to its commer­
cial counterpart in Spain. Like them, the merchants of colonial 
Spanish America were eager to protect their wealth and to "deliver it"
intact to their heirs. Thus, they too purchased estates and placed
them under entailment. "Such an arrangement coincided with the wealthy 
merchant's usual ambition to found a noble family."H® Clarence Haring 
has commented:
Land was the principal source of riches and pres­
tige in a society which disdained trade and indus­
trial pursuits, and the successful miner Land mer-
chantj invested his income in farms and haciendas.
Landed property was also an indispensable requisite
for the exercise of the few political rights which 
the colonists enjoyed. A minority of fortunate land­
owning Creoles lived much like their Spanish ancestors, 
imbued with similar aristocratic prejudices, and with 
similar improvidence and lack of foresight.
l^L.N. McAlister, "Social Structure and Social Change in New 
Spain," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 48, no. 3 (August 
1963), p. 368.
H-^Parry, The Spanish, p. 316. ^^Brading, Miners. p. 103.
Hearing, The Spanish Empire, p. 241. Genovese raised a similar 
issue on the Hispanic social psychology when he stated: "Those who 
would dismiss the historical debate on the "spirit of capitalism" as 
mere metaphysics, might ponder the combined effects of the pre-bourgeois 
Luso-Hispanic ideology and psychology." The World The Slaveholders Made. 
p. 59.
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Another argument explaining the limited industrial development
of colonial Spanish America has been Spanish mercantilism; however,
as J.H. Elliott has written, referring to imperial policy:
...it could be cogently argued that it was pre­
cisely because of the lack of any consistently 
pursued mercantilist policies that the country 
CSpainl ran into such serious economic difficul­
ties. There was no attempt at systematic exploi­
tation of the resources of the New World other 
than those of the mines, and almost nothing was 
done to develop in the New World an economy which 
might complement that of Castile. It is true that 
the government ordered the destruction of the 
newly planted Peruvian vineyards and olive groves, 
for fear of their competition with...the exports 
of Andalusia; but colonial industries were allowed 
to develop unchecked, and Charles V gave specific 
encouragement to the silk industry of New Spain 
although this was an obvious competition to the 
silk industry of Granada .*•2 ®
Haring does not so readily agree with Elliott's argument of
limited restrictions:
Manufacturing industries had no extensive develop­
ment in the colonies, in part because the Spanish 
government after the period of the conquest was 
inclined to discourage or forbid industries which 
competed with the manufacturers and trade of
another c o u n t r y . 1^1
And yet, he adds that: "Interference by the metropolis with colonial
122industry, however, was never very systematic. *
These conflicting arguments of Elliott and Haring indicate an 
inconsistency on the part of the crown regarding the relationship 
between Spain and its American colonies. Genovese has offered an 
interpretation of mercantilism which proposes that the mercantile 
policy of a state be viewed with respect to the "social bases of state
120Ellio tt, Imperial Spain, p. 196.
l^Haring, The Spanish Empire, p. 242. 122jbid.
96
1 O'*
power,11 i.e. that because the rise of absolutism was based on 
differing alliances in different states, the policies of those states 
would have reflected their class bases. Thus, while the mercantilisms 
of England and Holland were linked to the alliance of the state and 
the bourgeoisie, the mercantilism of Spain was not. The exploitation 
of the mineral wealth of the colony did not go to developing capitalist 
industry in Spain, but rather provided the funds to support Spanish 
imperialism in Europe and for "shoring up the decaying hidalguia."124 
The inconsistency of the crown might then be understood as having been 
due, perhaps, to the contradictions involved in securing immediate 
revenues while keeping the colonies supplied. As opposed to "mercan­
tilism in the sense of a league between the state and the capitalist 
interest,"125 Spanish mercantilism was the policy of a state based on 
an alliance with seigneurial nobles and merchant-seigneurs.
Within the limits of Spain's inconsistent policy, or "seigneurial 
mercantilism," there arose a guild system patterned after the one in 
Spain, and a textile industry based on the obrajes.
The guilds, or gremios. organized the artisans by their crafts: 
"silversmiths, goldbeaters, harness and saddle makers, potters, weavers, 
hatters, candlemakers,"^^ "shoemakers, furniture makers, glassworkers 
and practitioners of other crafts."^^ These guilds have been noted
l^Genovese, The World The Slaveholders Made, p. 56.
12% b i d . , pp. 57-58. See Leopoldo M. Solis, "La Influencia del 
mercantilismo espanol en la vida economica de America Latina," El 
Trimestre Economico, vol. 31, no. 2 (April/June 1964), pp. 200-209.
125yfeber> General Economic History, p. 257.
126naring, The Spanish Empire, p. 252. 127Qibson, Spain, p. 127.
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for their anti-capitalist orientation:
The small artisanal producer understands that his 
interests demand the preservation of his monopo­
listic position and for that reason he mobilizes 
his forces and those of the guild to prevent 
competition,128
Economically considered, the guilds were anti­
capitalist institutions because...the spirit of 
enterprise and individual initiative were absent 
...the members of the guilds were unable to 
invest in their businesses as potential indus­
trialists because the guild structure impeded 
it.129
On the other hand, the obrajes represented a nascent capitalism 
developing in the midst of the seigneurial society and colonial 
economy. However, the obrajes were opposed by the guilds,1^0 inhibited 
by the Atlantic trade which continued to supply the colonies with the 
manufactures desired by the dominant classes, and limited in its 
development by the limited size of the colonial market. Furthermore, 
the qualification of the obraje as nascent - or embryonic - capitalism 
is essential to an appreciation of it. Xts origins depended on compul­
sory labor service and debt bondage; and even in the late eighteenth 
and very early nineteenth centuries the relations of production 
between the obraje owners and their labor force were not very far
1 Ol
removed from those origins. Writing in the last few years of the
128Semo, Historia del capitalismo. p. 161.
129j{anuel Carrera Stampa, Los Gremios mexlcanos: la organizacion 
gremial en Nueva Espans. 1521-1861 (Mexico: EDIAFSA, 1954), p. 265.
On Peru, see Gustavo Adolfo Otero, La Vida social en el coIonia1e (La 
Paz: Editorial Juventud, 1958), pp. 280-281.
130ibid,f (Carrera Stampa), p. 266.
131])iego G. Lopez Rosada, Historia v pensamiento economico de 
Mexico (Mexico: Instituto de Investigaci6n Economics, Universidad 
Nacional, 1969), pp. 224-230; Fernando Silva Santisteban, Los Obrajes
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colonial period, Alexander von Humboldt described the laboring
situation of the obrajes:
Free men, Indians and men of color are confused 
with galley slaves whom the courts distribute to 
the shops to make them work... Each shop appears 
more or less like a jail; the doors, which are 
double, are always locked to prevent the workers 
from leaving, and those that are married only 
return home on Sundays. These obraje owners are 
like those of Quito and are similar to hacendados
in their behavior.132
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the historical 
development of Spanish America were a formative period, in which the 
Spanish conquerors and colonizers sought to establish relations of 
production with the conquered peoples similar to those which existed 
in Spain. In spite of the inconsistent opposition of the crown and 
clergy, and the varying resistance of the Indian communities, the 
Spanish colonizers were extremely successful in establishing seigneu­
rial relations in the New World. Thus, the colonial system in Spanish 
America was being transformed into a colonial society founded on the 
class relations of dominant landowners and dominated peasantry. The 
reforms of the eighteenth century did little to alter the direction of
this process. -^33
The Spanish colonial system was based primarily on the
en el virreinato del Peru (Lima: Museo Nacional de Historia, 1964), 
pp. 37-41; John Leddy Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth 
Century (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 68-70.
132Alexander von Humboldt, Ensayo politico sobre el reino de la 
Nueva Espana (Mexico: Editorial Porr6a, 1966), p. 452.
133grian Hamnett, Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico. 1750- 
1821 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), and John Fisher, 
Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System. 1784- 
1814 (London: University of London Press, 1970).
99
exploitation of precious metals and the monopolization of imperial
commerce by Spain - which served the function of the "merchant"
between Western Europe and the colonies. Unlike the later colonial
empires of Western Europe, which supported the capitalist-industrial
development of the colonizing societies, Spain’s colonial system did
not support such change:
...the new colonial system which emerged in the 
middle of the seventeenth century became one of 
the chief elements...in the preparation of the 
industrial revolution. But - and this is the 
mouc important - the new colonial system only 
emerged fully in those countries which had no 
access to the old, and after the collapse of 
the old.134
Thus, while Spanish America was imprinted with the seigneurialism
of Spain, neither did Spain itself experience capitalist development.
Weber recognized:
...that it depends entirely upon the nature of 
the labor system what tendency will result from 
an inflow of precious metal. The gold and silver 
from America, after the discovery, flowed in the 
first place to Spain, but in that country a 
recession of capitalist development took place 
parallel with the importation. There followed 
on the one hand the suppression of the conmuneros 
CsicJ and the destruction of the commercial 
interests of the Spanish grandees, and on the 
other hand, the employment of the money for military 
ends. Consequently, the stream of precious metals 
flowed through Spain scarcely touching it, and 
fertilized other countries, which in the 15th 
century were already undergoing a process of 
transformation in labor relations which was favorable 
to capitalism. 135
134-Eric j # Hobsbawm, "The Seventeenth Century in the Development 
of Capitalism," Science and Society, vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring 1960), p. 
197.
135weber, General Economic History, pp. 259-260.
CHAPTER IV
SPANISH AMERICAN SEIGNEURIALISM
The Spanish American Wars for Independence (1808-1826) were not 
social revolutions, and the political conflicts of the early national 
period, although infused with the competing ideologies of liberalism 
and conservatism, appear to have been merely elitist, intra-class 
battles for control of the State, rather than struggles over the 
structure of society.
In those colonial Spanish American societies of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries where the Indian peasantry 
and working classes had risen in rebellion against the increasing 
exactions of the creole'*' and Spanish landowners, miners, and officials 
of the empire, the creoles and Spaniards had united to suppress them. 
However much the creoles might have begun to favor independence from 
Spain - motivated by the political and economic ideologies of the 
Enlightenment, the example of the successful United States War for 
Independence, the opportunity to expand commercial relations with 
North America and Europe, and the opportunity to eliminate the social
1
*The creoles were those Spaniards who were born in America.
(They were considered "inferior" to Spaniards born in Spain.)
^For Peru and the Andes, see Daniel ValcArcel, Rebeliones 
indigenas (Lima: Editorial P.T.C.M., 1946), and La Rebelion de Tupac 
Amaru (Mexico: Fondo de Culture Econ6mica, 1947); for Mexico, see 
Hugh Hamill, The Hidalgo Revolt - Prelude to Mexican Independence 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966).
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and legal obstacles to their upward mobility in the governmental struc-
O
ture and the military^ - they were unwilling to support independence 
movements which potentially challenged their current and future domina­
tion of the Spanish American societies. And when the creoles did 
finally favor independence and seek to establish it, it was because they 
recognized that they could no longer afford to depend on the power and 
questionable will of Spain to secure them against the possibility of 
social revolution by the laboring classes, or invasion by a foreign 
power.4
Undeniably, the ideas of the Enlightenment and the example of
the French Revolution influenced the Spanish American independence
movements; however, it was the less radical Anglo-American liberalism
and the example of the United States which became their ideological
style. John Lynch has explained:
...embracing the principles of liberty and 
applauding the rights of man. Equality was 
another matter. Situated as they were between 
the Spaniards and the masses, the creoles wanted 
more than equality for themselves and less than 
equality for their inferiors... The more radical 
the French revolution became and the better it 
was known, the less it appealed to the creole 
aristocracy... The influence of the United 
States was more benevolent and more enduring... 
its existence...and its embodiment of liberty 
and republicanism.5
^Robin Humphreys and John Lynch, eds., The Origins of the Latin 
American Revolutions (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965).
^John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions. 1808-1826 (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), pp. 20-24. Also, see F. Stirton 
Weaver, "Political Disintegration and Reconstruction in 19th Century 
Spanish America: The Class Basis of Political Change," Politics and 
Society, vol. 5, no. 2 (1975), pp. 162-170.
■’ibid., (Lynch), pp. 28-29. As well as the liberal movement 
towards independence there was, at the same time, a conservative
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The Spanish American Wars for Independence, thus, ended three 
centuries of Spanish colonial rule. The dominant classes of Spanish 
America removed the Iberian-Spanish elite from politico-economic con­
trol and established republican governments; the control of which were 
to be fought over by rival factions of those "liberated" dominant 
classes.
But except for the removal of the Iberian-Spanish elite, whose
political position was filled by members of the Creole aristocracy and
whose economic position was filled both by Spanish Americans and newly
arrived foreign merchants,^ the social structures of the Spanish
American societies were little changed. Or, as the historian, Robin
Humphreys, has written:
The hierarchical structure of society remained 
intact... The Indians were by far the largest 
element and after them the mestizos. But the 
coming of independence meant little or nothing 
to the Mexican peon, Peruvian Indian, or the 
Chilean inquilino, and the social and economic 
power of a small territorial aristocracy was 
in no way diminished.^
Liberalism and Agrarian Reform 
Although the Spanish American societies were not "structurally 
revolutionized" by the Wars for Independence, the formation of inde­
pendent states and the creation of governments (whose politico-economic
movement sometimes opposed, sometimes allied with, the liberals for 
independence. The achievement of independence led to the political 
battles between these two "parties" during the early national period.
6See Tulio Halperin Donghi, The Aftermath of Revolution in Latin 
America (New York: Harper and Row - Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 44-52.
^Robin Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt in Latin America (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 10-11.
orientations were to be decided) did lead to significant changes, even 
- if not particularly - in the countryside. As well as the abolition 
of slavery (immediately in some countries and later in others)® there 
were also agrarian reforms enacted, and often implemented, which 
greatly affected the Spanish American land tenure structures.
It may have been the liberalism and republicanism of the French 
Revolution and the United States which provided the ideology for the 
Spanish American Wars for Independence, but it was the economic 
liberalism of Britain which provided the Spanish American liberals 
with their ideology of political economy. However, British liberal 
economic theory had emerged as the ideology of the bourgeoisie of a 
developing capitalist and industrializing society,^ while the Spanish 
American societies had experienced almost three centuries as conquest 
and colonial societies, dependent on agriculture and mining, and 
dominated by admittedly commercial, but seigneurial, classes.
Liberalism, thus, appears incongruent as an ideology championed 
by a significant faction of the dominant classes of the Spanish 
American societies, particularly when one considers that the liberal 
ideology was directly opposed to "feudal'* politico-legal property 
systems and relations of production, and that it posited the free, 
private landowning yeoman-farmer as the ideal agrarian class.^
®Mellafe, Breve historia. pp. 141-168.
®See Eric J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the 
Present Day (London: Penguin Books, 1969).
lOcharles Hale, Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora. 1821-1853 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 175-179, and Frederick 
B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1967), pp. 64-69.
However, as we have seen, the Spanish American landowning classes were 
not "feudal nobilities" - aristocratic though they appeared. Rather, 
they were classes which remained open and available to successful 
members of the merchant and mining "bourgeoisies." That is, social 
mobility for the middle ranks of society*’*' (often, the creole heirs to 
the Spanish merchants who had established themselves in the colonies) 
into the dominant, landowning class was possible:*-^ "Independent 
Mexico, as in colonial times, saw large amounts of commercial capital 
channeled into large landed estates; constituting a new agrarian aris­
tocracy of bourgeois origins."*■•* And in Chile, where "The great mass 
of the population was dominated by a small oligarchy of creoles..."
Some of the newer members of the creole 
oligarchy had made their money in trade, but 
used it to acquire estates, land being the 
basis of all wealth in the colony.*-^
This is not to argue that those merchants abandoned their com­
mercial enterprises, although some historians have argued that they 
did, but rather to recognize that the landed "aristocracies" of the 
Spanish American societies were continually strengthened by the
^Using the term "middle ranks" loosely.
*-^Some historians and sociologists have defined feudal societies 
in terms of "estates" rather than classes, emphasizing the improbabi­
lity of social mobility; this is another reason why it has been argued 
that Spanish America cannot be defined as "feudal."
*--*Francisco Lopez cSmara, La Estructura economica y social de 
Mexico en la epoca de la Reforma (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1973), p. 206.
*-^Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics in Chilean Independence. 
1808-1833 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 5. The 
creole merchants had continued to affirm Dobb's hypothesis that a 
merchant class "is likely to struggle to 'muscle in' upon an existing 
form of appropriating surplus labor, but it is unlikely to try to 
change this form." Dobb, Studies, p. 18.
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admission of new families which had secured their entree to the power 
and privilege of landed status through wealth acquired in mercantile 
activities. Or, as one Latin American sociologist has commented: "The 
Latin American oligarchy is permanent, but its members change with each 
generation.
Not "feudal nobles," the members of these dominant classes did 
not hold their estates by "feudal" prerogatives, but rather as indivi­
dual private landowners. Thus, except for the institution of mayorazgo, 
i.e. the entailment of estates (which was abolished rather early every­
where but Chile) the Spanish American landowners would not be threa­
tened by the enactment and implementation of liberal agrarian reforms, 
directed at "feudal" property systems. In fact, as we shall see, they 
could only benefit from such reforms.
Regarding the social relations of production between the Spanish 
American landowners and their work forces: Negro slavery was being 
abolished and the peasantry was legally free. That is, the peasants of 
the estates were not bound to them by any legally sanctioned servile 
status, as were their counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe.
Neither was debt peonage, which was more common in some regions than 
in others, officially sanctioned; although both the Spanish Crown 
during colonial times, and the weak, landowner-dominated, governments 
of independent Spanish America lacked either the power or the will to 
suppress it. (And there were even those who would argue that indebted 
laborers were very dissimilar to serfs, because actually they were
*-5Fernando Guillen Martfnez, "Paternalism, Individualism, and 
the Strategy of the West," in Norman A. Bailey, ed., Latin America: 
Politics. Economics and Hemispheric Security (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1965), p. 85.
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merely laborers fulfilling contracts.)
Hypocrisy? Perhaps, but the landowners who favored a liberal 
political economy for their governments, and liberal agrarian reforms 
directed against supposedly "feudal" property systems, were not 
opposed by conservatives who challenged their mode of domination in 
the countryside; for they, too, as landowners, practised that same 
form of social control. However much the conservatives might oppose 
liberalism, they were either defeated by the liberals or were at least 
defeated long enough for liberal agrarian reforms to be enacted, 
enabling them to profit by them as well!
Varying according to their respective significance in each of 
the Spanish American countries, the "feudal" property systems which 
came under attack from the liberal agrarian reforms were the land­
holdings of the Church and its associated bodies, the communally-owned 
lands of the Indian peasantry, and the mayorazgos.
An attack on "feudal" property structures had, necessarily, to 
include ecclesiastical holdings, which, although often managed quite 
efficiently, represented a corporate monopoly on property.^ Further­
more, the church's role as mortgage-holder and credit institution 
generated increasing antagonisms, and the lack of financial resources 
of the newly-established Spanish American governments led the liberals, 
and conservatives alike, to recall the dictum of Adam Smith that "the 
richer the Church, the poorer the State."^
l^Not to be confused with private business corporations and 
monopolies.
l^Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannon (New York: The Modern Library, 
1937), p. 765.
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The desamortizacion. i.e. the alienation of ecclesiastical pro­
perties, which the liberals sought, was not without precedent.*-® In 
the late eighteenth century, the Spanish crown had seen fit to expell
the Order of Jesuits from the empire and put their numerous, and valu-
IQ
able, holdings up for sale, which were then purchased by merchants 
and miners, eager to enter the landed class, or by the already landed:
The removal of the Jesuits had several important
short-term effects in Chile... It also strengthened
the economic and social power of several creole
families who were able to buy up Jesuit estates. u
Through a variety of laws the Spanish Americans "liberated" 
ecclesiastical properties from entailment and religious encumbrances, 
or at least reduced the role of the church as a credit institution and
mortgage-holder.2*- In theory, the desired effect of this process was
to generate a market in land, in order to give rise to the much 
idealized class of yeomen-farmers; however, the process of desamorti­
zacion and related acts, followed a more predictable path. That is, 
rather than create a middle stratum of farmers, the disentailment of 
ecclesiastical holdings merely furthered the concentration of land- 
ownership in private hands. For example, in Mexico, where the aliena­
tion of ecclesiastical property was carried out on the broadest scale, 
the class which benefited most was the already landed, i.e. the 
hacendados, whose mortgages were reduced and encumbrances removed.
Also able to take advantage of, and benefit from, the liberal agrarian
*-®For example, revolutionary France, and even Spain.
^Arnold Bauer, "The Church and Spanish American Agrarian Struc­
ture, 1765-1865," Americas, vol. 28, no. 1 (July 1971), pp. 82-84.
2®Collier, Ideas and Politics, p. 33.
2*Bauer, "The Church," pp. 84-86.
reforms were the merchants, both native and foreign, and the urban
99professionals who aspired to landed status. *
The communal landholding systems of the Indian peasantries were 
also defined as "feudalistic" and obstacles to "modern'' agriculture 
because the peasant's lands were entailed to the community; thus pro­
hibiting the development of private landownership and the evolution 
of the more capable peasants into yeomen-farmers. At the same time, 
this issue was related to the greater social issue of "Indian 
integration."
The Spanish Crown, as we have seen, exhibiting the inconsistency 
evident in all colonial regimes, had sought to protect the Indian 
peasantries in their communities at the same time that it harnessed 
those Indian communities to serve as a mode of social control and as 
a system for colonial exploitation via the encomienda and the repart- 
imiento. Thus, to favor the dissolution of the Indian peasantry's 
communal system and the subdivision of their communal lands into pri­
vate landholdings represented not merely an attack on the system of 
communal-entailment, but also an attack on a remaining structure of 
the colonial regime, which had maintained the Indians in their 
"separate" and "unequal" status.^ -3
Opposition to the dissolution of the Indian peasant communities
22see Jan Bazant, Alienation of Church Wealth in Mexico: Social 
and Economic Aspects of the Liberal Revolution. 1856-1875. trans. 
Michael P. Costeloe (London: Caui>ridge University Press, 1971).
^^Hale, Mexican Liberalism, pp. 220-221; and Thomas M. Davies, 
Indian Integration in Peru (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1974), pp. 17-43. In Peru, the colonial tribute system persisted in 
several regions for much of the nineteenth century, in spite of laws 
against it.
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and the subdivision of their lands was divided between those conserva­
tives who wished to continue the ,rprotective,, policies of the former 
colonial regime and those liberals who recognized the contradictions 
in their own policies. They saw that to remove the "legal obstacles" 
to the development of private property amongst the Indian peasantry 
would also be to remove what little protection the Indian peasant land­
holders possessed. That is, the Indians would merely pass from a sys­
tem of communal landholding to a condition of landlessness. However, 
the politically powerful of the Spanish American societies were the 
hacendados, supported by the urban commercial classes and professional 
stratum eager to become landowners.^
The promulgation of laws disentailing the community landholding 
systems^ did not immediately lead to the peasantry's loss of their 
lands and their relocation onto the latifundia. The community land- 
holding systems continued to persist through the strength of custom 
and in spite of the laws. (And, significantly, those communities which 
did lose their lands often persisted within the latifundia which had 
swallowed them up. Thus, the peasants ceased to own their lands, but 
they continued to possess them.) However, the reform laws did faci­
litate the encroachment, both illegally (by force) and legally (by 
purchase), by the hacendados and "would-be" hacendados on the 
communities' lands.
^T.G. Powell, El Liberalising v el campesinado en el centro de 
Mexico, 1850-1876. Sep Setentas no. 122 (Mexico: Secretarfa de Educacion 
Publica, 1974), pp. 66-70; and Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 
67-69.
^^For Mexico, see Powell, El Liberalismo. pp. 74-100; for Bolivia, 
see Ramiro Condarco Morales, Zarate, el "temible" Wilka (La Paz, 1965), 
pp. 41-49; and for Peru, see Davies, Indian Integration, pp. 19-31.
The Indian peasantries did not necessarily accept the liberal 
reforms pacifically. Throughout the nineteenth century, and into the 
twentieth, the Mexican, Bolivian, and Peruvian countrysides experi­
enced numerous peasant uprisings, generated by encroachment or the 
threat of encroachment on the lands of the communities.^
The legislative and physical encroachment on the lands of the 
Indian peasant communities was, of course, a significant issue only in 
those countries where the communities had survived the conquest and 
colonization. In Chile, where the Indian population had been greatly 
reduced in numbers, or limited to the southern territories, the 
peasantry was generally mestizo, and it had developed along with the 
estates. Neither was the issue of ecclesiastical landownership sig­
nificant in Chile, compared to the other Spanish American countries, 
because the major ecclesiastical landholder had been the Order of 
Jesuits, \rtiose lands had already been confiscated and sold off to 
private purchasers late in the eighteenth century. But what appear 
to have been more significant in Chile than elsewhere were the 
mayorazgos.
The legislative struggle over the mayorazgo issue followed the 
changing balance of conservative-liberal politics. In 1818, the 
Chilean independence leader, O'Higgins, had decreed the abolition of
2fiJean Meyer, Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias (1821- 
1910), Sep Setentas no. 80 (Mexico: Secretaries de Educacion Publica, 
1973); Condarco Morales, Zarate: and Jean Piel, "The Place of the 
Peasantry in the National Life of Peru in the Nineteenth Century,"
Past and Present, no. 46 (February 1970), pp. 108-133. Of interest is 
the fact that during the Mexican conservatives' attempt to establish a 
monarchy with French support and an Austrian prince, the Indian pea­
santry of some regions gave their support to the conservatives because 
they hoped it would mean a return of the protectionist policy of the 
colonial period. (See Powell, El Liberalismo. chapter 4.)
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the mayorazgo system, but his decree had no effect at all - except to 
further the split between liberals and conservatives.22 Again aboli­
shed by the liberal constitution of 1828, it was restored by the con­
servatives in 1833.2® It was not finally abolished until 1852.
The mayorazgo issue has traditionally been viewed by historians 
as part of a major socio-political struggle between the "landed aris-
q n
tocracy" and more progressive urban interests, which one historian
has updated to argue that the landed aristocracy was losing political
3 1sway to the merchant class. However, most recently, it has been 
shown that the socio-economic and political significance of the mayo­
razgo issue has been exaggerated. That is, the issue was more an 
ideological one between conservatives and liberals than a socio-economic 
one, because mayorazgos were fewer in number than previously assumed 
and, thus, disentailment would not seriously threaten the landowners' 
estates. They would remain intact: "Mayorazgos went without a bang 
and barely a whimper, while the great landowners remained firmly in 
control of the countryside."^2 (Furthermore, considering the origins 
and ties of the landowning class, the "struggle" between it and the 
merchant class would have been more of a "family-feud" than inter-class
22Collier, Ideas and Politics, pp. 247-248.
28Ibid., pp. 292, 324.
2^Luis Galdames, A History of Chile, p. 292.
30Ricardo Donoso, Las Ideas pol^ticas en Chile (Mexico: Fondo de 
Cultura Economica, 1946), pp. 115-173, (chapter 5 "La lucha contra la 
aristocracia").
31jay Kinsbrunner, Chile: A Historical Interpretation (New York: 
Harper and Row - Torchbooks, 1973), pp. 59-60, 67-70.
•^Arnold Bauer, Chilean Rural Society from the Spanish Conquest 
to 1930 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 20-21.
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conflict.)
The attacks on and alienation of ecclesiastical property, the 
threats to and encroachment on many Indian peasant communities, and 
the less significant, but actual disentailment of mayorazgos, were 
supposed to give rise to a class of yeomen farmers. And yet, without 
doubt, the greatest obstacle to the development of such a class was 
the latifundia land tenure pattern. However, as private property, the 
haciendas were inviolable. Although there were critics of the land 
tenure pattern, the direction of the agrarian reforms, and the seig­
neurial mode of domination in the countryside, the liberal intelli­
gentsia could not challenge the private property system they were so 
eager to further; nor would the liberal (and conservative) political 
chieftains have accepted such legislation, when their socio-economic 
strength and political power were based on their landownership. Thus, 
however successful the liberal legislators might be in their attacks 
against "feudal," entailed property systems, their goal was contra­
dicted by their own ideology. And the reforms which were enacted, 
instead of changing the structure of rural Spanish America, had the 
effect of actually reinforcing and expanding seigneurialism in the 
countryside.
Seigneurial Domination
The liberal agrarian reforms carried out in Spanish America 
during the nineteenth century - involving the disentailment of 
ecclesiastical holdings, Indian peasant communal lands, and mayorazgos,
3^As we would expect: "...the liberal attack on latifundia was 
also undermined for social reasons, since most of the legislators 
themselves were landowners." Hale, Mexican Liberalism, p. 181.
furthered the concentration of private Landownershlp and strengthened
the landed aristocracy by freeing the land from religious encumbrances, 
and also, by permitting the entry of new families to landed status.
However, the concentration of landownership in the hands of a 
single class does not necessarily constitute the formation and 
persistence of a seigneurial regime. For although the class structure 
of a society is based on those classes’ relations to the means of pro­
duction, those relations are not determined merely by the classes’ 
positions in relation to property. The relations themselves may vary. 
That is, there may be extreme concentration of landownership, but the 
landowner-laborer relationship may be that of capitalist-proletariat, 
landowner-tenant, or landlord-peasant. Or, as Marx wrote:
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus 
labor is pumped out of the direct producers, deter­
mines the relation of domination and servitude as 
it emerges directly out of production itself and 
in its turn reacts upon production... It is always 
the direct relation between the masters of the 
conditions of production and direct producers which 
reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation 
of the entire social edifice... This does not prevent 
an economic basis which in its principal characteris­
tics is the same, from manifesting infinite variations 
and gradations, owing to the effect of innumerable 
external circumstances, climatic and geographical 
influences, racial peculiarities, historical 
influences from the outside, etc. These variations 
can only be discovered by analyzing the empirically 
given circumstances.
There was a definite similarity to the agrarian social relations 
of production of the Spanish American societies. The terms peonage 
(Mexico), huasipunguale (Ecuador), colons1e and yanaconale (Peru and
^Karl Marx from Capital (Vol. Ill), Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, trans. and ed. T.B. 
Bottomore and M. Rubel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 99.
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Bolivia), and inquilinaje (Chile) all referred to the relations of pro­
duction in which the landowner ceded a parcel of land to the peasant in 
return for labor service on the estate itself. And yet, noting Marx, 
these seigneurial relationships existed within specific agrarian struc­
tures (and national societies, which to a greater or lesser extent were 
involved in the world economy) exhibiting their own structural features 
and variations.^5
In Mexico, travelling from north to south, one passed through 
three agrarian regions. The northern region of Mexico was dominated 
by the great estate with its dependent labor force of peons. The 
Mexican peons were not maintained on the estates merely through their 
tenancy on a parcel of land granted by the hacendado. They were also 
often held on the land through a system of debts, which Marx termed 
slavery:
In some states, particularly in Mexico...slavery 
is hidden under the form of peonage. By means 
of advances, repayable in labor, which are handed 
down from generation to generation, not only the 
individual laborer, but his family, become defacto, 
the property of other persons and their families.
Occasionally, on the more extensive latifundia, there were also
tenant-farmers.^7
35xhe significance of the variations amongst and within the 
Spanish American agrarian structures directly affected the possibili­
ties for and the course of peasant mobilizations and agrarian reforms, 
as we shall see in this and the next chapter.
3*>Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 
vol. 1, p. 168, footnote 2.
37i?ranjois Chevalier, "The North Mexican Hacienda: Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries," in A.R. Lewis and T.F. McGann, eds., The 
New World Looks at its History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1963), pp. 95-107.
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In Central Mexico the hacienda continued to dominate the 
countryside, but more often It "coexisted" with numerous independent 
peasant villages whose members depended to differing degrees on the 
seasonal employment offered by the estates.®® And in the southern 
region, rural Mexico was characterized by Indian peasant villages 
which had survived the conquest and colonization alongside large, and 
ever-encroaching, but less overwhelming h a c i e n d a s .
In Peru, regional variation in the agrarian structure existed 
between the Sierra and the Coast. The Peruvian Sierra (and the 
Bolivian highlands)^® were characterized by the symbiotic coexistence 
of the haciendas and the Indian peasant communities which were 
struggling to persist. The haciendas' labor forces consisted of the 
colonos. and often satellite Indian peasant communities resident on 
their own lands or their former lands, tfiich had succumbed to the 
expanding latifundia.^ The Indian peasant communities - even when in 
possession of their own lands, often provided a reserve labor force for 
the estate by virtue of the hacienda's monopolization of local 
resources; which might range from additional grazing land to control 
of the water supply, or perhaps merely control of the path between the
®®Powell, El Liberalismo. pp. 44-46.
®^William B. Taylor, "Landed Society in New Spain: A View from 
the South," Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 54, no. 3 
(August 1974), pp. 387-413.
^^Dwight B. Heath, Charles J. Erasmus, and Hans C. Buechler,
Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1969).
^Henri Favre, Claude Collin Delavaud, and Jose Matos Mar,
La Hacienda en el Peru (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1967), 
pp. 247-255.
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village and the villagers' lands in the next valley, for which a 
"toll" might be levied.^2 Of course, there were areas where the 
Indian peasant communities were not threatened nor dominated by 
haciendas; however, following the liberal agrarian reforms these 
areas were reduced in number.
Latifundia also dominated coastal Peru; however, the mode of
/ Q
production on the coastal estates was originally based on African 
slavery, introduced early in the colonial period.^ Negro slavery 
persisted in Peru even after independence and was not finally abolished 
until 1854. When it was finally abolished, the landowners responded 
by changing the relations of production from slavery to yanaconaje, 
i.e. the former slaves and additional Indian laborers were settled on 
the latifundia in a system similar to colonaje in the Sierra.^ A 
further change in the relations of production on the coastal latifundia 
was the "importation" of Chinese laborers to Peru, both to work in the 
guano deposits and on the plantations. These Chinese laborers were 
held on the plantations by a system of debt bondage. Thus, the coastal 
latifundia came to depend on two labor forces: the Negro and Indian 
yanacona and the indebted Chinese.^
^2Ibid.
^^Which have been called plantations from early on, because of 
the export orientation of sub-tropical and tropical produce, e.g. 
sugar and cotton.
^Frederick Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru: 1524- 
1650 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974).
45piel, "The Place of the Peasantry," pp. 122-124.
46Ibid., p. 125. Also, see Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in 
Peru: A History of Chinese Coolies in Peru: 1849-1874 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1951).
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Chile, as we have seen, was conquered and colonized by the Spanish 
later than Mexico and Peru. And yet, there too, seigneurial relations 
of production had developed in the countryside: at first by locating 
the estate near the encomienda grant, or by relocating the Indians onto 
the estate itself; and later by inviting the settlement of mestizos and 
poor Spaniards onto the margins of the latifundia, for which they 
supplied a specified amount of labor service to the landowner. Also, 
in a manner similar to the hacendados of the other developing socie­
ties of Spanish America, the Chilean landowners responded to increased 
market demands and opportunities by enlarging the size of the demesne 
and increasing the required labor service of the peasantry 
(inquilinos)
In addition to the resident labor force of inquilinos, the 
estate owners could also call upon a reserve labor force known as
A O
afuerinos. ° The afuerinos were peasants who lived outside the 
boundaries of the latifundia on smallholdings and yet depended for 
their subsistence on the seasonal employment offered by the estates.
The situation of the afuerinos in relation to the estates, 
although similar to that of the satellite Indian peasant communities 
of the Mexican and Peruvian haciendas, was not actually comparable to 
them, because the afuerinos were not bound together through any 
traditional communities as were the Indian peasantry:
^Bauer, Chilean Rural Society, pp. 145-159.
^®The afuerinos are also referred to as peons by many writers; 
not to be confused with Mexican peonage.
^^Bauer, Chilean Rural Society, pp. 145-159.
The majority of them CafuerinosU lead an entirely 
nomadic life, rarely remaining in the same place 
and passing without hesitation from one province 
to another as if movement and change were their 
only necessity.
Nor were the inquilinos and afuerinos the only labor forces 
available to the landowners. There also developed a third peasant 
stratum in relation to the estates. This third stratum, the 
voluntarios. lived in the homes of the inquilinos and remained 
directly dependent on them. (Often, they were relatives of the 
inquilinos.) The inquilinos maintained the voluntarios so that, 
during the seasons when the inquilinos were required to render 
increased labor service on the estate, for example at harvest time, 
they were often able to send the voluntarios in their p l a c e s . T h u s ,  
when the Chilean estate owners found it necessary, they were able to 
call upon the labor of their inquilinos, the marginal, yet dependent, 
afuerinos, and the voluntarios.
The Spanish American agrarian sectors were not, therefore, 
structurally uniform. Although the dominant social relations of pro­
duction on the estate were based on the seigneurial relationship which 
had developed between the landowners and their dependent, resident 
labor forces, there was diversity amongst the agrarian structures of 
the Spanish American societies as well as variations within them. 
Mexico was regionally differentiated on the extent of the hacienda's
^Claudio Gay, Historia f£sica y politica de Chile: agricultura 
(Santiago: Museo de Historia Natural, 1862), vol. 1, p. 198.
51-Solon Barraclough, Agrarian Structure in Latin America 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 136-137. This book is a 
resume of the CIDA Land Tenure Studies of the early 1960's.
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expansion in relation to the Indian peasant communities.^ Peru's 
regional differentiation was between the coastal plantations with 
their yanacona and Chinese laborers, and the Sierra with its hacienda 
system of colono laborers and satellite Indian peasant c o m m u n i t i e s . - ^
And the agrarian structure of Chile, which in the nineteenth century 
referred to central Chile (where Indian communities had all but ceased 
to exist), was dominated by latifundia, upon which three strata of 
peasantry depended: the inquilinos, afuerinos and voluntarios.
Nevertheless, even in its diversity, rural Spanish America - as 
the product of the conquest and colonization by Iberian Spain, followed 
by the liberal agrarian reforms, was characterized by latifundia and 
pre-capitalist modes of production. And yet, thus far we have merely 
explained the formation and described the structures of agrarian 
Spanish America, we have not explained those structures as "total" 
modes of domination and exploitation.
Eugene Genovese, whose own work has been extremely critical of
those historians and social scientists who promote "economic
"determinisn,"^ has explained that:
A particular base (mode of production) will 
generate a corresponding superstructure (political 
system, complex of ideologies, culture, etc.) but
^Although we have been referring to them as Indian peasant 
communities, many of the Mexican peasant communities, particularly in 
the central region, had become mestizo, socio-culturally.
^The agrarian structure of the Peruvian sierra, as we have 
indicated, was also characteristic of highland Bolivia.
^ O n  Genovese, see the essays by William F. Steirer, "Eugene 
Genovese: Marxist-Romantic Historian of the South," The Southern 
Review, vol. 10, no. 4 (October 1974), pp. 840-850, and "Let Us Begin 
with the Masters: Eugene Genovese and the Slaveholders," Southeastern 
Latin Americanist, vol. 19, no. 1 (June 1975), pp. 3-6.
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that superstructure will develop according to 
its own logic as well as in response to the 
development of the base.^
And along these lines, Alexander Gerschenkron, the economist,
has quoted one of his colleagues to the effect that: "Although Marxian
analysis claims to be most concerned with the economic Infrastructure
it is actually more concerned with the superstructure."^ But, perhaps
Antonio Gramsci, the Italian political philosopher, has presented the
issue most clearly in his concept of the "historical bloc":
...in which precisely material forces are the 
content and ideologies the form, though this 
distinction between form and content has purely 
didactic value, since the material forces would 
be inconceivable historically without form and 
the ideologies would be individual fancies 
without the material forces.^
Thus, to understand the seigneurialism of rural Spanish America 
it is necessary to examine not only the "content" (material forces), 
but also the "form" (ideologies) of the landlord-peasant relations of 
domination and dependence.
Marx recognized the significant difference between the seigneu- 
rial and capitalist modes of production. Although both are relations 
of exploitation, the seigneurial mode of production differs from the 
capitalist mode of production because it involves extra-economic ties 
between the landowners and their dependents which bind them together 
in personal relations beyond that of merely property owners and
55Genovese, In Red and Black, p. 322.
5<>Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, p. 96.
57Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. 
and ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (New York: International Publishers,
1971), p. 377.
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l a b o r e r s . 58 That is, the relationship of exploiter and exploited of 
the seigneurial mode of production is embedded in more extensive 
personal relations; unlike the capitalist mode of production in which 
"...the relation between property owner and worker...ClsJ confined to 
the economic relationship of exploiter and exploited.
Max Weber wrote that the power of a seigneurial lord was com­
posed of three elements: "first, landholding (territorial power), 
second, possession of men (slavery), and third, appropriation of 
political rights."^® The landowning classes of Spanish America were 
very successful in living up to this ideal-type. One mid-nineteenth 
century traveller to Mexico wrote of the landowners' domination of 
the peasants:
The rich who rule everything - even the minds of 
the poor... They have the power to punish to 
almost any extent - even death, and are served 
with the most abject deference by their peons or 
slaves. (As slavery is not recognized the word 
servant is more proper.) They are bound to their 
masters for some debt, which the latter take care 
shall never be paid...neither mind nor hope above 
their present condition...when addressing their 
masters they take off their hats and speak in a 
hesitating and trembling manner as though they 
were in the presence of a Superior Being.61
Jesus Silva Herzog, the Mexican historian, described the 
nineteenth century hacienda in the following terms;
The peon of the hacienda can't be called a serf,
^®Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. and ed. T.B. Bottomore (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1964), pp. 114-115.
-^ Ibid.
^^Hfeber, General Economic History, p. 63.
61-William W. Carpenter, Travels and Adventures in Mexico (New 
York: Harper and Bros., 1851), p. 148.
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nor the landowner a lord, nor the agrarian 
structure feudal - strictly speaking; however, 
if one is seeking a certain analogy by which to 
compare the economic and socio-political struc­
ture of the Mexican countryside, then it is 
European feudalism: the great hacendado with 
the European lord of the seventeenth century 
and the peon with a medieval serf.6^
Similarly, the Peruvian writer, Jose Carlos Mariategui, wrote of
the latifundia of his own country:
The hacienda is run like a baronial fief. The 
laws of the state are not applied in the lati- 
fundium without the tacit or formal consent of 
the large landowners. The authority of politi­
cal or administrative officials is, in fact, 
subject to the authority of the landowner in 
his domain. The latter considers his latifundium 
to be outside the jurisdiction of the state...63
And of Chile, resident foreigners and travellers noted that:
"The proprietor is a magistrate and has power to put a man in irons if 
he deems it necessary."6^ and "These owners of haciendas are really and 
truly as much the owners of the peasantry as the feudal lord was of the 
serf."65
These and other descriptions of the domination of the landowners 
over the peasantry of the Spanish American estates refer also to the 
jails located on the estates, beatings and whippings of the peasantry 
by the landowners and their overseers, the customary right of the
6^Jesus Silva Herzog, El Agrarismo mexicano y la reforma agraria 
(Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economics, 1964), p. 130.
65Jose Carlos Mariategui, Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian 
Reality, trans. M. Urquidi (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), 
p. 63.
6Slevin 0. Winter, Chile and Her People of Today (Boston: L.C. 
Page, 1912), p. 199.
65George Byam, Wanderings in Some of the Western Republics of 
America (London: John Parker, 1850), p. 8.
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landowners Co pursue, capture and punish runaway peasants. One
traveller, after describing the servile status of the peasants and
their families on the estates of Andean South America, summed it up
well in recalling the following episode: After witnessing a peasant
receive a thrashing from the landowner he asked why the peasant
deserved to be whipped:
Most courteously he responded that the Indian 
had run away from his home upon the landowner's 
estate in order to go to La Paz to be a workman.
But he was caught and thrashed and brought back.66
According to these and other descriptions, the domination of the
peasantry by the landowners could be harsh, if not brutal, and yet the
domination by the Spanish American landowners depended on more than
merely the "brutalization" of the peasantry. One authoress, after a
residence in Peru, broadened the picture of domination - and tempered
it, when she wrote:
The happiness of such Indians depends almost 
entirely on the disposition of their owner, 
for they, like their fields, belong to the 
master of the farm. Some hacendados bring 
sin and disgrace into the lives of their 
Indians, while others rule with gentle
kindness.67
But even the recognition of individual variations is obviously 
still too incomplete for an historical appreciation of Spanish American 
seigneurialism. For, as Genovese has written, paraphrasing Gramsci: 
"Historically, class hegemony is achieved and maintained by consent, 
not force."68
6&Alexander Adams, The Plateau Peoples of South America: An 
Essay in Ethnic Psychology (London: Rutledge, 1915), pp. 61-66.
67ceraldine Guinness, Peru (New York: Revell, 1915), p. 166.
68Genovese, In Red and Black, p. 406.
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Marx wrote that a seigneurial lord's domination of his peasantry 
was both political "and even has an agreeable side."^ And Spanish 
American landowner-peasant social relations were characterized not only
by the harshness of seigneurial domination,, but also by the paternalism
of seigneurial domination.
George McBride, the historical and social geographer, and
author of two classic studies on rural Spanish America,recognized
the duality of the landowners' domination of their work forces when
he wrote in his work on Mexico:
Over this aggregation [the hacienda] the owner 
presides in a more or less patriarchical manner, 
the degree of paternal care or of tyranny 
varying...The life of a Mexican hacendado is a 
curious mixture of primitive rusticity and 
modern luxury, of self-indulgence and fatherly
solicitude for his dependents, of stern
administration and paternal discipline.. , ^
Later, in his work on Chile, after describing the harshness of
the peasant's life and condition, he wrote of the landowner-inquilino
relationship:
...the traditional relationship that exists 
between the inquilino and the hacendado - between 
master and man - somewhat ameliorates the hard­
ships of the inquilino's condition. The land­
owner is not only employer, he is also patron.
The system is quite patriarchal in its actual 
operation. The inquilino usually feels a sense 
of loyalty and even of devotion to the farm 
owner. The latter, in turn, looks upon the 
inquilinos as his wards, almost as his children.
He regards them with solicitous care.^2
G^Marx, Early Writings, p. 114.
70George M. McBride, The Land Systems of Mexico (New York: 
American Geographical Society, 1923), and Chile: Land and Society 
(New York: American Geographical Society, 1936).
^Vlbid. (The Land Systems), pp. 28-29. 72McBride, Chile, p. 162.
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Nor were the landowners of Peru unlike their fellow Spanish
Americans in their mode of social control.Anthropologists working
in the Peruvian Sierra recognized that paternalism was an essential
element of landowner-peasant social relations:
The patron of a Peruvian hacienda is likely to 
exhibit a great deal of personal kindness, to 
allow indulgences, so long as the work of his 
Indian laborers and tenants is carried out to
his satis faction.74
Another anthropologist noted that: "One very great advantage of 
the peon-hacendado relationship is the protection which the patron may 
give to his Indian peons."75
In part because of the landowners' paternal domination, but also 
as a result of the peasants' having been born and raised on the 
estates, the peasants developed an attachment and sense of identifica­
tion with the estates - which in turn lent support to the landowners' 
position of dominance.76 George McBride recognized this sense of 
attachment when he wrote on Mexico:
...many of these peons have proprietary claims 
on the land which they and their ancestors have 
occupied and cultivated for generations. Uhile 
it is true, their tenure has no legal status,
^^Mario C. Vasquez, Hacienda, peonaie. v servidumbre en los 
Andes peruanos (Lima: Editorial Estudios Andinos, 1961), pp. 26-42.
74ihomas r . Ford, Man and Land in Peru (Gainesville: University 
of Florida Press, 1955), p. 111. The author adds, referring to the 
landowner: "His display of injured righteousness in response to the 
exploitation charges of would-be reformers is not feigned, but quite 
genuine."
75william W. Stein, Hualcan: Life in the Highlands of Peru 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 40.
76see Marx, Early Writings, pp. 114-115, on the personal identi­
fication of the seigneurial estate owner with the land and the 
peasants' relationship to the estate owner.
it has generally been recognized by the owners 
of the haciendas and has survived in custom 
because it has proved advantageous to the land­
lord no less than to the native. Furthermore, 
the peons feel an attachment to the land that a 
stranger unacquainted with their psychology can 
hardly appreciate. Upon it their ancestors have 
lived for generations, have followed the one 
occupation of tilling these fields, and have 
looked to the owner as their patron. As a 
result, the peons not only feel that the land 
belongs to them, but that they belong to it, 
and a deep-rooted sentiment binds them to the 
estate.77
Similarly, it has been written of the Chilean estates - in a
manner which highlights the way the peasants' sense of attachment
inhibited class consciousness:
A principal duty of service tenants was to guard 
the estate against forasteros - the outsiders 
Cafuerinos3 - and to ride in escort with the 
owner...Most came to identify with the estate 
itself; the land was his land, the cattle better, 
the bulls braver than on other haciendas. This 
attachment between inquilino and hacienda went 
deeper than the owner himself. Landowners bought 
and traded property with surprising frequency and 
someone has correctly pointed out that Chilean 
landowners appear to love the land but not any 
particular piece of it. This was not so with the 
service tenantry who often, in fact, had a longer 
history of residence than the owner.78
The peasantry's "attachment to place"79 and their identification 
with the estates and the estate owners not only inhibited class con­
flict by "softening" the landowners' domination, but also because it 
"subjectively" rounded out the "objective" differentiation of the
77McBride, The Land Systems, p. 30.
7®Bauer, Chilean Rural Society, p. 164. Or, as one Latin 
American sociologist has commented: "Latin American paternalism is 
carried on by one changing and absolute minority." Guillen Martinez, 
"Paternalism," p. 86. Also, see McBride, Chile, p. 149.
79Ibid.
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peasantry according to their respective positions in relation to the 
estates. That is, the Spanish American peasantries were not homo­
geneous classes, and their heterogeneity divided them, strengthening 
the landowners' domination.®®
In Chile, as indicated in the above quote, the inquilinos' iden­
tification with the estates made them view the afuerinos with hostility. 
And their advantaged tenure position on the estates placed the volun­
tarios in a position of dependence, i.e. subordinate to the inquilinos. 
This differentiation increased the difficulties of peasant 
mobilization.®^-
The differentiation of the peasantry in the Peruvian Sierra 
inhibited class action there, as well. One anthropologist noted the 
effect which differentiation of the peasantry in relation to the 
latifundia had on inter-village relations:
Some rivalry, perhaps even basic hostility, exists 
between the people of Huante and Monus. The latter 
look with some longing at the property and conse­
quent freedom and independence of the former...on 
the other hand, Huante people are likely to resent 
the protected position of the peons.®^
And he added that the independent peasants "looked down" on the peons
and called them serfs.®®
Differentiation of the peasantry in Mexico had a similar effect.
Even in the midst of the Revolution (1910-1920), when the villagers of
80ln fact, it might be argued that the term "peasantry" in 
Spanish America refers historically to several classes, not one, e.g. 
peasant-serfs of the estate, members of the Indian-peasant communities.
®*See Norma Chinchilla and Marvin Sternberg, "Chile: The Agrarian 
Reform and Campesino Consciousness," Latin American Perspectives, vol.
1, no. 2 (Summer 1974), pp. 106-128.
®2stein, Hualcan. pp. 43-45. ®®Ibid.
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the south were fighting to regain the lands they had lost to the
haciendas, the peons of the estates (acasillados) were immobilizable.
John Womack, in his work on the Zapatista movement of the Mexican
Revolution, has written:
Only rarely did they recruit rebels among the 
gente de casa. who anyway preferred their 
bonded security, and nowhere evidently did 
they excite these dependent peons to rise up 
and seize the plantations they worked on.84
And a team of Mexican researchers found that when the revolution 
arrived in a certain region, the peons of the estate remained on the 
estate so long as the landowner or his representative remained, but 
when the patron fled the estate, they did too!®^
In those regions of Mexico (and Spanish America) where the dif­
ferentiation of the peasantry was colored by ethnicity, i.e. socio­
cultural differences (e.g. mestizos on the estates and Indians in the 
communities) the division of the peasantry was accentuated. One 
historical anthropologist, in the study of a Mexican village during 
the Revolution, found that the acasillados "scorned everyone who spoke 
Tarascan,11®^ and:
Mainly, because of cultural or economic ties, the 
acasillados initially sided with the hacendados, 
often hiring themselves out as militiamen or 
gunmen (pistoleros). ”
S^John Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (London: Penguin 
Books, 1972), p. 127.
Helguera, S. LtSpez, R. Ramirez, Los Campesinos de la tlerra 
de Zapata (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, 1974), 
pp. 108-109.
®6paul Friedrich, Agrarian Revolt in a Mexican Village (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 44.
®^Ibid., p. 112. On the plantations of coastal Peru in the
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Thus, the differentiation of the peasantry, as well as the 
paternalistic domination of the landowners and the peasants' 
"attachment to place," Inhibited class action.
And yet, it must be added, that not all peasants accepted the 
landowners' domination and their seigneurial mode of social control. 
There were peasants who resisted, particularly in Mexico and Peru.
Not only the peasants of the communal-landholding villages, but also 
social bandits - or, as Eric Hobsbawm has termed them: "primitive 
rebels"®® - were nuisances to the seigneurial regime. In a major work 
on nineteenth century Mexico, supervised by the historian, Daniel 
Cosfo Villegas, it was written: "One of the manifestations of the
peasant discontent is banditry: the runaways from the haciendas formed 
gangs of bandits, the social cancer of the Republic."®^ And in some 
regions of the Peruvian Sierra, the "primitive rebels" disrupted the 
social order of the latter half of the nineteenth century so seriously 
as, on one occasion, to threaten the seigneurial regime itself: 
requiring the use of army troops to suppress them.^®
nineteenth century, the landowners also practised "divide and rule" by 
exploiting the racial differences and when necessary the Indian and 
Negro yanacona and Chinese laborers were used to suppress each other. 
(Stewart, Chinese Bondage, pp. 100-101.)
®®See Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1959), and Hobsbawm, Bandits (London: Penguin Books,
1972). The author writes: "The point about social bandits is that they 
are peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but 
who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people 
as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even 
leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped 
and supported." (Bandits, p. 17).
®^Daniel C o s l o  Villegas, Historia moderns de Mexico. Part I,
La Republica Restaurada. Vol. 3, Vida Social (Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 
1956), p. 351.
®®Piel, "The Place of the Peasantry," pp. 129-131.
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At the same time, the political significance of the social 
bandits can be too easily exaggerated. For, as the Peruvian socio­
logist, Anibal Quijano Obregon, explained: "Even though clearly a 
form of social protest against the injustices of the most powerful, it 
never develops a "broader Ideology" than revolt against specific abuses 
and o p p r e s s i o n . B e s i d e s ,  the majority of Spanish American peasants 
continued to accept the seigneurial domination of the landowners, its 
harshness and its paternalism.
Thus, the end of Spanish colonial rule did not end Spanish 
American seigneurialism. The Spanish American societies persisted in 
their seigneurial molds, inherited from Spain, the conquest and the 
colonization. In fact, Spanish American independence enabled the 
landed aristocracies to expand their "ownership" of the countryside 
and their seigneurial mode of production and domination at the expense 
of the church and the Indian-peasant communities. And it strengthened 
the landowning class by permitting the entry of new families of 
"bourgeois" origins to landed status.
The historico-economic significance of the persistent strength 
of the pre-capitalist structure of society and the seigneurial domina­
tion of the countryside, has been recognized by development economists. 
Summarizing their conclusions, Genovese has written:
While the peasantry remains tied to the land, 
burdened with debt, and limited to minimal pur­
chasing power, the labor recruitment and market 
preconditions for extensive manufacturing cannot 
emerge. Land reform - that is an agrarian 
revolution - constitutes the essential first step
^Anibal Quijano Obregon, "Contemporary Peasant Movements," in 
Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., Elites in Latin America 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 301-340.
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In the creation of an urban working class, the 
reorganization of agriculture to feed growing 
cities, and the development of a home market.^
^Genovese, The Political Economy, p. 159.
CHAPTER V
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The Spanish American societies had been characterized historically
by the hegemony of a seigneurial landowning class; and rural Spanish
America had experienced the formation and continuous expansion of the
latifundia land tenure pattern and the persistence of seigneurial
social relations of production. That is, the Spanish conquest and
colonization had transferred to America - enhanced and further
elaborated - the Iberian "historical-bloc": the seigneurial mode of
production and the norms and values of the Iberian superstructure. And
the independence of the Spanish American societies, instead of reducing
the hegemonic position of the landowning "aristocracies," led to the
strengthening of their domination both in the countryside and in the
national societies. The Steins, in their book, The Colonial Heritage
of Latin America, have summed up the historical pattern of land tenure
up to this century by writing:
Until the twentieth century, the basis of oligarchy 
in Latin America has been the monopolization of, and 
access to, landownership. In fact, the most signi­
ficant feature of the history of land tenure there 
until recent decades has been the spread of the large 
estate into frontier areas, or the aggrandizement of 
long established estates, if not for control of cul­
tivable lands or scarce water rights, then for control 
of scarce labor, agricultural manpower. In Latin 
America, the nineteenth century may be viewed as a 
period of acceleration in the rate of estate formation 
and estate owners' control of manpower.*
lStein and Stein, The Colonial Heritage, p. 138.
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And yet, since the 1930's the Spanish American societies
- Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, Chile and Peru - have experienced land 
reforms which, unlike the reforms of the nineteenth century, which 
furthered the concentration of landownership and the landowners* 
seigneurial domination of the countryside, have seriously challenged
- if not eliminated - that concentration.
The political histories of the Spanish American countries 
during this century are, of course, unique to the respective national 
societies. However, the fact that after four centuries of the forma­
tion, development and persistence of the latifundia land tenure 
pattern and seigneurial domination, there have occurred serious - if 
not decisive - challenges to the hegemony of the landowning classes of 
Spanish America leads the researcher to seek a common socio-historical 
experience and pattern in those changes. Thus, the question 'why did 
seigneurialism persist in rural Spanish America?' is now placed in 
relation to the question 'why have there recently been major changes 
in rural Spanish America?'
Eastern Europe, which, as it has been shown, experienced the 
"second serfdom" historically parallel to the persistence of Spanish 
seigneurialism in the formation and development of seigneurialism in 
Spanish America, also experienced liberal agrarian reforms in the 
nineteenth century. Significantly, with respect to an extended com­
parison with Spanish America, the liberal reforms of Eastern Europe, 
although abolishing serfdom, left intact the latifundia, i.e. the 
socio-economic power base of the noble landowners; which meant that
^Excluding the Russian Empire.
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seigneurialism might persist beyond the feudal politico-legal struc­
tures which had sanctioned it.
And yet, of further - and, perhaps, greater - historico-compara­
tive significance is that seigneurialism was not finally eliminated in 
Eastern Europe by land reform, as had been the case in Spanish America, 
but rather by the proletarianization of the peasantry.-*
Lenin wrote, prior to the Russian Revolution, that there had been 
two paths to capitalist development in agriculture: "The survivals of 
serfdom may fall away either as a result of the transformation of 
landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the landlord lati­
fundia... He called the first path the "Prussian path" and the 
second path the "American path" (though he might have been better 
calling it the French path). That Eastern Europe tended towards the 
first path while Spanish America has apparently tended towards the 
second, considering the similarity in their historical development, 
can provide a comparison by contrast.-*
Persistence and Change in Eastern Europe
The "development of underdevelopment" model advanced by Andre 
Gunder Frank argues that the backwardness of rural areas of Spanish
^Eastern European history was, of course, dramatically changed by 
the Second World War, followed by Soviet domination, and collectivization.
^V.I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Problem of the Social Democrats," 
Collected Works of Lenin (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House,
1962), Vol. 13, p. 238.
-*An interesting and suggestive article on this subject has been 
written by Cristobal Kay, "Comparative Development of the European 
Manorial System and the Latin American Hacienda System," Journal of 
Peasant Studies, vol. 2 no. 1 (October 1974), pp. 68-98. I wish to 
thank Dr. Kay for encouraging me to pursue this issue further.
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America** is a function of the development of the more advanced areas, 
and that the "underdevelopment" of SpaniBh America is, in fact, the 
result of its exploitation by the developed, capitalist economies.
Critical of Frank's model - though not rejecting all of its ele­
ments - F. Stirton Weaver,^ the economist, has written: "...frequently, 
too much stress has been laid on the effects of the political and 
economic hegemony exercised by the dominant capitalist nations."® And 
he has proposed that the persistence of the pre-capitalist social 
structures of Spanish America may be due more to the "changes which 
have occurred in the internal dynamics of the industrialization 
process itself..."^
It is Weaver's thesis that the "old evolutionary dialectic is 
dead."*-® That is, the very success of the bourgeois revolutions in 
England and France and the industrial revolution initiated by England, 
meant that later industrialization and capitalist development would, 
necessarily, proceed differently. The historico-social variation 
between earlier and later capitalist-industrialist development can be 
seen in the following contrast:
^Frank's model pertains to all of Latin America.
?See F. Stirton Weaver, "Positive Economics, Comparative 
Advantage, and Underdevelopment."
®Weaver, "Relative Backwardness and Cumulative Change: A Com­
parative Approach to European Industrialization," Studies in Comparative 
International Development, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer 1974), p. 71. The 
author states that he derives his methodology from a synthesis of the 
work of Alexander Gerschenkron, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Leon Trotsky.
9Ibid.
l^Weaver, "Growth Theory and Chile," Journal of Inter-American 
Studies and World Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1 (January 1970), pp. 55-61.
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...in the first stages the main body of capital 
and more particularly of entrepreneurs that pro­
duced the upheavals of the industrial revolution 
was of modest and nearly always agricultural 
origins.
It would seem, however, that the later industria­
lization began, the greater was the contribution 
of the upper strata of the bourgeoisie, with 
occasional financial aid or even direct parti­
cipation from the landed aristocracy. ^
According to Weaver, this historico-social variation between the
early and late Industrializers represents the changed nature of the
industrialization process, i.e. changes in the economy and technology
1 1of industrialization. In those societies of early (in the case of 
England, original) industrialization, the process was generated by a 
numerous rising class of capitalists possessed of revolutionary sig­
nificance: for examples, let us note the English and French revolu­
tions. However, in those societies of later industrialization, the 
process was able to be imported at an already advanced level by a less 
numerous (already elite?) class of capitalists, and, as already indi­
cated in the above quote, often with the participation of the landed
IVPaul Bairoch, "Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution, 
1700-1914," in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of 
Europe. Vol. 3, The Industrial Revolution (London: Fontana Books, 1973), 
p. 496.
*-2J.F. Bergier, "The Industrial Bourgeoisie and the Rise of the 
Working Class, 1700-1914," in Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History 
of Europe. Vol. 3, The Industrial Revolution, p. 410.
l^See Weaver, "Relative Backwardness." An important work on 
this subject is David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological 
Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the 
Present (London: Canfcridge University Press, 1969).
l^See, on England, Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution. 
1603-1714 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1961), and, on France,
Albert Soboul, The French Revolution. 1789-1799. trans. A. Forest and 
C. Jones (New York: Vintage Books, 1974),
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aristocracy. For examples, Weaver contrasts Germany with England:
...in Germany, unlike England during the early 
years of its industrial revolution, industria­
lization did not diffuse economic power among 
a large number of owner-operators from diverse 
backgrounds, but instead made for a new con­
centration of economic power controlled by 
those who had access to the considerable finan­
cial resources necessary for establishing an 
enterprise on an economically viable scale.15
And he noted that, in contrast to the earlier "liberal" capita­
list development of England, France (and the United States), the later 
capitalist-industrial development of Germany was "conservative:"!® 
"Industrialization no longer had to come from below, tranforming all 
dimensions of social life, but could come from above, preserving and 
strengthening traditional hierarchies and cultural f o r m s . I n  
Germany, although not without conflict between the bourgeoisie and the 
landed aristocracy - as evidenced by the Revolution of 1848,1® the less 
numerous capitalist entrepreneurs of later industrialization were more 
easily absorbed by the dominant class into a ruling b l o c . Even the 
liberal elements of the bourgeoisie had to accept alliance with the 
landowning aristocracy because of the threatening proletarian
l^Weaver, "Relative Backwardness," p. 75.
16Ibid., p. 79.
l?Ibid., P* 89. It is interesting to note that Marx recognized 
a revolutionary path and a conservative path to capitalism. The revo­
lutionary path occurred when the producer became capitalist, and the 
conservative path occurred when the merchant took possession of 
production. See Marx, Selected Writings (from Capital), p. 130.
l®See Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration. Revolution and Reaction: 
Economics and Politics in Germany. 1815-1871 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966).
l^Weaver, "Relative Backwardness," p. 77.
139
movement.
And yet, what was the significance of the changes in the nature 
of the industrialization process for rural Eastern Europe (and Spanish 
America)?
During the nineteenth century, Germany's independent kingdoms 
were being "pushed and pulled" towards unification. Moving west to 
east across the geography of Germany was to travel from Western to
Eastern Europe. In fact, western Germany more closely resembled
France than eastern Germany (Prussia), rural sociologically speaking.
And, in turn, Prussia more closely resembled Eastern Europe than 
western Germany. Stated simply, this referred to "the small holdings 
of the west and the great estates of the east;"2 1^ the former being 
similar to the French countryside and the latter to the countryside of 
Eastern Europe.
The contrasting land tenure patterns of western and eastern
Germany were the product of the different histories of agricultural
economy of the respective regions.
In the states of the west, the nobleman became 
increasingly an absentee landowner, deriving
the bulk of his wealth from peasant dues.
Since his rights as a feudal overlord were con­
verted into annual dividends, his direct control
over the soil weakened.22
But in eastern Germany, on the other hand, the landed aristocracy 
(the Junkers) had been more directly active in the grain trade and,
2®see Hamerow, Restoration, on the workers' role in the 
Revolution of 1848. He points out that the proletariat was in forma­
tion, i.e. being displaced from artisanry and crafts due to the rapid 
development of industry. Thus, they were a conservative, anti-capitalist 
force; a potential ally of the landed aristocracy.
21Ibid., p. 40. 22Ibid., p. 50.
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since the sixteenth century, rural Prussia had experienced the "second 
serfdom" characteristic of Eastern Europe.
Thus, because of the landed aristocracies' respective 
relationships to their lands and their peasants, the movement towards, 
and results of, the emancipation of the serfs differed.
In the west, from the late eighteenth to the middle of the nine­
teenth century, the gradual, historical trend towards peasant emanci­
pation moved at a more rapid pace; under the liberalizing influence of 
the Enlightenment on the bourgeoisie which had been developing there, 
the disruption of the expansion of the French Revolution, and finally 
- but significantly - the strength of the peasant uprisings during the 
Revolution of 1848. In this process the peasants* proprietary rights 
to the lands they occupied were recognized and ratified, ffius, 
seigneurialism was finally eliminated with tae emancipation of the 
peasantry and their victory in securing landownership.
But in Prussia, where the countryside was dominated by large 
seigneurial manors, worked by both resident and non-resident peasant- 
serfs, laboring part-time on the lord's demesne and part-time on either 
land ceded to them by the lord or on their own lands, emancipation 
ratified the Junkers' property rights (and those of non-resident land- 
holding peasants). In fact, the Junkers gained in the process because 
the non-resident peasant-serfs had to redeem themselves and their land 
by cash payments or the cession of part of their own land to the lord.^ 
And a more subtle gain, though extremely significant in the long run, 
was that the process of emancipation furthered the social distance
^Ibid., see chapters 6 and 9. ^*lbid., pp< 50-52.
between the landholding peasants and the landless peasants of the 
estates, whom one historian has called the "real victims."2^ This 
differentiation of the peasantry decreased the possibility of any 
unified peasant mobilization, for with the passage of time those 
peasants who survived the tranformation to agrarian capitalism (in 
the east and west of Germany) increasingly identified themselves with 
the estate owners, as agrarian entrepreneurs and employers of 
agricultural workers.
The Junkers also gained because the emancipation of the peasants 
from the burdens of serfdom also relieved the Junkers from the obli­
gations of lordship. One historian has even commented that the pro­
cess of peasant liberation "degenerated into a movement dominated by 
the great estateowners."2®
In the Revolution of 1848 (the final blow to "servile dues") the 
Junkers - though threatened by an alliance of bourgeois, proletariat 
and peasant - were able to secure their landownership because the 
bourgeoisie had no intention of challenging a basic tenet of their 
ideology, i.e. the inviolability of private property. To do so would 
have set a very dangerous precedent.2^
2^Kurt Borchardt, "The Industrial Revolution in Germany, 1700- 
1914," in Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of Europe. Vol. 4,
The Emergence of Industrial Societies. Part I, p. 98.
2^Werner Conze, "The Effects of the Nineteenth Century Liberal 
Agrarian Reforms on Social Structure in Central Europe," in F. Crouzet, 
W.H. Chaloner, and W.M. Stern, eds., Essays in European Economic 
History. 1789-1914 (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), p. 65.
22See Hamerow, Restoration, p. 170 ff. Note the similarity 
between the liberal agrarian reform of Germany and those of Spanish 
America. Also see, on this historical period, Eric J. Hobsbawm, The 
Age of Revolution. 1789-1848 (New York: Mentor Books, 1962).
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Thus, In the process of peasant emancipation, the Junker estates
remained intact, which meant in addition that: "The former paternal
authority could be retained within the 'manorial district,1 thus
carrying part of the old overlordship into the new era."^
In the west of Germany, the historical pattern of land tenure
and the course of the peasants' emancipation from servitude led to a
countryside of predominantly peasant farms, while in the east:
Abolition of servitude, of monetary and labor 
dues, did not mean for the aristocracy, as in 
the west, the loss of the class basis of 
existence as hitherto known; on the contrary, 
it cleared the path from the old manorial to 
a capitalist system of large estates.^9
Increasingly, towards the end of the nineteenth century, with 
the rapid development of German industry and the creation of a national 
market, the Prussian estates made the transition to the capitalist mode 
of production, their labor forces reflecting the past and the future. 
Writing late in the century, Max Weber, in his study of the agricul­
tural situation of eastern Germany, reported the changes on the estates:
Capitalism had gnawed at the social character 
of the Junker and his laborers. In the first 
half of this last century, the Junker was a 
rural patriarch. His farm hands...were by no 
means proletarians...they did not receive 
wages, but a cottage, land and the right of 
pasturage Cet cetera]... Thus they were... 
agriculturists with a direct interest in 
their lord's husbandry. But they were 
expropriated by the rising valuation of land;
28conze, "The Effects of," p. 67. ^9ibid.
30For a brief description of the relations of production on the 
estates as they reflected the past and the future, see Reinhard Bendix, 
Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1962), 
pp._16-19. Cristobal Kay recognized the similarity between the 
Prussian estates and the estates of Chile. ("Comparative Development," 
pp. 85-86.)
the lord withheld pasture and land, kept his 
grain, and paid them wages instead. Thus, the 
old community of interests was dissolved, and 
the farm hands became proletarians.^
Weber also noted that the estate owners were replacing their 
German workers with the cheaper, seasonal labor of Polish and Russian 
migrant workers: "...since the maintenance of idle hands throughout 
the year would be too heavy a burden."^
It, thus, appears that the Junkers had responded and were 
continuing to respond to the expanding national market by "modernizing" 
the social relations of production on their estates, but this was not 
entirely the case. To understand the changes which were taking place 
in rural eastern Germany, it is necessary to place those changes back 
into the context of the national unification and the development of 
capitalism and industry in Germany, where this analysis began.
Weber indicated the socio-economic pattern of the national uni­
fication when he wrote: "The east continued to be, and henceforth 
became more and more, the seat of agrarian capitalism whereas indus­
trial capitalism tooks its seat primarily in the west."33 That is, 
the west had been industrializing prior to, and continued to do so 
during and after, the unification period. Western Germany had not 
experienced the "second serfdom" and the consequent inhibition of the 
development of a bourgeoisie. During the later eighteenth and into 
the nineteenth centuries the west German bourgeoisie borrowed heavily
3lMax Weber, "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," in 
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed. and with an Intro­
duction by A.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1946), p. 382.
32Ibid. 33Ibid., p. 380.
from British industrializing experience and foreign capital (British, 
French, Belgian, Swiss) was significant in the capitalization of
Q /
German industries. The bourgeoisie of western Germany favored uni­
fication to increase the size of their "domestic market" and provide 
for a strong protective tariff for their industrialization against 
west European industries.^-*
Eastern Germany, which, though benfiting from west German econo­
mic development and the growth of the national grain market, did not 
experience industrial development comparable to that of the west. The 
Junker landowners were, therefore, opposed to a protectionist policy 
which might jeopardize their grain exports to Western Europe. Never­
theless, the Junkers were fervent nationalists, because they were 
opposed to the influence, and possible political leadership of AuBtria 
in a German federation. '
Thus, supported by the west German bourgeoisie, hopeful to 
enlarge its markets and protect them, and favored by the Prussian 
ruling class, eager to unify Germany in a national structure excluding 
Austria, unification proceeded. It was finalized in the 1870's with 
the creation of the German Empire - which coincided with the Junkers'
^^Borchardt, "The Industrial Revolution in Germany," pp. 81-83; 
and Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, p. 158. Also, see W.O. Henderson, 
The Industrialization of Europe: 1789-1914 (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1969), and Rondo Cameron, France and the Economic Develop­
ment of Europe. 1800-1914 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), pp. 223-242.
^^Hamerow, Restoration, pp. 12-14, 134-136.
36lbid. Also opposed to protectionism were the merchants of 
northern, coastal Germany.
37p0r a short synopsis of German unification and the role of 
Prussia, see Norman Rich, The Age of Nationalism and Reform. 1850-1890 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1970), pp. 75-95.
movement towards favoring a protectionist policy against the growing 
competition of American and Russian grains.
And yet, there was a contradiction in the Junkers' support for
national unification (and industrial development), for it indirectly
furthered a growing threat to their own existence as a class. The
threat came not from the peasantry, whom they continued to dominate,
but from the increasingly wealthy bourgeoisie, who were purchasing
estates both for capitalist agriculture and to acquire the prestige of
landed status. Thus, a process of capitalist encroachment upon the
property base of Junker seigneurialism was occurring; a continuous
process paralleling the unification and development of
capitalist-industrialization. Peter Stearns has pointed out:
In Prussia, a third of the Junker estates were 
bought by members of the middle class between
1815 and 1848 alone. By 1885 about 87 per cent
of east Prussian estates had changed hands...
[[throughout Central and Eastern Europe] increas­
ingly many estates were administered by the 
middle class on a commercial basis.39
The transition from seigneurialism to capitalism, therefore, was
not merely the commercial response of the Junkers to expanding market
opportunities, as it might appear, but rather it may also have been a
matter of survival. Weber himself had indicated it:
He would like to be a feudal lord, yet he must 
become a commercial entrepreneur and a capita­
list. Other powers, rather than the Junker,
endeavor to snatch the role of the landlord.
3 % o r c h a r d t ,  "The Industrial Revolution in Germany," p. 127. 
On this issue, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Bread and Democracy in 
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), pp. 43-50.
■^Peter Steams, European Society in Upheaval: Social History 
Since 1800 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 90. Also, Hamerow, 
Restoration, p. 51.
The industrial and commercial capitalist begin 
increasingly to absorb the land.^O
Many Junkers lost their lands and devoted their conservative 
energies to the military and government of the German Empire; others 
attempted to maintain their "old patriarchal way of life" though it 
was uneconomical in the capitalist society that had developed; still 
others made the transition to capitalism.^ At the same time, the 
bourgeois purchasers of estates were not necessarily anti-aristocratic. 
They joined the Junkers in supporting the entailment of estates, 
which represented the "aristocratization" of their wealth. For Weber, 
the "marriage of iron and rye" increasingly meant the "amalgamation 
between a landed aristocracy corrupted by money-making and a capita­
list middle class corrupted by aristocratic pretensions."^
Barrington Moore has written of the transition to capitalism in 
Germany:
Marx and Engels in their discussion of the 
abortive 1848 revolution in Germany, wrong 
though they were on other major features, 
put their finger on this decisive Ingredient: 
a commercial and industrial class which is too 
weak and dependent to take power and rule in 
its own right and which, therefore, throws 
itself into the arms of the landed aristocracy 
and the royal bureaucracy, exchanging the right 
to rule for the right to make money.^
The "Prussian path" (as Lenin termed it) to agrarian capitalism,
40^eber, "Capitalism and Rural Society," p. 383.
41-Bendix, Max Weber, pp. 38-41. ^Ibid., p. 40.
^Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1966), p. 437. He adds: "...even if the commercial and 
industrial element is weak, it must be strong enough (or soon become 
strong enough) to be a worthwhile political ally."
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whereby the estates remain intact and the peasantry is proletarian- 
ized,^ was the path followed by most of the Eastern European societies. 
And yet, though similar in that seigneurlal estates were transformed 
into capitalist estates, the transition was made in differing "politi­
cal" circumstances. That is, while Germany was experiencing national 
unification, the empires of Eastern Europe (the Austro-Hungarian, and 
the East-Central European sectors of the Russian and Ottoman) were 
challenged by rising nationalism.^
In the latter part of the eighteenth century, influenced by the 
ideas of the Enlightenment, the Hapsburg Monarchy sought to stimulate 
economic growth and development as well as "modernize" the empire, 
particularly Austrian society. Thus, the first steps toward peasant 
emancipation were decreed^ and the crown instigated and supported the 
Austrian nobility to participate in commercial and industrial 
activities with foreign capitalists and the wealthy, but limited, 
Austrian bourgeoisie:
Germans, Swiss, Italians and Greeks were pro­
minent in domestic and foreign trade and con­
nected activities. At the same time, many 
Industrial entrepreneurs were of the nobility.
Not only because they had resources at their 
disposal, often under-employed manpower and 
natural wealth (in forests and mineral deposits)
^ T h e  path "which condemns the peasants to decades of most 
harrowing expropriation and bondage." Lenin, '!rhe Agrarian Problem," 
p. 239.
45in South-Eastern Europe, Serbia and Bulgaria gained indepen­
dence from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and in the 
process removed seigneurialism. (On this period, see Rich, The Age of 
Nationalism.)
^These first stepB refer to the acts taken between 1740 and 
1790 by Maria-Theresa and Joseph II. See Rud£, Europe in the 
Eighteenth Century, pp. 34-35.
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for which they saw new opportunities of gainful 
activity; but also because they had easier access 
to government subsidies, grants, and loans.
Nevertheless, their pioneering role, in many 
cases undertaken at the Empress's instigation, 
was also indicative of the retardation of the
bourgeoisie.47
Thus, in the Austrian regions of the empire, capitalist 
development began in the late eighteenth century - instigated from 
above - with the active participation of the landed aristocracy: 
which might be termed the "embourgeoisment" of the nobility.
In the countryside, on their estates, the aristocracy also 
expanded their commercial activity and even began some petty-industrial 
activities there. At first demanding increased payment of servile dues 
mixed with wage labor, but increasingly threatened by peasant unrest 
and recognizing the economic advantages of free, wage laborers, the 
Austrian landowners, it has been argued, welcomed the outcome of the 
1848 revolution, i.e. peasant emancipation, because it opened the path 
for the entrepreneurial landowners to transform their estates to the 
capitalist mode of production.48 Of course, the aristocracy's attitude 
toward the emancipation of the peasants was conditioned by the terms 
of it, which, though providing more lands on more favorable terms to 
the peasants than the reforms in Prussia, was similar to the Prussian 
reform in that the landed aristocracy maintained ownership over the 
body of the estates and received some compensation for the loss of
47n.T. Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Hapsburg 
Monarchy, 1750-1914," in Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of 
Europe. Vol. 4, The Emergence of Industrial Societies. Part I, p. 229.
48see Jerome Blum, Noble Landowners and Agriculture in Austria. 
1815-1848 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948).
''feudal incomes."^9
The agrarian reform in Austria, therefore, left the estates 
strongly intact and created a class of free peasant landowners. The 
peasant landowners either succeeded on their holdings and increasingly 
identified with the conservative estate owners, or failed to keep pace 
and lost their lands, in which case they either went to work in indus­
try or as wage laborers on the large estates which were undergoing 
capitalist t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . I n  the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, wage labor became increasingly common on the Austrian estates. 
The changes were carried out either by a modernizing noble landowner 
or a bourgeois purchaser or l e a s e h o l d e r . A n d  in this manner, similar 
to Germany, the peasantry was increasingly split between those owning 
land and the landless, who were being proletarianized: "...it must be
remembered that interests conflicted not only between lords and pea­
sants but also between peasant owners and landless proletariat."^
Furthermore, the weak alliance between the bourgeoisie and the 
peasantry easily broke down following the 1848 Revolution - again, for 
reasons similar to those of Germany - and the bourgeoisie and landed 
aristocracy formed a ruling bloc under the monarchy.^3 The Austrian
49Ibid., pp. 203-238.
5°Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Hapsburg Monarchy," 
p. 257.
51ibid. Also, see Ivan Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Economic 
Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1974), chapter 2, "Agrarian Transfor­
mation and Modern Agrarian Development," particularly pp. 40-42, 44-48.
52ibid., (Gross), p. 256.
53on the political history - with reference to socio-economic 
and cultural change - of the later Hapsburg monarchy, see Arthur May, 
The Hapsburg Monarchy. 1867-1914 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968).
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ruling bloc was also conservative, but unlike German conservatism which
was nationalistic and developmental, Austrian conservatism was anti-
nationalistic in opposition to the nationalisms which threatened the
coherence of the empire. And it has been argued that this seriously
inhibited Austrian development:
The most advanced bourgeoisie in the Monarchy 
thus became a partner of the supranational 
forces which held the Empire together, although 
these were mostly the very groups whose 
interests were endangered by capitalism in 
general and rapid industrialization in
particular.54
And if capitalist development and industrialization were slowed 
by the persistent power of the aristocracy in alliance with a conser­
vative bourgeoisie, as in Austria, what would be the situation in 
those societies where the bourgeoisie was even weaker - or barely 
existed at all - in relation to the power of the landed aristocracy?
In Hungary, a semi-autonomous state in the Hapsburg empire, where 
the emancipation of the serfs paralleled that of Austria, the landed 
aristocracy maintained its hegemony even more effectively because of 
the more dependent position of the commercial class. As a result of 
the weak bourgeois impulse the Magyar landed aristocrats persisted in 
their seigneurial mold and the transition to a capitalist mode of pro­
duction on the estates was s l o w e r . A l s o ,  the land tenure pattern of 
the Hungarian countryside was more characteristically latifundia- 
minifundia than in Germany and Austria, accentuating the peasants' 
dependence on the estate owners and leading to the gradual
S^Gross, "The Industrial Revolution in the Hapsburg Monarchy," 
p. 250.
55conze, "The Effects of," pp. 77-78.
proletarianization of those peasants whose parcels were insufficient.^^
Furthermore, (and significantly with comparative reference to 
Spanish America), the weaker bourgeoisie in Hungary, compared to 
Germany and Austria, and the greater capitalization required for 
industrial development to be competitive, meant that to an even larger 
extent capitalist development would depend on foreign capital in 
alliance with the landed aristocracy and its commercial dependents. ^
It has been commented that: "...the strongly enhanced export of capital 
from Western Europe in the closing decades of the nineteenth century 
became the principal factor in the economic transformation of these 
countries.
Not only Western European capital, but also German and Austrian 
capital was heavily involved in the capitalist development of Hungary. 
And yet, the initially less significant Hungarian role increased from 
the latter half of the nineteenth century to become the principal
cq
force in Hungarian capitalist development, due to the growth and 
participation of the bourgeoisie, as well as the ever-increasing 
participation of the landed aristocracy.®® At the same time, the 
Hungarian economy and society were not so rapidly "modernized:"
"...the advanced economic fields of industry and banking were really 
only islands in an ocean of backward agrarianism burdened by the 
weight of traditional farming."®*'
An even more extreme case was Rumania, where the peasantry was
5®Ibid. 57uerend and Ranki, Economic Development, p. 99. 
58ibid. 59ibid., pp. 100-104. 60Ibid., pp. 163-165.
61-Ibid., p. 165. Such a description also appears representative 
of Spanish America.
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finally emancipated from serfdom In 1864, but the estates remained
C*y
intact and seigneurialism persisted. It was more extreme because 
industrialization in Rumania was not only instigated originally by 
foreign capitalists, but also because, to a great extent, it was 
limited to the extraction and exportation of petroleum. That is, 
capitalist enterprise stimulated less change due to its high concen- 
tration and the nature of the industry, and "...rural stagnation 
which often preserved pre-capitalist conditions was compatible with 
the powerful monopoly organizations..."^ But "stagnation" does not 
refer to the absence of commercial activity, for while seigneurial 
social relations persisted in Rumania®^ the beginning of the twentieth 
century witnessed the country's becoming the second largest oil 
producer in Europe and "...fourth among the world's grain exporters... 
exporting about 40 per cent of its grain."
Thus, to summarize, in Eastern Europe where the bourgeoisie 
found it convenient or necessary to accept an alliance with the landed
62see David Mitrany, The Land and the Peasant in Rumania (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
Berend and Ranki, Economic Development, pp. 106-107. Also, see 
the work edited by Doreen Warriner, Contrasts in Emerging Societies: 
Readings in the Social and Economic History of South-Eastern Europe in 
the Nineteenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965). 
She notes in the Introduction: "Apart from Hungary, what plainly failed 
to occur in these countries was the general rise of a capitalistic 
class, capable of transforming social attitudes and acting as a dynamic 
force. Even in Hungary the growth of capitalistic industry did not 
undermine or rival the power of the landowner." (p. 18.)
^Berend and Ranki, Economic Development, p. 165.
6%itrany termed it "neo-serfdom." See The Land and the Peasant. 
chapter 4, pp. 63-91.
^^Warriner, Contrasts, p. 21.
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aristocracy In a conservative ruling bloc, the path to agrarian 
capitalism was carried out on the latifundia, and gradually the former 
serfs were proletarianized. Through a temporary alliance between the 
peasants and the liberal elements of the bourgeoisie, serfdom was 
finally eliminated; however, pushing the revolution further was beyond 
the goals of the bourgeoisie and they moved towards the alliance with 
the aristocracy. The peasants, on the other hand, were split between 
those securing landownership and those left landless. The more success­
ful peasants, as petty entrepreneurs and employers, played a conserva­
tive political role thereafter and the landless peasants, being prole­
tarianized, continued to be dominated by the estate owners. Barrington 
Moore has noted: "By themselves the peasants have never been able to 
make a r e v o l u t i o n . B u t  he added: "The allies that peasant discontent 
can find depends upon the stage of economic development that a country 
has reached and more specific historical circumstances."0 which leads 
to the issue of a peasant-worker alliance.
Peter Stearns wrote: "...the discontented classes could not 
easily cooperate,"*’® in referring to unrest in Eastern Europe in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. In addition to the problem of 
the urban-industrial worker as consumer and the peasant as supplier, 
was the issue of "proletarian strategy." The middle class leadership 
of the workers' organizations and their representative parties were 
opposed to an alliance with the peasantry, whom they believed would 
eventually disappear as a class, submerging into the proletariat. Also,
^Moore, Social Origins, p. 479. ^®Ibid., p. 480.
^ t e a m s ,  European Society, p. 306.
154
their "orthodox" interpretation of Marx - as well as predicting the 
disappearance of the peasantry - considered the peasantry a conserva­
tive political force, which it often was.^® Thus, when the workers 
sought support in the countryside it was from the agricultural workers, 
i.e. the rural proletariat, which further alienated the richer 
peasantry. The workers and the peasants did not form an alliance.71
The latifundia did persist, but not unchallenged. Following the 
First World War, there was increased agitation for land reform by 
peasants and urban political groups; however, except for Rumania, the 
land reforms which were attempted were immobilized by the aristocratic 
landowners and the bourgeoisie.^ The estates persisted, and in the 
1930's the aristocrats supported the Fascist and authoritarian regimes 
emerging in Eastern Europe:
The aristocrats in eastern and southern Europe 
were not solely responsible for the development 
of authoritarian systems o*f government, but 
they played a major role. Everywhere they had 
been under new attack; their political traditions 
were affected and their land bases threatened.
The reaction had been swift and effective.
Although the class in most instances had to 
accept new types of regimes, it managed to 
preserve some political power and succeeded, 
for the most part, in saving the large 
estates.73
7°0n this issue in Eastern Europe, see David Mitrany, Marx 
Against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1951).
7*Which is not to say that such an alliance was impossible, as 
the Russian Revolution indicates.
72steams, European Society, p. 331; Gerschenkron, Bread, pp. 
126-132; Berend and Ranki, Economic Development, pp. 186-192.
73lbid., (Stearns), p. 332.
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Persistence and Change In Spanish America
In Eastern Europe, the capitalist classes were weaker and more
politically and economically dependent upon the traditional ruling
classes of landed aristocrats than had been the earlier bourgeoisies
of Western Europe. And, in the nineteenth century - though a temporary
alliance between the bourgeoisies and the peasantries finally eliminated
servile dues - the landed aristocrats maintained their estates intact
and the bourgeoisies and the aristocracies with foreign capital,
technology and enterprise, carried out "modernization from above."
Thus, if the process of modernization from above 
is left to its own course, the peasantry is 
doomed in the long run. It is only when external 
political elements intervene, which present the 
possibility of liberation and, above all, of 
proprietorship to the peasantry and the elimina­
tion of the latifundia or the manorial estate, 
that the process can be different.
In the late nineteenth century, a process similar to that which 
had been occurring in Eastern Europe began in Spanish America. That 
is, capitalist enterprise developed alongside the seigneurial relations 
of production which dominated the countryside. However, even more so 
in Spanish America, the landed "aristocracy" seemed to maintain its 
traditional seigneurial mode of production and domination.
The capitalist development of Europe, and especially the indus­
trial revolution of the nineteenth century, increased the demand for 
the resources which the Spanish American countries could provide. Thus, 
European (and eventually, North American) capitalists either established 
enterprises in Spanish America with or without the participation of the 
national commercial classes, or made commercial arrangements with the
7^Kay, "Comparative Development," p. 86.
Spanish American commercial and landed classes. There was also in 
this period the appearance o£ a new entrepreneurial group in Spanish 
America, immigrants from Europe.
The world economy experienced in this period what has been des­
cribed by one Latin American economic historian as the 'emergence of 
an international division of l a b o r . '^5
In Mexico, during the last few decades of the nineteenth and 
first decade of the twentieth centuries - a period known as the 
Porfiriato, after the dictator, Porfirio Diaz - great amounts of 
foreign capital were invested in the development of the country's 
infrastructure (for example, Mexico's railway system) and the exploita­
tion of the country's resources, as well as industrial activities.^® 
The major sources of foreign investment in Mexico were the United 
States, Great Britain and France. The United States' Investors and 
enterprises were heavily involved in mining activities and railway 
development; the British invested mostly in the railway system and 
public services, as well as in the nascent petroleum industry; and the 
French were most active in commerce and industry. German investors 
were also interested in Mexico, to a lesser extent, and most of their
^Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey 
from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution, trans. Suzette Macedo 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 27-34.
7%ee Daniel Cos£o Villegas, Historia moderna de Mexico. Part II, 
El Porfiriato. La Vida economica. Vol. II, (Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 
1965), chapter 10, "Las Inversiones extranjeras," pp. 973-1177. For 
shorter surveys on several Spanish American countries in this period, 
see Roberto Cortes Conde, The First Stages of Modernization in Spanish 
America, trans. Toby Talbot (New York: Harper and Row, 1974). On 
Mexico, see chapter 5, pp. 78-115.
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Investments were in manufacturing industries.77
Although many of the investments were initiated and directed from
abroad, leading to the term neo-colonialism, much of the capitalist
development was carried out by foreigners who were resident in Mexico,
and who were often immigrants intending to remain, in association with
Mexican commercial groups. For example, in the early decades of the
national period, many French merchants had established themselves in
Mexico and not only expanded their commercial activities, but during
the Porfiriato, invested in industries serving the Mexican market
7 f t- however limited it was. The Mexican economic historian, Fernando
Rosenzweig, has written of the role of foreign capitalists in Mexico:
It is evident that many of the capitalists who 
arose in Mexico were foreigners. From the days 
of Antunano there were foreign residents among 
the merchants, artisans and small industrialists, 
and even consular agents that supported the 
creation of factories... Among the nationalists 
represented there were Frenchmen, Englishmen,
Spaniards, Germans and North Americans whose 
feeling for economic opportunities contributed 
decisively to the formation of a capitalist 
mentality.7^
Geographically, though much of the economic development was 
located in the central region of the country, it was during this period 
that the rapid development of northern Mexico, centered on Monterrey, 
began, generated by foreign residents, immigrants, the Mexican mercan­
tile and mining class (who were often major landowners too!), and
77Ibid., (Cosio Villegas), pp. 1149-1167.
78Ibid., pp. 1118-1119.
7®Fernando Rosenzweig, "El Desarrollo economico de Mexico de 
1877-1911," El Trimestre Economico. no. 127, vol. 32, no. 3 (julio- 
septiembre de 1965), p. 429.
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additional foreign investment.®^ At the same time, the southern 
regions of the country did not experience capitalist development 
comparable to the center and north of Mexico.®*
Mexico, thus, experienced capitalist development in the late 
nineteenth century, based on the growth of the national infrastructure 
and the exploitation of its mineral resources. However, in addition 
to this capitalist development oriented to the industrializing 
countries of Europe and North America, there was also the development 
of industrial activity for the growing, though still limited, domestic 
marke t.
In Peru, capitalist enterprise also emerged and expanded in the 
late nineteenth century; however, it was even more limited to the 
extraction of resources for export - though not totally so.
The first major extractive "industry" in the nineteenth century 
was the exploitation of the guano deposits along the Peruvian coast,®^ 
which began in the 1840's and continued until the 1880's, dominated 
by British companies.®® And yet, although dominated by British firms, 
which were able to supply the capital necessary for "ships, warehouses,
®^See Frederic Mauro, "El Desarrollo industrial de Monterrey 
(1890-1960)," in David Barkin, ed., Los Beneficiarios del desarrollo 
regional. Sep Setentas no. 52 (Mexico: Secretaria de Educaci6n Publics,
1972), pp. 100-102.
®^See Kirsten Appendini and Daniel Murayama, "Desarrollo 
desigual en Mexico (1900-1960)," in Barkin, ed., Los Beneficiarios. 
pp. 128-137.
®^Guano is bird excrement, which served as an excellent source 
of fertilizer.
®®See Cortes Conde, The First Stages, chapter 2, "Peru in the 
Age of Guano," pp. 10-29.
159
transportation, lodging and wages,"®^ the Peruvian commercial class
also profited from the expansion of commerce, and they often invested
those profits in coastal sugar estates.®-*
Furthermore, the income generated by the exports of guano
financed the construction of railroads ("...and by 1878 it was possible
to say that Peru was ahead of all Latin American countries in terms of
railways")®® and other infrastructural projects.
The guano deposits, however, were not in infinite supply, and by
ft 7the 1880's they were depleted. Therefore, although stimulating 
infrastructural development and enriching the traditionally wealthy 
mercantile class centered in Lima, the ephemeral nature of the guano 
deposits did not generate the creation of a proletarian class, 
particularly since the labor force had been predominantly "imported"
Chinese workers.®®
Nevertheless, Peru was increasingly penetrated by foreign cor­
porations.®^ And expanding trade opportunities continued to enrich the
mercantile c l a s s . A l s o ,  foreign immigrants arrived with "money and
91training" with which they established small industrial operations.
Especially significant were those immigrant-entrepreneurs who started
®4lbid., p. 17.
®->Peter F. Klaren, Modernization. Dislocation and Aprismo:
Origins of the Peruvian Aprista Party. 1876-1932 (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1973), pp. 4-5.
®®Cortes Conde, The First Stages, p. 27. ®^Ibid.
8®See Stewart, Chinese Bondage.
89pike, The Modern History of Peru, p. 134. 90jbid.
91-Ibid. Also, Jorge Basadre, His tor ia de la repub lica del Peru 
(Lima: Editorial Peruamericano, 1963), Vol. Ill, pp. 3425-3430.
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the Peruvian textile industry based on domestic sources of cotton and 
wool . 9 2
It was also in this period that Peru experienced what one his­
torian has termed, the "renac imiento minero. Beginning late in the 
nineteenth century, and expanding rapidly in the twentieth, foreign 
corporations, particularly United States ones, purchased mines and 
lands in Peru to exploit the rich copper deposits there.
In the extreme south of Peru there were large nitrate deposits 
which began to be exploited as the guano deposits were depleted, 
however, they were lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879).
Thus, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and continuing 
until the end of the First World War, it was Chile which received the 
income generated by the exportation of nitrates. The actual exploita­
tion of the nitrate fields was carried out by Chilean and British 
capital with Chilean l a b o r e r s . ^4
Prior to the nitrate boom, copper had been the dominant mining 
industry and major mineral export of Chile, but in the last few decades 
of the century, Chilean copper suffered from cheaper foreign competi­
tion.^^ In the early part of this century, technological advances made
92j)avid Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 96-100.
93Basadre, Historia de la republics, p. 3203.
^^Cortes Conde, The First Stages, pp. 66-69; Kinsbrunner, Chile, 
pp. 105-111. For an interesting article on this subject, see Harold 
Blakemore, "Limitations of Dependency: an historian's view and case 
study," Bolet(n de estudios latinoamericanos y del Caribe. no. 18 
(junio de 1975), pp. 74-87.
95ciark Reynolds, "Development Problems of An Export Economy: The 
Case of Chile and Copper," in Markos Mamulakis and Clark Reynolds, 
Essays on the Chilean Economy (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), pp. 
210-212.
the exploitation of Chilean copper competitive and profitable again; 
however, the technological advances required higher capitalization 
favoring foreign enterprise. Thus, the expansion of copper mining in 
Chile was dominated overwhelmingly by foreign capital. Also, to 
stimulate its rapid expansion, the government did not tax the mining 
enterprises for the first twenty years (1904-1925)
Nevertheless, the income generated from the nitrate boom had 
provided capital for infrastructural development.^ Also, in the last 
few decades of the nineteenth and the first few decades of the twen­
tieth centuries, Chile experienced, similar to Mexico and Peru, the 
arrival of foreign immigrants with varying amounts of capital and 
entrepreneurial ability who established their own enterprises or 
became active in already established Chilean and foreign-owned com­
panies.^® Thus, in Chile too, capitalist development resulted from 
foreign investment and enterprise, foreign immigrants' capital and 
entrepreneurial talents, and the ever-growing wealth of the Chilean 
commercial and mining class.
In Mexico, Peru, and Chile, the renewed exploitation of the 
"traditional" mineral wealth, and newer exploitation of "non-precious" 
mineral wealth, led to the expansion of capitalist enterprise and 
social relations of production. In Bolivia, also, where the social 
structure closely resembled that of the Peruvian highlands, it was the
96Ibid., pp. 214-227.
9^Ibid., p. 210; and Cortes Conde, The First Stages, p. 67.
9®Dale Johnson, "Industrialization, Social Mobility, and Class 
Formation in Chile," Studies in Comparative International Development. 
vol. 3, no. 7 (1967-68), pp. 134-137.
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resurgence of mining activities that initiated capitalist development:
...from the middle decades of the century Bolivian 
and foreign entrepreneurs were able to draw on the 
capital being generated by the English and the 
Chileans in the copper, nitrate, and guano mines 
along the coast. By the late 1860's capital 
began pouring into the altiplano and almost over­
night production Cof silverJ began to climb 
dramatically.
The resurgence of the silver mines continued until late in the 
century and then declined in significance, "and its preeminent place 
in the Bolivian economy had been taken by tin," which was increasingly 
in demand due to the industrial growth in the United States and 
Europe.100 Mining expansion also instigated the modest development of 
a railway system and other infrastructural p r o j e c t s , w h i c h  increased 
in number in the early decades of this century, with the continued 
growth of the tin mining industry. There were also some light 
industrial factories established in this period, but they were 
relatively insignificant.
Nor was Venezuela unlike the other Spanish American countries 
where history and society had been dominated by seigneurial landowners 
of varying orientations and degrees of involvement in the local and 
world economies and a commercial class eager to enter the landed
^^Herbert S. Klein, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia. 
1880-1952 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 16.
lOOibid., p. 31.
101Ibid., pp. 42-43. Also, see J. Valerie Fifer, Bolivia: Land. 
Location and Politics Since 1825 (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1972), pp. 247-248.
102jbid., (Klein), pp. 58-59.
10%bid,, p. 59.
aristocracy.^-®^ As a Venezuelan historian has written:
The new and significant of this period Cthe first 
decade of the twentieth century] in the economic 
structure of Venezuela is represented by the form 
of production instigated by the investment of 
petroleum capital, that is, the introduction of 
the capitalist mode of production in the global 
system of pre-capitalist and latifundia relations 
of production.1®*
Thus, foreign capital and enterprise, the immigration of poten­
tial entrepreneurs, and the participation of the national commercial 
and mineowning classes generated capitalist development in the Spanish 
American societies. Although it was often limited to the expansion of 
the exploitation and exportation of mineral and natural resources, the 
development of the infrastructure (particularly a railway system), and 
significantly - but less frequently - the establishment of 
manufacturing industries, it did give rise to an "urban-industrial" 
proletariat.
At the same time, what was the impact of the expansion of the 
world economy, the industrialization of the United States and Europe, 
and the development of the capitalist mode of production in Spanish 
America on the Spanish American countryside and the national and rural 
hegemony of the landed aristocracy?
The expansion of mining operations, although increasingly 
modernized and carried out by advanced industrial techniques and a 
"modern" proletariat, had always been compatible with Spanish American 
seigneurialism, because the mineowners - who were often landowners
I04see F. Brito Figueroa, Historia economica y social de 
Venezuela. Vol. I (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1966).
i°5lbid., Vol. II, p. 399.
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themselves - were not In need of a national market for their resource 
exports. And, although foreign capitalists might interfere in rival­
ries amongst political elites, they would not necessarily welcome 
socio-political revolution and upheaval which might threaten their 
investments.
Nor would the arrival of entrepreneurial-immigrants, and their 
economic activities represent a threat to the ruling bloc of landowners, 
merchants and miners. Limited in numbers and socio-economically 
distant from the Spanish American masses, they did not challenge the 
Spanish American regimes. If their enterprises were successful, they 
could be absorbed by the ruling bloc.^®^
In fact, referring to this period, one historian has written
"The Creole landowning aristocrats...never had it so good."*®^
Similarly, Frederick Pike has commented:
In their endeavors to conserve the sort of social 
structure inherited from the colonial past, the 
privileged classes in Spanish America sensed that 
they could combine their traditional ideals and 
values with the advantages of foreign capital.
This referred to the fact that foreign capitalists' activities 
in the Spanish American countries also benefited the traditional ruling 
bloc of landowners and merchants. For example, the income and revenue 
generated by foreign investments in mining and similar operations
^■^See Franpois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary 
Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 46-47; and Frederick B. 
Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations in Chile, 1850-1960," in Petras and 
Zeitlin, eds., Latin America, pp. 202-219.
107simon Collier, From Cortes to Castro: An Introduction to the 
History of Latin America. 1492-1973 (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 224.
lOSprederick B. Pike, Spanish America, 1900-1970: Tradition and 
Social Innovation (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), p. 38.
provided capital for infrastructural projects, reducing the need to
tax the national propertied classes (if that were possible). In turn,
infrastructural development benefited the merchants eager to expand
their commercial activities and the landowning aristocracy, which was
not opposed to markets and profits furnished by others. As Paul Baran
wrote on the Third World:
The interests of these two groups run entirely 
parallel with those of the feudal landowners 
powerfully entrenched in the societies of the 
backward areas. Indeed, these have no reason 
for complaints about the activities of foreign 
enterprise in their countries. In fact, these 
activities yield them considerable profits.
Frequently, they provide outlets for the pro­
duce of landed estates, in many places they 
raise the value of the land, often they offer 
lucrative employment opportunities to members 
of the landed gentry.109
What was the response of the Spanish American landowning class 
to the growing commercial opportunities of the export and domestic 
markets? To a certain extent, although one historian has termed the 
period a "renacimiento minero." it might very well be termed a 
"renacimiento senorial" with reference to the countryside.
In Mexico, where the resurgence of mining activities, the spread 
of a national railway system and infrastructural projects, and the 
beginnings of industrialization were generating capitalist development, 
the agricultural sector was also affected by new commercial opportuni­
ties. H O  There was not merely a growing demand for foodstuffs in the 
mining, commercial and industrial zones, but also a growing export
lO^Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 338.
H^See Cosfo Villegas, El Porfiriato. Vida econ6mica. Vol. I , on 
"La Agriculture," pp. 1-134.
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market for uniquely regional agricultural products; for example, 
cotton from irrigated zones in northern Mexico, sugar from Morelos, 
and henequen from the Yucatan.
However, although commercialization increased, it was generally 
carried out in the traditional manner. The physical expansion of the 
Mexican latifundia by encroachment upon the Indian peasant communal 
landholdings was accelerated by commercialization, generating increased 
peasant uprisings and rural d i s c o n t e n t . T h e  landowners not only 
absorbed the peasants' land, but also sought to absorb and attach the 
peasants themselves as laborers on the estates. That is, commercial 
expansion was generating seigneurial expansion!
There is evidence that in certain regions of Mexico there was an 
increasing use of wage labor, but in fact - except in the northern 
states^-2 _ the "wage" labor was merely an extension of the system of 
debt peonage (bondage). In comparing the Porfirian hacienda to the 
previous land and labor situation in rural Mexico, Fernando Rosenzweig 
has written:
The consolidation of the Porfirian hacienda with 
its private property, market production and wage 
labor signified a triumph over the old state of 
things, but Cthe old state!] persisted in peonage, 
that restricted the free mobility of the worker, in 
extensive exploitation of the land held in monopolis­
tic ownership...in consequence there was little 
capitalization and dynamism in agriculture within 
the market economy.
lllMeyer, Problemas campesinos. pp. 116-152.
112gee Freidrich Katz, "Labor Conditions on Haciendas in 
Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends and Tendencies," Hispanic American 
Historical Review, vol. 54, no. 1 (February 1974), pp. 31-37.
H^Rosenzweig, "El Desarrollo," p. 427. Later he wrote of "The 
resistance and incapacity of Porfirian agriculture to adapt to the
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Frank Tannenbaum commented that: "the hacienda kept Mexican 
agriculture from being modernized.
In the Yucatan, on the henequen plantations, the social relations 
of production were basically that of slavery. Yaqui Indians, who had 
lost their lands in northern Mexico were forcibly relocated to the 
Yucatan plantations and attached to them along with impoverished Mayan 
peasants of the region.
In Peru, as well, commercialization instigated further seigneurial 
expansion. Similar to the process of latifundia expansion in Mexico, 
the commercial opportunities presented by the export market accelerated 
the encroachment on the Indian peasantry's lands by the estate owners 
in the Peruvian highlands. Land was not so much acquired for cultiva­
tion as for the grazing and herding of sheep and cattle to supply the 
export market with wool, hides and meat.H*’ Also, as in Mexico, rural 
discontent grew and expressed itself in banditry and localized 
Indian peasant uprisings.
Again, commerce did not "revolutionize" the mode of production
circumstances created by the ascent of capitalism in the country."
(p.447.)
114prank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (New York: 
(Macmillan, 1929), p. 128.
the nineteenth century Yucatan and the conditions on the 
plantations, see Nelson Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1964), and John Kenneth Turner, Barbarous 
Mexico (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1910).
ll^see Piel, "The Place of the Peasantry," p. 125, and "El 
Problems de la tierra en la region de Cuzco en la epoca contemporanea 
(fin del siglo XLX-prineipios del siglo XX)," in Regiones v ciudades 
en America Latina. Sep Setentas no. Ill (Mexico: Secretarfa de Educa- 
cion Publica, 1973), pp. 15-21. There was also increased demand for 
sheep and cattle products for Peruvian mills and population centers.
H7lbid., ("The Place of the Peasantry"), p. 126 ff.
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of the estates. One social historian has written of this period: "The
latifundia was maintained in a state of technical and social archaism
118...its labor force in a servile condition." And, because the sheep 
herding and ranching activities required less labor than the Indian 
peasantry's primitive cultivation, there was labor displacement, which 
provided workers for the mines and coastal plantations.
On the Peruvian coast, there was also a resurgence of economic 
activity on the plantations in the last decades of the nineteenth cen­
tury, following the War of the Pacific, which had ruined them. Because 
the Chinese labor source was no longer available, the plantation owners 
turned to a system of labor recruitment called enganche: "...a traffic 
in Indian labor which gave the spurious impression of being based on 
free c o n t r a c t . B y  this system, Indian peasants were brought down 
from the highlands by middle-men (enganchadores) for seasonal and/or
permanent employment on the coastal plantations and held there for as
120long as they were needed, by debt.
The Chilean countryside was also affected by the changing world
economy. In the 1840's and '50's, Chilean landowners experienced a
121rapid increase in demand for wheat from California and Australia; 
however, the Pacific export market was limited, compared to the export 
market of later decades:
118pielt "El Problems de la tierra," p. 17.
H^Piel, "The Place of the Peasantry," p. 131.
120jQareilj Modernization, pp. 25-30.
121see Sergio Sepulveda G., El Trigo chileno en el mercado 
mundial (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1959), pp. 37-54.
From about 1860 ont rail and steam put European 
markets in reach of the peripheral zones.
Chilean exports to England grew steadily while 
at the same time the northern mining districts 
and Santiago increased their demand for food,122
The landowners' response was to increase the inquilinos’ labor
123service and to expand the land area under cultivation. Beyond
that, the landowners absorbed additional numbers of peasant families
onto the estates from the ranks of the afuerinos. Arnold Bauer has
written of Chilean agriculture of this period, placing it in
comparative perspective:
Within the countries that supplied Europe's 
food in the nineteenth century, expansion 
created wholly new agrarian societies in some 
cases and provoked deep reform in others. In 
Chile, expansion took place within a traditional 
society and the effect was to strengthen the 
institutions already present.12^
Similarly, on Venezuela, it has been commented that foreign 
investment in capitalist enterprise and increased export opportunities 
led to the "fortification of the rural-latifundist economic struc­
ture."1^5
Thus, to borrow the phraseology of Raymond Carr: "the change in 
the classical agricultural structure of Spanish America was achieved 
by a rearrangement of the traditional economy, by its expansion in 
space, not by any fundamental change."12®
It appears, therefore, that the impact of the world economy in
122Am o l d  Bauer, "Chilean Rural Labor in the Nineteenth Century," 
American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 4 (October 1971), p. 1074.
123Ibid., pp. 1074-1083. 124Ibid., p. 1083.
125Brito Figueroa, Historia economica, p. 397.
126See Chapter 2, page 51.
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the late nineteenth century and Into the twentieth century, on the 
Spanish American societies had the combined effect of generating the 
development of capitalist social relations of production, at the same 
time that it strengthened seigneurial relations of production in the 
countryside. The Spanish American societies were, thus, characterized 
by the coexistence of seigneurial and capitalist social relations, in 
a manner not dissimilar to that in which Leon Trotsky had described 
pre-revolutionary Russia, which he called: "combined development;" 
that is, "a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, 
a combining of separate stages, an amalgam of archaic with more 
contemporary forces."127
In Eastern Europe, capitalist development was carried out from 
above and the transition to agrarian capitalism followed the Prussian 
path. That is, capitalist development in the countryside involved the 
proletarianization of the peasantry on the estates. The transformation 
of the social relations of production was accomplished either by the 
landed aristocrats themselves or - often - by the purchases (or renting) 
of the estates by members of the bourgeoisie, which, in turn, instigated 
the landed aristocrats to modernize their mode of production. But in 
Spanish America, although the landed "aristocracy" was often of 
"bourgeois" origins, the relations of production on the estates, while 
affected by the world economy and capitalist development in the national 
societies, remained more ch*-acteristically seigneurial. There are a 
number of possible explanations.
First, is that capitalist development had begun earlier in
127Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution, ed. F.W. Dupee (Garden 
City: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 4.
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Eastern Europe, particularly in Germany and Austria where the national 
bourgeoisies were moat active in manufacturing industries rather than 
in merely export-extractive industries typical of Spanish America.
Most comparable to Spanish America in this respect was Rumania, both 
a leading grain producer and petroleum exporter, where a seigneurial 
mode of production persisted longest. Thus, the East European bour­
geoisies were more "capitalistically” challenging to the seigneuriallsm 
of the landed aristocrats, and their purchases and modernization of 
estates pushed the transition to agrarian capitalism.
Second, is that the Revolutions of 1848 and the earlier attacks 
on serfdom and servile dues forced a more rapid transition to capita­
list social relations in Eastern European agriculture. There was no 
similar movement in the Spanish American societies in the nineteenth 
century (except perhaps against slavery) because "serfdom" did not 
exist by law.
Still a third possible explanation was the strength of the land­
owners' hegemony. The landed "aristocracy," as we have stated, was 
more open and available to successful members of the middle strata 
because entry to the class was based more on the fact of landownership 
than "aristocratic heritage or noble birth," as was the case in Europe. 
Thus, the hegemony of the landed class was strengthened by that class' 
openness and, to a certain extent, this meant that the norms and values 
of the seigneurial superstructure permeated the middle strata more 
effectively.
128purthermore, although it must be admitted that it has not 
been adequately treated herein, the racial-ethnic dimension lent (and 
lends) additional strength to class domination in Spanish America.
And yet, even in Spanish America, the impact, challenges, and
influences of foreign capitalist enterprise and the expansion of
national capitalist development and social relations began to"diffuse"
the capitalist mode of production through the countryside.
In Mexico, as already indicated, while debt peonage and seig-
neurialism characterized the relations of production in central and
southern rural Mexico (and the Yucatan), it appears that the estates
of far northern Mexico were making the transition to the capitalist
129mode of production. There are several possible explanations for
the changes on the northern estates. Freidrich Katz has suggested
that the northern estate owners had to modernize the labor system or
risk the loss of their labor forces to the mining or industrial centers
developing in that region, to which the peons could escape and where
they could secure employment. Another alternative for the peons was
provided by the proximity of the U.S. b o r d e r . K a t z  added that this
factor - the alternative presented by mining, industrial centers, and
the United States - also instigated the landowners into experimenting
with more "modern" forms of paternalism.
Another possible explanation is that the northern Mexican
estate owners were experiencing a challenge to their class basis of
existence similar to that which the Junkers had experienced. That is,
northern Mexican lands and estates were being purchased by foreign
entrepreneurs (particularly North American) and were being operated 
1capitalistically. A Thus, both because they were forced to compete
129xatz, "Labor Conditions." I30jbid., p. 33.
13*On the extent of foreign landownership in Mexico during the 
Porfiriato, see Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, chapter
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and because the more enterprising landowners recognized the advantages 
to the capitalist mode of production, the transformation was being 
m a d e . 132 A n d  because many of the northern landowners were also mine- 
owners and participants in industrial activities, the capitalist mode 
of production was being introduced onto the estates.
At the same time, it should be remembered, that while the far 
northern peasantry was being proletarianized, the peasants in the 
central and southern regions were laboring as "serfs" or "slaves," or 
being absorbed as such by the expanding seigneurial estates.
In Peru, it was the coast which, at the outset of the twentieth
century, was being transformed into a region of capitalist plantations.
In the early 1870's, coastal Peru had begun to experience an increased
demand for sugar exports, and the guano boom brought new investment to
the coast. One historian has commented that:
Now, perhaps more than at any time since the early 
eighteenth century, the planter aristocracy of the 
valley.,.were able to enjoy the seigniorial life 
that had long been the ideal of Hispanic-Peruvian
society.133
However, the collapse of the guano boom, followed by the War of 
the Pacific, severely damaged coastal agriculture and "Some four 
decades later...almost all of these prominent planter families had
15, pp. 358-370. For example, Tannenbaum points out that 40% of the 
total privately owned land area in Chihuahua was foreign-owned. (p. 360)
132gee Roger D. Hansen, Mexican Economic Development: The Roots 
of Rapid Growth (Washington: National Planning Association, 1971), pp. 
26-27; and Dudley Ankerson, "Some Aspects of Economic Change and the 
Origins of the Mexican Revolution, 1876-1910," Working Papers no. 12 
(Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies, University of Cambridge, 
no date), p. 12.
133Klaren, Modernization, p. 3.
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disappeared from the valley."*-34
The planter aristocracy attempted to revive the estates and 
introduced the system of enganche-labor, but they were incapable of 
overcoming the decadence. In their place appeared a new group of 
entrepreneurs, foreign immigrants who purchased and modernized the
I O C
plantations, as well as foreign corporations, like W.R. Grace & Co. J 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, and particularly in the 
first decades of the twentieth, these new landowners modernized the 
plantations, expanded the labor force via the enganche system and 
basically "industrialized" coastal agriculture. In the process, the 
Indian peasants of the enganche system became a distinctly proletarian 
class.136
The cotton plantations of the coast were also experiencing a 
transition to more characteristically capitalist social relations of 
production, but not so rapidly as the sugar plantations. At the out­
set of this century, the cotton estates utilized several modes of pro­
duction: Indian peasant yanacona, Oriental sharecroppers, and Negro 
laborers.137 But in the 1940's, there began a definite trend towards 
mechanization and the transformation of the labor forces of the 
estates into a proletarian class.*-3®
l34lbid. l35Ibid., pp. 6-23.
136ibid., chapter 2, "The Rise of a Rural Proletariat," pp. 24-50.
137iouis C. Faron, "A History of Agricultural Production and Local 
Organization in the Chancay Valley, Peru," in Julian Steward, ed., 
Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies, Vol. 3 Mexican and Peruvian 
Communities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 227-294; 
see outline of labor force history on pp. 232-233.
l38Ibid., pp. 232-233, 254-257.
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Highland Peru had persisted In Its seigneurial framework; in 
fact, commercialization had furthered the expansion of the seigneurial 
relations of production. However, in recent decades even the sierra 
had begun to be penetrated by the capitalist mode of production and the 
proletarianization of the p e a s a n t r y . N o t i n g  the changes which had 
been taking place in the 1950's, one Peruvian anthropologist wrote 
that: "...the traditional Andean hacienda is acquiring a new social 
and economic physiognomy...in imitation of the coastal haciendas.
It should be added that the transformation begun was gradual and was 
often the result of foreign enterprise and/or coastal plantation 
owners purchasing highland estates.
In Venezuela, too, there was the emergence of capitalist social 
relations of production on new estates formed during the 1920's. The 
expansion of commercial agriculture may have been the cause of 
capitalist estate formation at the same time that it furthered the 
expansion of the traditional, seigneurial estates.
And in Chile, in the 1930's, there also began a trend towards 
proletarianization of the estates' labor f o r c e s , w h i c h  became most
139vaZque2> Hacienda, chapter 8, "Cambios en la estructura de la 
hacienda," pp. 43-48.
l^Olbid., p. 43.
141piel, "El Problems de la tierra," p. 26. Also, for a case 
study, see Solomon Miller, "Hacienda to Plantation in Northern Peru: The 
Process of Proletarianization of a Tenant Farmer Society," in Steward, 
ed., Contemporary Change. Vol. 3, Mexican and Peruvian Communities, 
pp. 133-226.
142John Duncan Powell, Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan 
Peasant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 23.
143james Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Agrarian Radicalism in 
Chile," in Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems, pp. 512-513.
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pronounced in the 1950's. (This is especially interesting because
it occurred simultaneously with a rapid decline in demand for Chilean
wheat in the export market, and continued during the period when
Chilean agricultural production was stagnating and the country became
an importer of grains and foodstuffs
The proletarianization process appears to have been related to
a "turnover" of landownership in rural Chile, not dissimilar to what
had occurred in Prussia in the nineteenth century: ..between 1925
and I960 some 60 per cent of the arable land in Chile's fertile
central valley changed hands."^® That is, urban, bourgeois and middle
strata purchasers were becoming estate owners and the impact of their
ownership was the proletarianization of the p e a s a n t r y . T h e  Chilean
estates were being transformed "consciously" by the introduction of the
148capitalist mode of production and mechanization in this period and, 
in a more subtle way, by the "dilution" of seigneurial relations.
Furthermore, population growth in the countryside was enlarging the 
rural proletariat relative to the inquilinos.*-^
Thus, in Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and Chile - at least on a 
regional basis - a transition to capitalist social relations of pro­
duction had begun in a manner similar to the process which had occurred
l^Chinchilla and Sternberg, "The Agrarian Reform," pp. 106-109.
l^5See Sepulveda G., El Trigo chileno. pp. 104-124.
l^Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations," p. 214. 147jbid.
^®Kay, "Comparative Development," p. 86.
l^Robert ^  Kaufman, The Politics of Land Reform in Chile.
1950-1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 27.
150Ibid., pp. 28-29.
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in Eastern Europe. And yet, unlike Eastern Europe, land reforms have 
occurred since the 1930's in the Spanish American societies which have 
both seriously challenged seigneurlallsm and, apparently, halted the 
proletarianization process.
To understand both the beginning of the proletarianization 
process and the land reforms which halted it, the Spanish American 
countrysides must be placed within the larger context of their 
respective societies and the world economy.
Populism. Capitalism and Land Reforms
Introduced in the form of a contradiction, it can be stated that 
the same force which generated the proletarianization process also 
generated the land reforms which halted it. That is, the capitalist 
development generated by foreign enterprise, in cooperation with the 
landed aristocracies and commercial bourgeoisies, also generated the 
development of classes in those societies which provided the Spanish 
American peasantries with the necessary alliances against the 
landowners.
Somewhat relevant to this issue is the comment by George 
Lichtheim:
...to say that monopolistic capital tries to 
exploit foreign countries is to say that 
indirectly it helps to develop them - unless 
one make the totally unrealistic assumption 
that exploitation can be permanently divorced
15lThe qualification made by the use of the word "apparently" 
refers to the uncertainty of Chilean political society and economy and 
the land reforms which have taken place, as well as the persistence 
- by their exclusion from the reforms, of capitalist estates in regions 
of the other Spanish American countries!
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152from development.
It might be argued - and it surely must be - that the nature of 
the capitalist development carried out by foreign enterprise has not 
been (nor is) necessarily the type of capitalist development which 
would have been most beneficial for the societies involved. Never­
theless, it was that capitalist development - however incomplete and
limited - which gave rise to those classes which have been most
instrumental in the formation of the Spanish American "populist"
alliances.
The Spanish American "populist" alliances have been multi-class 
movements which were politically formalized into parties, involving 
- with historical variation, depending on the particular country - the 
peasantry, a sector of the bourgeoisie (which Octavio Ianni has called 
the bourgeoisie "in formation"), the middle class, and the prole­
tariat. They have, again, with variation, presented themselves in 
opposition to the ruling blocs (most often referred to as oligarchies) 
of landowners and mercantile bourgeoisies, and, what they argued was
1 Sfiexcessive foreign ownership and control of their national economies.
*52{;eorge Lichtheim, Imperialism (London: Penguin Books, 1974), 
p. 136.
153gee Octavio Ianni, La Formacion del estado populista en 
America Latina (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1975).
154ib id., pp. 60-65.
155A 1 s o , see Gino German!, Torcuato S. di Telia, and Octavio 
Ianni, Populismo v contradicciones de clase en Latinoam^rica (Mexico: 
Ediciones Era, 1973).
15<)Ianni, La Formacion. pp. 60-65. It should be restated that 
the political histories of the respective countries are, of course, 
unique to the respective societies, but, at the same time, an especially 
common characteristic of the Spanish American societies has been the 
formation of these populist alliances and political parties.
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In Mexico, the populist alliance developed out of the Revolution 
(1910-1920) and was formalized in the 1930's, under the leadership of 
Lazaro Cardenas, in the creation of the Partido de la Revolucion 
Mexicans (FRM).^^
The origins of this populist alliance were in the Mexican 
Revolution.^--*® The Revolution was directed against the dictatorship 
of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) and the landowning and mercantile 
oligarchy which had been strengthened by the activities of foreign 
capitalists.
In the central and southern regions of the country, the
Revolution was characterized by peasants seeking the restoration of
their village lands from the haciendas, which had always dominated
rural Mexico and were now threatening to convert the countryside into
159"one large estate." At the same time, in the industrial and mining 
centers of the north - as well as on the railroads - the proletariat 
had been attempting to organize unions but were prevented from doing 
so, often forcibly, by the Diaz government. Thus, they, too, were 
opposed to the Diaz regime and the foreign capitalists for whom they
■*-^The forerunner to the PRM was the Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (FNR), but it was greatly reorganized by Cardenas into 
the PRM. In the 1940's, with some slight revision, it became the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional. which it has remained. See, on 
the political sociology of Cardenas' administration, Arnaldo Cordova,
La PoljLtica de masas del cardenismo (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1974).
158on th e Mexican Revolution, see J. Silva Herzog, Breve historia 
de la revolucion mexicana. 2 vols. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 
1960).
*^See Womack, Zapata. Also, Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the 




In addition to peasant resistance and rebellion, and labor
unrest, there was also growing dissent within the Mexican bourgeoisie
and the middle sectors - particularly in the northern states.
James Cockcroft has written:
In spite of a record of having collaborated with 
foreign capital, Mexico's bourgeoisie was not 
immune to the pressures of foreign competition 
and economic nationalism. While some Mexican 
businessmen profited from collaboration with 
foreigners, others suffered an economic squeeze.
Thus, many families of the northern Mexican bourgeoisie, mine- 
owners and industrialists, moved in opposition to the regime because 
of its links with foreign capitalists who, as far as they were con­
cerned, were monopolizing the Mexican economy. Significantly, many 
of the families were also being challenged by foreigners (especially 
from the United States) who were purchasing land and competing for the 
regional and export m a r k e t s . N a t i o n a l i s m  intensified when the 
government sold off large tracts of public land in the north, enabling 
foreigners to purchase huge acreage. It was even further accentuated 
when the government made grants of land to those foreign companies 
building the railways.
160Ibid., (Wolf), pp. 20-21.
^^Ibid., pp. 22-25. Also, see James D. Cockcroft, "Social and 
Economic Structure of the Porfiriato: Mexico, 1877-1911," in Cockcroft, 
et at., Dependence and Underdevelopment, pp. 47-70; and Ankerson,
"Some Aspects of," pp. 7-14.
*62lbid., (Cockcroft), p. 52.
^-^Ankerson, "Some Aspects of," p. 12; and Wolf, Peasant Wars, 
pp. 22-23,
■^^Ibid., (Ankerson), p. 9.
Although the peasants and the proletariat provided the armies of 
the Revolution, it was the urban middle class and the bourgeoisie which 
often provided the leadership. Still, in the Constitution of 1917, the 
rights of labor were guaranteed, land reforms for the peasants were pro 
mised, and the State was provided with greater authority over the
1 £ C
national economy and resources. However, the contradictions, com­
petitions, and conflicts of the multi-class (populist) alliance which 
had emerged from the Revolution, inhibited any action from being taken 
to implement the intentions of the new constitution. (For example, 
landowners from the north opposed wide-scale land reforms which the 
southern peasantry had fought for.) Except for isolated circumstances, 
like the rise of a radical state governor, little effort was made to 
Implement land reform and break up the latifundia.
At the same time, although the national government was failing
to carry out the reforms intended, the countryside was not peaceful.
Unrest characterized many rural areas and battles continued to break
out between peasants and hacendados. Furthermore, labor union
organizers were increasingly able to mobilize workers in the extractive
and industrial centers, and even began to mobilize peasants and
168agricultural workers into syndicates.
l^On the Mexican Constitution of 1917, see Charles C. Cumberland 
Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1968), pp. 259-272.
^><>See Michel Gutelman, Capitalismo v re forma agraria en Mexico 
(Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1974), pp. 86-101.
167see Gerritt Huizer, "Peasant Organization and Agrarian Reform 
in Mexico," in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., Masses in Latin America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 445-464.
l68Ibid. Also, see Arturo Anguiano, El Estado v la poljftica 
obrera del cardenismo (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1975), pp. 22-29.
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The world economic depression of the 1930's regenerated the
populist alliance in Mexico (and, as we shall see, instigated similar
movements in the other Spanish American societies). The export
economy declined and, in turn, reduced Mexico's ability to import
manufactured consumer products. (Ianni has referred to this period
as a "gran crisis para las ollgarqufas.")
The resurgent populism in Mexico brought L^zaro Cardenas to
presidential power (1934-40) and under his leadership the populist
coalition was consolidated at the same time that reforms were carried
out. In fact, they were two sides of the same p r o c e s s . T h e
peasants were organized into the Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC),
which became one of the corporate bodies of the PRM, and were supported
against the l a n d o w n e r s . T h e  result of peasant mobilization with
government support was a wide-scale land reform by expropriation,
which, though not affecting all latifundia, effectively eliminated
172seigneurial!sm in Mexico.
The workers' movement, like that of the peasants, was
strengthened by government support, and the workers' unions were mobi-
173lized into a single federation incorporated as a body into the PRM.
The workers' demands were supported by the government against Mexican 
and foreign enterprises - particularly foreign ones. In fact, govern­
ment support of labor led to the nationalization of the railways and
169purtado, Economic Development, pp. 39-42.
170see Cordova, La Polftica de masas. ^^-Ibid., pp. 93-122.
l^Gutelman, Capitalismo y reforma agraria. pp. 105-111.
l^Cordova, La Polftica de masas. pp. 67-92; and Anguiano,
El Estado y la polltlca obrera.
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foreign petroleum companies, which strengthened national capitalism.
Under Cardenas, the Mexican bourgeoisie, which had dominated the
populist alliance, was strengthened in its domination - though it had
to accept the necessity of the populist reforms - and was enlarged
through the admission of middle class elements.^75 And it was during
this period, i.e. the depression and the Cardenas administration, that
the government supported Mexican capitalists in order to stimulate
176industrialization via import-substitution. The bourgeoisie, as 
such, was not represented as a distinct body in the party, but is now 
represented formally, to the extent that it is necessary, in the 
"popular sector," i.e. a third corporate body consisting of middle 
class organizations, and in business leaders' associations.^77
Thus, the populist alliance which emerged from the Mexican Revo­
lution, dominated by the Mexican "bourgeoisie in formation," harnessed 
the unrest of the peasantry to oppose the oligarchy of landowners and 
the commercial bourgeoisie. In this way, the peasants secured the 
alliance which enabled them to eliminate the seigneurial haciendas, 
and in the north prevent their proletarianization, by granting them 
proprietorship; which they were unable to accomplish by themselves.
(It should be noted, however, that not all of the latifundia were
174cuniberland, Mexico, pp. 308-317. See Howard F. Cline, The 
United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 226-238.
I75()n Mexico and Cardenas, see Frederick B. Pike, Spanish 
America, pp. 47-52.
176ibid., and Anguiano, El Estado. pp. 94-105.
177gee L. Vincent Padgett, The Mexican Political System (Boston 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 123-136, on the "formal" organization 
of the middle class and bourgeoisie.
expropriated. Many capitalist estate owners, particularly in the 
north, were able to maintain ownership of their lands by several means. 
These "neo-latifundists" manage their estates capitalistically, that 
is, they employ a propertyiess agricultural proletariat, not an 
"attached" peasantry. ) ^ 8
The populist alliance, formalized by Cardenas in the PRM, has
persisted, but it is no longer populist. Beginning under Cardenas,
the populist alliance has become a national corporate structure
dominated by a public and private bourgeoisie. James Petras has
described such a corporate structure:
...the corporatist approach, whereby the govern­
ment controls and directs lower-class associations 
and links them with existing economic elites in an 
attempt to encourage collaboration for national 
development. *-79
In 1952, Bolivia also experienced a populist revolution which 
finally challenged and eliminated seigneurialism in the countryside. 
There, even more than in Mexico and the other Spanish American socie­
ties, seigneurialism had persisted as the mode of domination and pro­
duction. The capitalist development which had occurred in Bolivian 
society was based, in particular, on mining, and though there had been 
infrastructural and industrial development, it was limited. By the 
1930's, the Bolivian ruling bloc:
^78()n Mexico's agrarian structure since 1940, see Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, 'Social Aspects of Agrarian Structure in Mexico," in 
Stavenhagen, ed., Agrarian Problems, pp. 233-235, 263.
179james petras, Politics and Social Forces in Chilean 
Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 5. 
Also, see pp. 199-203 for a contrast of populism and corporatism.
...consisted of hacendados, mine owners, leading 
merchants, bankers and the new industrialists,
...and made up a self-conscious oligarchy...which 
directed the socio-economic and political life 
of the nation... Cand wasD United by close ties 
of marriage, conmon absentee ownership of estates,
Cetc .3180
However, as Herbert Klein recognized, "...the oligarchy could
not rule the nation alone, and depended for its political power on the
constantly expanding numbers of the urban middle c l a s s . A n d ,
With the development of the middle class there 
also emerged an urban proletariat...With the rise 
of light industry and heavy mining, the growth of 
government service and, most important, with the 
development of the communications and transportation 
network, a new type of industrial wage worker came 
into being. And with his emergence, almost exclu­
sively confined to the urban and mining areas, there 
now appeared on the Bolivian scene a modern labour 
movement.182
The hegemony of the oligarchy remained stable until the nineteen 
thirties; however, during that decade two events began to shake the 
foundation of that hegemony and generated challenges to its domination 
the world economic depression, and the Chaco War (1932-35) with 
Paraguay.
The depression led to a decrease in demand for Bolivian tin in 
the world market and forced a further decline in its price, which had 
already been the trend since the end of the First World War. This 
led to a slowdown in mining operations which resulted in growing 
unemployment amongst the Bolivian mineworkers.1®^ Furthermore, the 
depression in the tin mining industry led to declining revenues upon
l®°Klein, Parties and Political Change, p. 168.
181Ibid. l82Ibid., p. 60. 183Ibid., pp. 107-108.
IS^Ibid., pp. 117 ff.
which the government depended for its income and, in turn, the middle 
class' position was weakened: "Increasingly, the economic situation
began to occupy the public mind, and added new cause for unrest...
Though the entry of Bolivia into the Chaco War at first reduced 
social tension by creating nationalist fervor, Bolivia's defeat 
generated increased unrest amongst the middle class and proletariat. 
Robert Alexander has written that: "The Chaco War made the Revolution
of 1952 inevitable.
Not only did the middle and working classes begin to question
the hegemony of the oligarchy, the war also had an impact on the
countryside. The mobilization of the peasantry to fill the ranks of
the army on the front line disrupted rural life and the seigneurial
mode of domination;
In the aftermath of the Chaco War the masses 
showed signs of increasing restlessness. Many 
Indian conscripts into the Bolivian army, now 
that they had been given some of the rudiments 
of a primary education and afforded a new 
vision of their country and their position in 
it by being uprooted and forced out of the
confines of their native localities, proved
reluctant to revert to their old style of life 
once the war e n d e d .
Peasant unrest had manifested itself previously (as, for example, 
in the late nineteenth century, Indian peasant resistance to the 
expanding haciendas); however, unlike previous periods of peasant
unrest, the peasantry now possessed "potential" allies - though by no
185Ibid., p. 108.
186R0bert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 22,
^8^Pike, Spanish America, p. 63.
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means guaranteed, as evidenced by Eastern Europe - in the middle and 
proletarian classes. Following the Chaco War, the first attempts were 
made to organize the peasants, carried out by mineworkers who still 
maintained their ties with their peasant-village origins, and by 
dissident members of the middle class.
In the urban and mining centers new political parties were
formed, ranging from neo-fascist to neo-marxist (and combinations of
the two!). The two most significant parties were the Movimiento
Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) - based on middle class support and
including dissatisfied army officers - and the Partido de la Izquierda
Revolucionaria (PIR) - based on organized labor's s u p p o r t . T h e  MNR
was nationalistic, and included both neo-fascist and neo-marxist
190elements, while the PIR was marxist and radical nationalist.
The ruling bloc was under increasing political pressure from the 
middle and working classes. And yet, it succeeded in forming, via its 
own representative parties, temporary governing alliances with both of 
the new parties - first with the MNR, and then with the PIR. But what 
resulted, by the late 1940's, was increasing working class support for 
the MNR at the expense of the PIR, while the MNR "retained full support 
of its urban middle-class elements.**191 Furthermore, during the same 
period of the nineteen forties, the MNR was active in the countryside
188Huizer, Peasant Rebellion, pp. 49-50; and Dwight B. Heath, 
"Bolivia: Peasant Syndicates among the Aymara," in Henry A. Landsberger, 
ed., Latin American Peasant Movements (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1969), pp. 175-177.
^®9See Klein, Parties and Political Change, chapter 11, "The 
Rise of the National Left," pp. 334-368.
ISOxbid., pp. 338-341. 191Ibid., p. 383.
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mobilizing the peasantry.
Thus, the MNR was becoming "a newly amalgamated party of middle- 
class and worker elements," and although dominated by the middle class, 
the incorporation of more radical working class demands into its 
program meant the MNR "represented a new type of radical populist 
movement. In 1952, the MNR staged what has become known as the 
Bolivian Revolution. Supported by the middle class and the proletariat 
the MNR took control of the government, and "to begin with...the
lgA
entire tin industry was nationalized in October 1952." But what 
about the countryside?
Much more rapid and much less violent than the Mexican Revolution, 
the Bolivian Revolution had not mobilized the peasantry, and although 
the new MNR regime made some pronouncements about land reform, little 
serious action was taken to implement it. However, the rural organi­
zing which had already taken place, and which was renewed at a more 
rapid pace now that the urban revolution had been effected, roused the 
peasantry to implement its own land reform through land invasions! In 
order to harness the peasant movement somewhat, and identify itself 
with the reforms begun by the peasantry, the MNR government rapidly 
approved a land reform law and gave full support to the peasants' 
a c t i o n s . T h u s ,  the latifundia were expropriated and seigneurialism
192ibid., pp. 379-380; Heath, "Bolivia: Peasant Syndicates," 
pp. 173-174; and Huizer, Peasant Rebellion, pp. 51-53.
193njid., (Klein), p. 401. 194Ibid., p. 403.
•^9^See Richard W. Patch, "United States Assistance in a 
Revolutionary Setting," in Robert D. Tomasek, ed., Latin American 
Politics: Studies of the Contemporary Scene (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1970), pp. 354-363.
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was eliminated from rural Bolivia.*’®®
Xn Bolivia, as in Mexico, the populist alliance was dominated by 
elements of the bourgeoisie "in formation" and the middle class, 
though it was necessary to carry out the reforms demanded by the pro­
letariat and the peasantry (or accept what had already been set in 
motion) in order to consolidate and maintain the alliance. Frederick 
Pike has written:
In revolutionary Bolivia, as in revolutionary 
Mexico, steps were taken to facilitate the 
growth of a new capitalist elite at the same 
time as the quiescence of the masses was
assured...197
However, by the early nineteen sixties, the inherent contradic­
tions of the populist alliance - that is, meeting the demands of an 
aggressive workers' movement while, at the same time, furthering the 
development of a national bourgeoisie and national capitalism - caused 
its dissolution, and:
Rejecting its rather uneasy partnership with 
organized labor, the middle class has now aligned 
itself with the organized peasant groups in frank 
opposition to labor and the extreme left.198
And, paralleling the collapse of the populist alliance was the
196()n the Bolivian land reform, see Antonio Garc{a, "Agrarian 
Reform and Social Development in Bolivia," in Stavenhagen, ed.,
Agrarian Problems, pp. 301-346; and Heath, et al., Land Reform and 
Social Revolution in Bolivia.
197pike, Spanish America, p. 69.
198itlein, Parties and Political Change, p. 408. In a footnote 
the author states that: "The middle class was now composed of...: the 
merchants, industrialists, small miners, and a group which became 
known as...los nuevos ricos. the members of the MNR and their supporters 
who grew wealthy on the U.S. aid progranmes and the vast increase in 
the government bureaucracy.
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development of the corporate socio-political structure and political 
economy which now characterizes Bolivian society, similar to Mexican 
corporatism, except for the position of labor.
In Venezuela, a populist alliance also began to develop in the
nineteen thirties and emerged in the political party Accion Democratica 
( A D ) . U n d e r  middle class leadership, Accion Democratica forged a 
populist alliance with labor, i.e. the workers in the foreign-owned 
petroleum industry, and with the peasantry and emerging rural 
proletariat.^®*1
The 1930's was a period of crisis for the Venezuelan ruling bloc,
particularly the traditionally dominant landowning class. In addition
to the death of the dictator, Juan Vicente Gomez, under whose dictator­
ship (1908-35) the ruling bloc had prospered due to the revenues on the 
foreign-owned petroleum companies and the growing demand for export
crops produced by the Venezuelan latifundia, there was the crisis
909caused by the depression.
The commercialization of Venezuelan agriculture and the expansion 
of the latifundia had originally been accomplished by the incorporation 
of independent minifundist-peasants onto the estates in seigneurial
199gee Melvin Burke and James Malloy, "From National Populism to 
National Corporatism: The Case of Bolivia (1952-1970)," in Studies in 
Comparative International Development, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1974), 
pp. 49-73.
200gee John D. Martz, Accion Democratica: Evolution of a Modern 
Political Party in Venezuela (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1966) .
201ibid., pp. 255-286.
202pike, Spanish America, pp. 76-79; and Powell, Political 
Mobilization, pp. 18-30.
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relations of production, and, as we have seen, during the 1920's there 
also appeared capitalist estates where the peasantry was being pro- 
letarianized. However, in the late nineteen twenties, and into the 
thirties, the depression halted the growth of Venezuelan agriculture 
and many estate owners began to lose their lands. John Duncan Powell 
has written:
Regardless of whether the estate operations that 
spread under Gomez were classic latifundia or 
rudimentary enserfment of increasing numbers of 
peasants meant that they were being drawn into 
an onerous relationship with a privileged class.
When commercial agriculture began to fail in the 
1920's and continued to decline during the 1930's, 
conditions on both types of operation undoubtedly 
grew worse. Wages were lowered, working hours 
extended, housing and feeding arrangements cut to 
a minimum cost to the owner. Faced with dropping 
prices and increased carrying costs for operational 
credits, landowners adopted these and other manipu­
lative extractions to keep a desperate situation 
from getting even worse. Thus, the landowning class
attempted to pass on the impact of the failure in
commercial agriculture to the rural labor force.2®3
In the midst of the worsening situation in the countryside, there 
were reports of peasant unrest, social banditry, and even small-scale 
u p r i s i n g s . T h i s  peasant unrest did not go unharnessed politically. 
Middle class political parties, which had begun to develop during the 
last few years of the Gomez dictatorship, became more active following
his demise and Accion Democratica emerged in embryonic form. It was
formally founded in 1941.
It was in this period, and into the first half of the 1940's, 
that Accion Democratica began - successfully - to build a populist
203!bid., (Powell), p. 50. 204Ibid., pp. 54-56.
2^%lartz, Accion Democratica, pp. 17-48.
base amongst the proletariat and the peasantry. And in 1945 the party
participated in a coup with reformist elements of the military. Thus,
it gained access to state power which it held only until 1948.^®^
During those three years, AD initiated reforms characteristic of
the populist alliance it represented. It negotiated and secured 50
per cent of the returns of the foreign-owned petroleum industry with
which it funded a national development corporation to stimulate
national capitalist-industrialization. At the same time, it supported
the consolidation and expansion of the labor movement and workers'
organizations. In the countryside, AD supported the organization of
syndicates to represent the peasants in their demands against the
landowners and, at the same time, harness the peasantry's political
support for itself. Furthermore, and most significantly, AD outlined
and initiated a land reform which involved the expropriation - with
207compensation - of privately owned lands. However, in late 1948,
the oligarchy responded to the threat of reforms with a coup carried
out by conservative elements of the military, and until 1958 the labor
and peasant movements were suppressed and the first attempts at land
208reform were reversed.
And yet, the populist alliance survived a ten year, conservative 
military dictatorship and re-emerged in the late 1950's. The reaction 
in the countryside to the return of Accion Democratica to state power 
was peasant land invasions to restore the reforms which had begun ten
206Ibid., pp. 49-80; and Powell, Political Mobilization, pp.
50-64.
2°7lbid., (Martz), pp. 81-88; and (Powell), pp. 65-86.
2^®Ibid., (Martz), pp. 89-96; and (Powell), pp. 87-99.
years previously and to carry them further. The governing coalition 
led by Accion Democratica sought to regain control of the peasant move­
ment and the land reform - which it did - but first it had to accept
209the de facto reforms carried out by the peasants themselves.
After the initial reforms - often de facto recognition of the 
peasantry's efforts - between 1959 and 1961, the land reform process 
has slowed down and the peasantry has been harnessed and retained as 
a major class base of support for AD, along with much of the labor 
movement. Nevertheless, seigneurialism appears to have been seriously 
challenged as a result.
At the same time that the bourgeoisie "in formation" has consoli­
dated its hegemony by carrying out a gradual land reform program 
financed by petroleum revenues, it has also been able to expand social 
services and finance further capitalist development from the same 
source. Thus, in Venezuela too, the elimination of seigneurialism has 
been the product of a populist alliance which provided the peasantry 
with class allies, enabling it to challenge the landowning class.
Unlike Mexico and Bolivia, however, Venezuela has not been 
characterized by a change from populism to corporatism - in part due, 
perhaps, to the luxury of the petroleum revenues.
Peru and Chile represent variations on the theme of Spanish 
American populist alliances and the elimination of seigneurialism.
The Peruvian political party, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana (APRA), which was founded in the 1920's and developed into 
a populist alliance during the decade which followed, though it served
209ibid., (Powell), pp. 103-114.
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as the "classical" model for Spanish American populist parties, never
210secured state power. And yet, it has remained a significant poli­
tical element in Peru. Significantly, it has been APRA's strongest 
opponent, the Peruvian military, which has carried out the populist
211reforms advocated by, and historically associated with, APRA itself.
Beginning as a small group of radical, middle class student 
intellectuals who were driven into exile, or underground in the 1920's, 
APRA arose during a period of Indian peasant rebellion in the highlands 
(in resistance to the continuing encroachment of the latifundia upon
their lands) and attempts at organizing the agricultural proletariat
212on the coastal plantations. But a dictatorship maintained the 
oligarchical domination of Peruvian society, and revenues on foreign 
capitalist enterprise operating in the country supported it.
APRA re-emerged in Peru in 1930, during the depression, which
had a severe effect on the Peruvian economy and weakened the hegemony
213of the ruling bloc over the middle class and proletariat. In the 
next few years, APRA sought to create a populist alliance under its 
leadership, and began - quite successfully - to mobilize elements of 
both the middle class, which was increasingly disenchanted with the
210Grant Hilliker, The Politics of Reform in Peru: The APRISTA 
and Other Mass Parties of Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1971).
Julio Cotier, "Political Crisis and Military Populism in 
Peru," in Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 6, 
no. 5 (1970-71), pp. 95-118.
2^Pike, Spanish America, p. 110; and Klaren, Modernization, 
pp. 39-49.
213ibid., (Pike), p. 112. Also, on the political history of this 
period, see Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 250-281.
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ruling bloc of landowners and commercial bourgeoisie linked to foreign 
capita lists, and the proletariat, particularly the coastal plantation 
workers and industrial workers of the textile industry.2^  APRA also 
began to penetrate the Peruvian highlands, and the possibility of an 
urban-peasant alliance grew.2^
However, APRA's attempts to achieve state power through a popu­
list alliance, at first by elections and then via a violent uprising 
in northern coastal Peru, were prevented and suppressed, respectively, 
and APRA's leadership was again forced into exile, or underground.2^
The oligarchy was so opposed to APRA - and, perhaps, fear
"populist revolution" - that it even supported Communist Party
2 1 7activities amongst the workers to reduce APRA's strength.
From the late 1930's to the late 1950's, the oligarchy maintained 
its dominant position; however, the coastal-commercial bourgeoisie and 
plantation owners had become far more powerful than the seigneurial 
estate owners of the sierra and were steadily moving into the highlands. 
As has already been noted, capitalist social relations of production 
began to diffuse into the agrarian sector of the sierra.
But the proletarianization of the peasantry and continuing 
encroachment of the latifundia upon the peasantry's lands did not go
^l^lbid., (Spanish America). p. 113; Ford, Man and Land, pp. 121- 
125; Klaren, Modernization; Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial, pp. 75-77; 
and Julio Cotier and Felipe Portocarrero, "Peru: Peasant Organizations," 
in Landsberger, ed., Latin American Peasant Movements, pp. 300-311,
2^Eric j. Hobsbawm, "Peasant Land Occupations," in Past and 
Present, no. 62 (February 1974), pp. 134, 145-146.
2^Pike, The Modern History of Peru, pp. 261-268.
217Chaplin, The Peruvian Industrial, p. 77.
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unchallenged. In the early 1940's, and again in the late 1950's, APRA
was permitted to participate openly in the political process (and
during the other years had done so more subtly). Although APRA ceased
to be a "revolutionary" party it remained essentially populist and
218active in the labor movement and even amongst the peasantry. In
addition to APRA's work amongst the peasantry, there were more radical
21 9political groups becoming active in the sierra. And, similar to 
Bolivia, there was a "backwash" effect from the mining and urban 
Industrial centers. That is, the workers provided experience - and 
often leadership - in labor organization and mobilization, which they 
brought back with them to the villages.^20 (In the same way that the 
capitalist mode of production was being diffused through the rural 
highlands, so was working class organizational experience!)
The combination of the gradual proletarianization of the estate 
peasantry (which may be gradual on a regional basis, but can occur 
rather suddenly on the estate level!), and the persistent struggle 
between the Indian peasant villages and the estates, which were now 
not only losing ownership of their lands but also possession of them, 
with the peasants' growing awareness that the landowners' hegemony was
weakening, led, in the late 1950's, to strikes on the haciendas and
221land occupations by the peasants. L  Increasing in intensity and
2l8Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Political Parties (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 185-190; and Hobsbawm, "Peasant 
Land Occupations," pp. 137-138.
219fluizer, Peasant Rebellion, pp. 73-83.
220nobsbawm, "Peasant Land Occupations," pp. 144-145.
^*Tbid,, pp. 141-147; for a case study, see Giorgi Albert, "The 
Breakdown of Provincial Urban Power Structure and the Rise of Peasant 
Movements," in Sociologia Ruralis. vol. 12, no. 3-4 (1972), pp. 315-333.
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territorial extent, by the early 1960's the Peruvian sierra was exper-
222iencing what seemed to be the beginning of a peasant revolution.
However, the government utilized the military to suppress it.
And yet, Peruvian society had been changing since the nineteen
22^twenties and thirties, and the military had also. The ruling bloc,
though still composed of the landowning aristocracy and the coastal
bourgeoisie, was no longer dominated by the seigneurial landowning
clsss, but by the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie itself was experiencing
internal conflict between the commercial bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie
"in formation," composed of industrialists and developmental sectors of
the middle c l a s s . A n d  the Peruvian military, not unlike other Latin
225American militaries, was also becoming middle class:
In many respects Peru's officer corps constituted 
a microcosm of the country’s...middle sectors. By 
the 1960's, most of the officers, even generals, 
came from a middle-class background, and felt a 
sense of exclusion and frustration in their rela­
tions with the top social elite, which they began 
to refer to with increasing disdain as a plutocracy. °
Thus, though the military suppressed the growing peasant revolu­
tion, it did not seek to restore seigneurialism in the highlands. At 
the same time that it restored order in the countryside, it supported
222xn addition to Huizer, Cotier and Portocarrero, and Hobsbawm, 
see Howard Handelman, Struggle in the Andes: Peasant Political 
Mobilization in Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975).
^23gee Anibal Quijano Obregon, "Tendencies in Peruvian Develop­
ment and Class Structure," in Petras and Zeitlin, eds., Latin America, 
pp. 289-328; and Bourricaud, Power and Society.
224cotler, "Political Crisis," pp. 95-99.
225gee Jose Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Petras and 
Zeitlin, eds., Latin America, pp. 145-185.
^^Pike, Spanish America, p. 162.
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a new "populist" political party, Acci6n Popular, in attempting to 
initiate reforms, (which also served to keep APRA from gaining hold of 
state powerl). However, the populist-civilian government proved too 
inefficient and too slow to satisfy either the peasantry or the mili­
tary. 227 Peasant unrest continued to threaten, and compounded by other 
events, the military took power in 1969 and initiated the populist 
reforms which, as we have stated, were historically associated with
APRA.228 a  Peruvian sociologist, Julio Cotier, has written:
The Armed Forces saw the need to institute refor­
mist measures which would attack the country's 
archaic structure and thereby neutralize the 
emerging popular masses - which might otherwise
become an irrepressible force - while at the
same time reducing foreign dependence.
In Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela, populist political parties
- dominated by the bourgeoisie "in formation," with the middle class
- secured state power and initiated reforms, which included supporting 
the peasantry in eliminating the seigneurial latifundia. And in 
Mexico and Bolivia, populism gave way to corporatism. In Peru, the 
populist political party, APRA, never secured power and the quasi­
populist party of the early 1960's, Acci6n Popular, failed to accom­
plish anything substantial. It was the military, in a "middle-class 
military coup," which carried out the populists' reforms.230 And
227see James Petras and Robert LaPorte, Cultivating Revolution: 
The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1971), chapter 3, "Gradualism inBelaunde's Peru," 
pp. 33-124.
^^Cotler, "Political Crisis," pp. 99-101. ^ % b i d . ,  p. 102.
230gee joost Kuitenbrouwer, "The Function of Social Mobilization 
in the Process Towards a New Society in Peru," Occasional Papers no.
32 (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1973).
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similar to Mexico and Bolivia, it has pursued the development of
231national capitalism through national corporatism.
In the countryside, the military has instituted wide-scale 
reforms. The predominantly foreign-owned sugar plantations along the 
coast have been expropriated and are supposed to become workers' co­
operatives (though, thus far, they appear to have become state farms)232 
while in the sierra the latifundia have been turned over to the peasants
and lands have been restored to the Indian peasant communities, which
233are being supported in efforts to form cooperatives.
However, former landowners do not lose everything in the reform
process. They have received bonds as compensation which they have been
encouraged by the government to invest in urban-industrial enterprises,
while the peasants who receive the land are expected to pay for it over
a period of time. This has led at least one observer to write:
The peasants will be bound more closely to the 
land, and will agree to pay up because of their 
desire for security, while the hacendados turn 
themselves into industrialists.
Nevertheless, seigneurialism has been eliminated from rural Peru.
231lbid. Also, see James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism, Corpora­
tism, and Mobilization in Peru," in Frederick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, 
eds., The New Corporatism: Socio-Political Structures in the Iberian 
World (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 52-84; 
and Cotier, "Political Crisis," pp. 102-113.
232For a critical analysis of the Peruvian land reform, see Ramon 
Zald£var, "Agrarian Reform and Military Reformism in Peru," in David 
Lehmann, ed., Peasants. Landlords and Governments: Agrarian Reform in 
the Third World (New York: Holmes and Meier Publications, 1974), pp. 
25-70.
233^ major problem, which also arose in Bolivia, was conflict over 
the land between colonos, i.e. peasants on the estates, and comuneros, 
i.e. Indian peasants whose lands had been lost to the estates.
2342aldivar, "Agrarian Reform," p. 45.
200
Eric Hobsbawm has written, summing up the change in the countryside
and the role of the peasantry:
In the early 1960s the land invasions were indeed 
sufficiently overwhelming in the central highlands 
and...sufficiently serious in other parts of the 
highlands to cause the highland hacienda system to 
collapse. But unlike Marx's proletariat, the 
spontaneous force of the peasantry, though capable 
of killing landlordism, was unable to dig its grave.
It made Agrarian Reform inevitable. But it took an 
army coup, after several years of shilly-shallying, 
to bury the corpse of the highland haciendas.235
What there had been on a populist alliance in Chile prior to the 
nineteen sixties and the emergence of the Christian Democratic Party, 
was a governmental coalition known as Frente Popular (Popular Front), 
which was formed in the late 1930's.2®®
As we have seen, the Chilean ruling bloc, consisting of the 
landed aristocracy and the commercial and mining bourgeoisie (as well 
as the still limited industrial group), had formed in the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth c e n t u r i e s . A t  the same time, the capi­
talist development of the period had also created an urban middle class 
and proletariat.2®®
Although the Chilean middle class "...on the whole remained
23Q
content to serve as the guardians of the aristocracy," it was
2®5Hobsbawm, "Peasant Land Occupations," p. 152.
236see John Stevenson, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942).
2®^Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations "
^3®An interesting, though brief, analysis of Chile in this cen­
tury is, Osvaldo Sunkel, "Change and Frustration in Chile," in Claudio 
Veliz, ed., Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford
University Press, 1965), pp. 116-144.
239pijce> Spanish America, p. 95.
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represented in Chilean political life in a decidedly middle class 
political party, the Radical Party, which played an increasingly signi­
ficant role in governmental alliances in the nineteen twenties and 
thirties. Meanwhile, the proletariat was struggling to organize itself 
into labor unions, which were often linked to a variety of socialist 
political p a r t i e s . T h u s ,  the middle class and the proletariat were 
incorporated into Chilean electoral politics in separate political 
parties. The peasantry, meanwhile, remained within the framework of 
the seigneurial mode of production and domination, and though their
numbers were declining relative to the urban classes, they were an
invaluable source of votes for the landowners' candidates.
The depression of the thirties, and the Communists' willingness 
to participate in anti-Fascist alliances, led the Radical party - now 
"...made up of largely middle-sector urban interests and including many 
powerful industrialists." - to form the Popular Front with a coali­
tion of leftist-socialist parties. The Popular Front was dominated by 
the Radicals, thus, although it was a middle class and proletarian 
alliance, it resulted mostly in benefits for the middle class and the 
industrial bourgeoisie:
On the one hand, the Popular Front made consi­
derable progress in creating an industrial
infrastructure, broadening the base of social 
participation beyond a small elite, and 
increasing conscious government involvement in
240gee Alan Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), chapter 2, "History of the 
Labour Movement and its Legacy," pp. 11-41.
241petras, Politics and Social Forces, p. 262.
242p£ke> Spanish America, p. 97.
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the development process.
On the other hand, these changes tended to 
enrich the upper and middle class In status, 
wealth, and power, at the expense of the workers 
and peasants.243
The Radical-dominated Popular Front sought to stimulate indus­
trialization and established a governmental development agency (CORFO) 
which became a "partner" to private capitalist development,^^ The 
labor movement also expanded during the Popular Front years (which 
lasted, with changes in the coalition, until 1950) through 
unionization, in great part due to the expansion of industry.
In Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru this period experienced 
populist alliances which included - or seriously threatened to include 
- the peasantry, but in Chile the Popular Front, though it represented 
a further decline in the landowning class' national political power, 
did not threaten the hegemony of the landowners in the countryside.
And the bourgeoisie "in formation" became "socially and politically 
integrated into the old oligarchy" - if it was not derived directly 
from it.246
But neither did the middle class, nor proletariat pursue change
in the countryside. As Arnold Bauer explains:
By the late 1930s and into the 1940s, organized 
labor threatened to extend its influence into 
the countryside and rural workers began haltingly
243petras, Politics and Social Forces, p. 132.
244vfeaver, "Growth Theory and Chile," p. 59; and Sunkel, "Change 
and Frustration," pp. 122, 135.
^^Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement, p. 54.
246yeaverj "Growth Theory and Chile," p. 57; Pike, "Aspects of 
Class Relations," pp. 210-214; and Petras, Political and Social Forces, 
pp. 99-100, 133.
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to develop an 'exacting temperament* and push for 
better salaries and conditions. As this occurred, 
the landowners rattled the sabre of higher agri­
cultural prices. It was obvious to urban politi­
cians that if higher food prices were allowed they 
would cut into the earnings of the flourishing 
industrial sector and create political problems 
with the urban mass. Under these circumstances, 
the industrialists, the proletariat and the 
landowners struck a mutually beneficial bargain 
at the expense of the rural workers: the land­
owners agreed to accept controls on agricultural 
prices in return for a hands-off policy in the 
countryside. Rural workers were not permitted 
to organize; protests were s q u e l c h e d . 247
The countryside was not experiencing widespread unrest. The 
peasant protests were extremely limited. However, that they occurred 
at all indicated that the impact of the capitalist classes was being 
felt in the countryside. That is, both socio-culturally, through 
increased communications, and socio-economically, as the bourgeoisie 
and the middle class purchased land and proletarianization gradually 
diffused through the countryside, seigneurialism was in decline.
That neither the bourgeoisie nor the middle class, nor the 
urban proletariat, supported peasant mobilization during this period, 
as in Mexico, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela, indicates not only the 
extent of the integration of the bourgeoisie into the ruling bloc, but 
also shows that a populist alliance does not automatically involve the 
peasantry.
Thus, it appeared that the path to agrarian capitalism in Chile 
would take place on the estates, involving the proletarianization of 
the peasantry.
However, in the late 1950*s and into the early 1960's, a new,
247]jauer, Chilean Rural Society, p. 230.
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predominantly middle class, reform-oriented political party grew in 
strength. The origins of this party, the Christian Democratic, were 
in the conservative Falange of the 1930's, which had favored the crea­
tion of a corporate socio-political s t r u c t u r e . B y  the early 1950's 
the party had come to include leading elements of the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat, and involved two, potentially contradictory ideologi­
cal orientations: one corporatist and the other populist; however,
2 AQ
during the mobilization process they were compatible.
The Christian Democratic party had emerged in opposition to both 
the pattern of capitalist development being pursued by the ruling bloc 
and to the socialist challenge to capitalist development presented by 
a Marxist coalition of the Socialist and Communist parties, the Popular 
Action Front.250
As an alternative to the right and the left, the party grew 
rapidly and took office in the national elections of 1964. Its pro­
gram included the "Chileanization" of major industries (particularly 
mining), support of further industrialization, improved conditions for 
the urban poor and residents of the rapidly expanding shanty towns, 
and eventually, workers' participation in industry.25  ^ Furthermore,
the Christian Democrats promised agrarian reform: land reform and
o so
peasant organization. J
248petras, Politics and Social Forces, p. 209.
249Ibid., pp. 197-219.
250see xhomas G. Sanders, "The Christian Democrat Regime in 
Chile," in Tomasek, ed., Latin American Politics, pp. 413-431.
251Ibid.
2^2Kaufmann, The Politics of Land Reform, pp. 86-97. The
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The agrarian reform of the Christian Democratic government (1964- 
70) did initiate a land reform and dramatically increased peasant 
organization; however, the contradictions of the multi-class alliance 
and the increasingly opposed ideological orientations within the party 
(i.e. corporatist and populist) inhibited the pursuance of an aggressive 
land reform and, to a certain extent, the mobilization of the peas­
antry. 253 The turnover of landownership in rural Chile, which had been 
taking place since the late 1920's, represented purchases of land by 
the bourgeoisie "in formation" and the middle class, which were the 
dominant elements of the Christian Democratic Party. Thus, the land 
reform could not have proceeded very far without the party's challenging 
its own class base.
The estates which were expropriated were often the more backward 
and inefficiently operated ones, which were most easily challenged due 
to the developmental orientations of the Christian Democratic govern­
ment. But many landowners blocked expropriation in the courts. 
Nevertheless, the estates which were secured for the peasantry were 
organized into cooperatives, called asentamientos. whose members were 
the inquilinos of the estates. Neither the voluntarios nor the 
afuerinos (i.e. the rural proletariat) was included. Thus, the
Christian Democratic agrarian reform was meant to be more than populis- 
tic, it was also intended to improve the performance of Chilean agri­
culture which, unnecessarily, had been performing so poorly that Chile 
had become an importer of foodstuffs.
^ ^ O n  the Christian Democratic agrarian reform, see Petras and 
LaPorte, Cultivating Revolution, pp. 125-252; David Lehmann, "Agrarian 
Reform in Chile, 1965-1972: An Essay in Contradictions," in Lehmann, 
ed., Peasants, pp. 71-120; and William C. Thiesenheusen, "Agrarian 
Reform: Chile," in Peter Dorner, ed., Land Reform in Latin America: 
Issues and Cases. Land Economics Monographs no. 3 (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin, 1971), pp. 103-125.
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Christian Democratic reform was leaving the capitalist estates intact 
and converting the inquilino into a privileged peasant stratum, which 
employed the voluntaries and afuerinos, as an agricultural proletariat 
when additional labor was needed.^54
While the land reform proceeded at an inhibited pace, the mobi­
lization of the peasantry was moving rapidly. In the late nineteen 
fifties, peasant discontent increased in the countryside, due to 
declining seigneurialism and gradual proletarianization, which also 
meant a gradual, but steady, decline in living standards. It also 
meant that the totality of the landowrers' domination of the peasantry 
was diminished, and with changes in the electoral law in 1958, the 
Christian Democrats and the parties of the Popular Action Front sought 
the support of the peasantry.^ 5  The nineteen sixties was a period of 
even further and more rapid politicization and organization in the 
countryside, particularly during the years of the Christian Democratic 
regime when the political parties and the government were actively 
mobilizing the peasants.
The politicization of the countryside generated increased peasant
2 57unrest and gave rise to increasing work stoppages and land invasions.
(Lehmann), pp. 82-97.
255see Petras and Zeitlin, "Agrarian Radicalism," on peasant 
voting patterns in the 1958 and 1964 elections. And, for a case study, 
see James Petras and Hugo Zemelman Merino, Peasants in Revolt: A 
Chilean Case Study. 1965-1971 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972).
256^^611^ Politics and the Labour Movement. Appendix 1, "Rural 
Unionism," pp. 245-263; Petras and LaPorte, Cultivating Revolution, 
pp. 233-242; and Lehmann, "Agrarian Reform," pp. 79-82.
257jbid., (Petras and LaPorte), p. 233.
And growing unrest in the urban-industrial and mining centers accen­
tuated the contradictions in the Christian Democratic party. Finally, 
in the late 1960's, the party split. The populist sector of the party 
moved left to the Popular Action Front, and the more conservative and 
corporatist elements moved right to the traditionalist parties, and 
the 1970 elections produced a victory for the Popular Action Front, 
renamed Unidad Popular (Popular Unity).
The peasants as a class also divided, into the beneficiaries of 
the Christian Democratic reform and those who had yet to benefit - or 
who had been excluded from land reform altogether. With the election 
victory of Unidad Popular the peasantry pushed the land reform on 
their own through land invasions and occupations, and the government 
had to give its s u p p o r t . T h u s ,  the latifundia, both seigneurial 
and capitalist, appeared to have been eliminated in favor of peasant 
proprietorship.
After three years in power, the Unidad Popular government was
overthrown by the military, which proceeded to undo the attempts at
259socialist development which had begun. The future of the land 
reform is in jeopardy.
Significantly, in comparative perspective, there has been dis­
cussion of creating a national corporate socio-political structure,
260in order to develop and assure capitalist hegemony.
258see Peter Winn and Cristobal Kay, "Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Revolution in Allende's Chile," in Journal of Latin American Studies, 
vol. 6, no. 1 (May 1974), pp. 135-159.
259see J. Ann Zammit, ed., The Chilean Road to Socialism (Sussex: 
England and Austin: Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex and University of Texas Press, 1973).
^^See Ronald C. Newton, "Natural Corporatism and the Passing of
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In Eastern Europe, capitalist development was carried out from 
above by the already dominant mercantile class, limited industrial 
bourgeoisie, and landed aristocracy. In the 1848 Revolutions, the 
peasantry was liberated from the remnants of serfdom and servile dues; 
but the estates remained basically intact in the possession of the 
landed aristocracy. Nevertheless, seigneurialism gave way to capita­
list social relations on the estates and the peasantry was gradually 
proletarianized. When, particularly in the 1920's, the peasantry and 
the proletariat threatened the ruling bloc of the landowning aristo­
crats and the bourgeoisie, there emerged the Fascist and authoritarian 
regimes of the 1930's. Thus, in Eastern Europe, where the peasants' 
ally in the 1848 Revolutions, the bourgeoisie, had originally supported 
them in the elimination of serfdom, but was unwilling to challenge the 
aristocracy's proprietorship of the land, the elimination of 
seigneurialism meant the gradual proletarianization of the peasantry.
In Spanish America, capitalist development also began as a pro­
cess carried out from above by the ruling bloc of landowners and mer­
cantile and mining bourgeoisies in participation with foreign capita­
list enterprise, or often by enterprising foreign immigrants. Thus, 
in Spanish America, as in Eastern Europe, the bourgeoisie "in 
formation" was not the classical revolutionary class of capitalists 
described by Marx and others.
However, in Spanish America, the persistence of seigneurialism 
led to the contradictions of combined, or heterogeneous development in
Populism in Spanish America," in Pike and Stritch, eds., The New 
Corporatism, pp. 34-51.
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which capitalist and seigneurial relations co-existed. That is, 
seigneurial-dominated peasantries co-existed with rapidly emerging 
working classes, organizing into labor movements, and urban middle 
classes which provided potential allies for the peasantries to 
challenge the landowners.
The historical conjuncture of growing peasant unrest against the 
traditionally dominant landowners, generated by the continued loss of 
peasant lands and/or the proletarianization process, and the emergence 
of populist alliances composed of elements of the bourgeoisies, the 
middle and working classes, against the patterns of capitalist develop­
ment being carried out by the oligarchies enabled the populists to 
harness the peasants into their alliances and, in turn, provided the 
peasants with allies to challenge seigneurial domination and prevent 
their proletarianization by securing the lands for themselves.
Thus, it might be stated, that although - as F. Stirton Weaver 
has argued - the classical dialectic is dead, there has been a uniquely 
Spanish American dialectic in which the contradictions of combined, 
or heterogeneous, development generated populist alliances. The 
contradictions of the popular alliances appear to lead to the 
development of national corporatism as the path of capitalist 
development.
CONCLUSION
The first part of the thesis of this dissertation has been that 
the Spanish American societies have - until recently - been character­
ized by the domination of pre-capitalist ruling classes and that rural 
Spanish America has been characterized by the persistence of pre­
capitalist, predominantly seigneurial social relations of production 
and domination.
It has been shown that Spanish American seigneurialism originated 
in Iberian Spain. Originally based on feudal-seigneurial prerogatives, 
but increasingly on landownership, it was further enhanced and 
elaborated through the process of conquest and colonization.
Comparatively with Eastern Europe, it has been argued that 
commercial expansion had a conservative impact on the formation and 
development of capitalism. Although there is no denying the capital 
accumulation by the mercantile and mining bourgeoisie, their wealth 
was most often applied towards the purchase of estates and their own 
seigneurialization; which had the effect of strengthening the hegemony 
of the landowning classes and their pre-capitalist domination of the 
Spanish American societies.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the dominant 
classes of the Spanish American societies secured their independence 
from the Spanish Empire, while at the same time maintaining their 
pre-capitalist, seigneurial domination. Having established their 
independence, the Spanish American ruling classes proceeded to reduce
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the landownership of the Church and the Indian peasantry by eliminating 
,'feudally,,-entailed properties, thereby expanding their seigneurial 
domination of the peasantry. It also further strengthened the hegemony 
of the landowning classes by permitting the entry of new families of 
"bourgeois" origins to landed status.
Although the Indian peasant communities often attempted to 
resist the encroachment of the seigneurial latifundia upon their lands 
they were generally unsuccessful, while the seigneurial mode of domina­
tion on the estates immobilized that sector of the peasantry. The 
hegemony of the Spanish American ruling classes was, therefore, based 
on the monopolization of landownership and the persistence of pre­
capitalist social relations of production and domination, however 
commercially oriented the landowners might be.
The second part of the thesis presented in this study has been 
that the participation of the Spanish American societies in the 
changing and expanding world economy of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had the combined effect of strengthening seig­
neurialism at the same time that it furthered the development of 
capitalism in those societies. Thus, the Spanish American societies 
experienced the contradictions of combined, or heterogeneous, develop­
ment (i.e. the coexistent expansion of seigneurial and capitalist 
social relations of production), which, during the twentieth century 
- under the impact of the world crises - generated the populist 
(multi-class) alliances which have seriously challenged the pre­
capitalist domination of the Spanish American societies and the 
persistence of seigneurialism in rural Spanish America.
Again, comparatively with Eastern Europe, it has been shown that
the early successes of capitalist development and the cumulative 
changes in the industrialization process meant that the capitalist- 
industrialization process itself could be imported at later, more 
advanced stages, into pre-capitalist societies, and, therefore, 
capitalist development could be carried out from above with decreased 
revolutionary significance. Thus, it appeared that the transition to 
capitalist social relations in the countryside would also be carried 
out from above, on the estates, involving the proletarianization of 
the peasantry. Which, as we saw, was what occurred in the Eastern 
European societies in the nineteenth century, carried out either by 
"modernizing" landed aristocrats or bourgeois purchasers of estates.
In Spanish America, even more than in Eastern Europe, the 
development of capitalism appears to have been the product of foreign 
capitalist enterprise and foreign immigrant entrepreneurs with or 
without the active participation of the dominant classes. And the 
extractive-export character of much of the capitalist development 
meant that the Spanish American societies would, again even more than 
the East European societies, experience the contradictions of com­
bined, or heterogeneous, development, that is the coexistent expansion 
of seigneurial and capitalist social relations. And yet, even in the 
Spanish American societies, the development of capitalism began to 
diffuse gradually into some regions of the countryside, either due to 
the purchases of estates by foreign or national capitalists or the 
"embourgeoisment" of landed "aristocrats."
However, the development of capitalism also gave rise to those 
classes which "potentially" provided allies for the peasantry to 
challenge the persistent expansion of the seigneurial latifundia and
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to prevent the gradual proletarianization process which was beginning. 
And, generated by the crises of this century, in particular the impact 
of the world depression upon the export-oriented economies of the 
Spanish American societies, there were formed populist alliances in 
opposition to the ruling blocs, or oligarchies, of landowning aristo­
crats and mercantile bourgeoisies; which, though by no means guaranteed, 
harnessed the growing unrest of the peasantry for their movements at 
the same time that they provided allies to the peasantry which enabled 
them to effectively challenge the landowners and secure the land for 
themselves. Thus, seigneurialism was finally eliminated through land 
reforms which also halted the process of proletarianization of the 
peasantry from above.
Finally, the third part of the thesis of this dissertation has 
been that the underdevelopment characteristic of Spanish America and, 
in particular, rural Spanish America, has not been due to the 
supposedly non-commercial orientation of the Spanish American land­
owning classes as argued by the dualist thesis. Nor has the partici­
pation of the Spanish American societies in the world economy 
- "although," to repeat the quote of Weaver: "inter-nation transfers 
of economic surplus is useful for understanding the benefits accruing 
to the developed capitalist trading and investing nations" - been the 
cause of Spanish America's underdevelopment, as argued by the develop­
ment of underdevelopment thesis. Andre Gunder Frank has correctly 
pointed to the ahistoricity of Jacques Lambert's dualist thesis: rural 
Spanish America, although admittedly with historical and regional 
variation, has actively participated in the regional, national and 
world economies. However, while Frank is historically more accurate
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than Lambert with reference to the commercial orientation of the 
Spanish American landowners, he has incorrectly attributed the cause 
of underdevelopment to that commercial activity. Rather, it has been 
argued, the underdevelopment characteristic of the Spanish American 
societies, and, in particular, rural Spanish America, has been the 
historical product of the domination of the pre-capitalist ruling 
classes and the persistence of pre-capitalist, predominantly seig­
neurial social relations of production and domination in the country­
side, which inhibited the emergence of a national bourgeoisie and 
capitalist development.
The Spanish American populist alliances have tended to give way 
to socio-political structures and political economies which have been 
termed corporatist and, we would argue, appear to be attempts to pursue 
capitalist development and industrialization and to establish capita­
list hegemony in those societies. From this perspective, there arises 
an interesting hypothesis in the context of the work done by Barrington 
Moore on "modernization."^ Jonathan Weiner has summarized Moore's 
thesis:
Moore argues that there have been three different 
types of modernization distinguished by the 
changes in class structure that accompany develop­
ment, and by the political costs and achievements 
of each in their contribution to increasing 
freedom and rationality.
The first type Moore calls "bourgeois revolu­
tion," in which a violent revolution abolished 
the domination of the traditional landed elite 
and brought capitalist democracy to England, France 
and the United States. The second is "revolution 
from above," the process in Germany and Japan by 
which the traditional landed elite defeated popular
1-See Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy.
215
revolution and preserved its dominant position 
during industrialization, a process which cul­
minated in fascism. The third type is "peasant 
revolution," which in Russia and China saw the 
traditional elite abolished, not by a revolu­
tionary bourgeoisie, but by a revolutionary 
peasantry which cleared the way for modernization.^
That is, according to Moore, there have been three paths to the 
"modern world," culminating, respectively, in: democratic capitalism, 
fascism, and communism. Thus, the hypothesis which might be formulated 
is that Spanish America appears to present a fourth path to the 
"modern world" = the populist path culminating in corporatism.^ Of 
course, the testing of such a hypothesis requires a number of things 
which are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but at the same time 
it does indicate the limitations and/or inadequacies of this study and 
suggests further areas of research.
A principal limitation of this study has been that it has, 
perhaps, overemphasized the similarity in the historical experiences 
of the Spanish American societies, for admittedly there have been, and 
are, great differences between them; for example, the most obvious 
differences between Bolivia and Chile. Thus, we would suggest that 
future comparative research based on class analysis focus on comparing 
the Spanish American societies amongst themselves,^ which might help in 
understanding why Venezuelan society has not moved towards corporatism.
^Jonathan M. Weiner, "The Barrington Moore Thesis and Its 
Critics," Theory and Society, vol. 2 (1975), p. 301.
^Both Moore (Social Origins, p. 483) and Weiner, ("The Barrington 
Moore Thesis," p. 325) suggest comparative studies of Latin America.
^See, for example, Weaver, "Political Disintegration and 
Reconstruction in 19th Century Spanish America: The Class Basis of 
Political Change."
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Such comparative study should also be expanded to Include those 
Spanish and Latin American societies where populist alliances have 
either failed to materialize, e.g. Colombia, or have done so - but 
without mobilizing the peasantry - e.g. Argentina and Brazil.
Another area requiring further study - of both an historical and 
'more contemporary' socio-political nature - which this dissertation 
has approached, but perhaps inadequately, is the issue of "hegemony;" 
that is, the manner in which a class maintains its rule by consent, 
not force.
Historically, this refers to the hegemony of the Spanish American 
landowning classes, both with respect to the dependent peasantry and 
the mercantile and mining classes which so eagerly seigneurialized 
themselves. In addition to the politico-economic links and social 
and family ties supporting hegemony, study should also focus on the 
ideological and cultural (i.e. superstructural) aspects of Spanish 
American seigneurial domination which served to legitimize it to both 
subordinate elites and the peasant and semi-proletarian classes.
Within this area of research might be included the role of the Church 
as the major cultural institution of those societies.
Frederick Pike has recently presented a model of Spanish American 
"hegemony" in which he argues that the Spanish American societies have 
consisted historically of two cultures, i.e. a dominant and a 
subordinate culture, differentiated by their world views.® He terms
^In addition to Gramsci's own writings (Prison Notebooks), see 
Gwyn A. Williams, "The Concept of 'Egemonia' in the Thought of Antonio 
Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation," Journal of the History of Ideas, 
vol. 21, no. 4 (October-December 1960), pp. 586-599.
^See Pike, Spanish America. He does not use the term hegemony.
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the dominant culture capitalistic and paternalistic (with which we 
must dissent and argue for the seigneurial thesis) and the subordinate 
culture non-capitalist and dependent.^ Although we would argue, that 
the Spanish American societies have, perhaps, not been so much cultu­
rally dualistic as that the dominant and subordinate aspects represent 
respective class orientations within the hegemony of the dominant 
class; nevertheless, Pike's model does give rise to some interesting 
hypotheses. For example, does the subordinate culture present a 
potential for opposing and challenging the dominant culture which 
would be other than conservative, as the Spanish American societies 
become increasingly capitalist?
With respect to "more contemporary" socio-political research 
and Spanish America's movement towards corporatism, in fact, does it 
merely represent an adaptation of the traditional culture by the 
dominant classes of the Spanish American societies in their attempts 
to establish their hegemony while, at the same time, carrying out 
capitalist development? And yet, if so, what will be the results and 
contradictions of seeking to maintain - or better, "carry-over" - the 
traditional superstructure while carrying out capitalist development 
and industrialization both with respect to the proletariat and the 
peasantry?
Finally, there remains the issue of the legacy of seigneurialism 
in the countryside. A significant feature of Spanish American
7lbid., pp. 9-14.
®Ibid. And Howard J. Wiarda, Politics and Social Change in Latin 
America: The Distinct Tradition (Amherst: The University of Massachu­
setts Press, 1974).
seigneuriaiism and the agrarian structure was the differentiation and 
division of the peasantry into, for example, Indian peasant villages 
and estate serfs which (particularly in this case, as the differen­
tiation is both socio-economic and socio-cultural)^ inhibited the 
development of peasant movements. A legacy of this intra-class dif­
ferentiation and division arose during the land reform processes. In 
Bolivia, to cite one example, Antonio Garcfa has written that, in 
addition to other problems of land reform: "Neither did it foresee the 
conflicts which were to arise between communities and ex-colonos over 
the lands of one and the same hacienda."*-® Similar conflicts also 
arose in Peru and Chile.*■*■ In fact, it might be asked, to what extent 
were peasant land occupations and seizures actually pre-emptive actions 
to the threat of land invasions by another peasant group?
Beyond the land reforms, what is the legacy of seigneurialism in 
the countryside with respect to the development of capitalism and 
industry? Although the peasantry, through the populist alliances, has 
apparently eliminated the seigneurial latifundia and prevented their 
proletarianization on the estates, it is difficult to imagine that this 
has opened the path to agrarian capitalism from below - nor was that 
the peasants' goal! That is, although the latifundia has been elimi­
nated from the latifundla-minifunda complex, the minifundia remains
^In this vein, it must be repeated that insufficient attention 
has been given to the racial/ethnic element as a dimension of class 
domination.
*®Garcia, "Agrarian Reform and Social Development in Bolivia," 
p. 310.
*-*Tn Chile, the inquilinos sought to exclude the voluntarios 
and afuerinos from the benefits of the reform.
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and underdevelopment continues to characterize rural Spanish America. 
Thus, vhile the peasantry continues to support the populist cum 
corporatist regimes, those regimes have not challenged the peasantry's 
conservatism by aggressively supporting the peasantry in rural develop­
ment efforts. Rather, resources for agricultural production (not land) 
are monopolized by those capitalist estates which have remained 
intact.
Not least of all due to population growth and pressure on the 
land, proletarianization proceeds from below - which is to be expected 
from capitalist development and historically has not been a "negative" 
feature in itself. However, as we have already seen, history has pro­
duced changes in the industrialization process such that industrial 
development is not necessarily labor-absorptive.^ Therefore, rural 
proletarianization, it appears, does not represent the transfer of 
peasants to industry as an urban proletariat, but the creation of a 
sub-proletariat; whose existence as a labor-reserve would seem to mean 
lower wages for the proletariat, and, at the same time, they appear to 
be the personification of what the economist, Joan Robinson, meant by: 
"...the misery of being exploited by capitalist is nothing compared to 
the misery of not being exploited at all."^ Thus, while
•^On Mexico, see Stavenhagen, "Social Aspects of Agrarian 
Structure," pp. 247-257; and for Bolivia, see Burke and Malloy, "From 
National Populism to National Corporatism," pp. 56-60. And in Peru 
there are Peruvian-owned capitalist 'farms' which are being left 
intact, see Zaldfvar, "Agrarian Reform."
13por an interesting article which presents a dissenting view on 
the supposed impossibility of industrialization and capitalist develop­
ment, see Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization," 
New Left Review, no. 81 (September-October 1973), pp. 3-44.
^Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (London: Penguin Books, 1964),
p. 46.
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capitalist-industrialization is pursued and a capitalist-estate sector 
threatens to command the agricultural economy, the peasantry of rural 
Spanish America continues to be characterized by a "pre-capitalist" 
mode of production.
And yet, if development is to be more than economic growth via 
industrialization - which has even been implicitly assumed herein
- then the development issue itself must be reconstructed. That is, 
the question can no longer be "is^  capitalist development possible?"
- which it is, as heretofore defined - but rather, "is there not an
alternative to capitalist development which would not entail its own
extremes of domination and exploitation?" But here we arrive at the
point where historical social science ends and politics begin. And,
to repeat the words of E.H. Carr:
A historically-minded generation is one which 
looks back, not indeed for the solutions which 
cannot be found in the past, but for those 
critical insights which are necessary both to 
the understanding of its existing situation and 
to the realization of the values which it holds.
Keeping this in mind, the evidence and interpretation presented 
in this dissertation - that seigneurialism persisted and yet was 
finally overcome - affirm the proposition that 'history is a process 
of becoming' and, therefore, other modes of domination and exploitation 
can also be challenged.
l^Carr, The New Society, p. 18.
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